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Abstract 
Comprehensive economic reform in China from 1978 has introduced profound 
restructuring of its financial system, in particular the banking sector. Recent 
initiatives have focused on ownership transformation via foreign participation 
and stock listing. China's stock markets have reacted highly positively to the 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of Chinese commercial banks. As stock listing has 
been considered as an effective tool to enhance the corporate governance of the 
firms, a case study using China Construction Bank (CCB) had been conducted 
to get a more detailed understanding of in what aspects had the corporate 
governance of the listed banks been enhanced after IPO? By comparing the 
annual reports of CCB from 1999 to 2008,1 found that the bank had made 
quite profound and comprehensive changes since its IPO in 2005. In all major 
areas required by the corporate governance principles, the CCB had displayed a 
very high level of compliance although flaws in some fundamental aspects still 
existed. 
Since the end of 2007, the US credit crunch had induced turmoil in the 
global financial market that caused the collapse of several world banking giants. 
Nonetheless, Chinese commercial banks had stood apart from the rest of the 
world and achieved remarkable results. With improved corporate governance, 
we further tested whether the banks' performance had been enhance after IPO? 
Meanwhile, the influence of the financial crisis to China's financial market and 
the future reform of its banking sector had also been addressed in this thesis. 
Employing data of 14 listed Chinese banks for the period 1999 to 2008, we 
applied both Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) to test our hypotheses. Our findings suggested that stock listing 
indeed could enhance the pure technical efficiency of the banks by about 5% 
and also improve their scale economies. 
A major contribution of this thesis is that it is the first study in English to 
employ two different frontier approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of IPO 
on the efficiency of Chinese banks. It also contributes to the growing literatures 
on the corporate governance issues related to IPO and firm performances, in 
particular under the background of China. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Questions 
Along with China's comprehensive economic reform from 1978, the Chinese 
banking system has experienced tremendous structural transformations and 
fundamental changes. The banking system in China has evolved from a 
monopolistic state agent to one with more than a hundred commercial banks, 
urban cooperatives and financial institutions coexisting in the market. In the 
past, banks served as government policy lending agencies, providing funds to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and taking deposits from private and public 
savers. This was especially the case for the state-owned banks (SOBs). 
Encumbered with non-performing loans (NPLs), their profitability, 
productivity and asset quality remained quite low even after a series of banking 
reforms. Recently, the reform has focused on ownership diversification as 
reformers believed that tightened corporate governance, better budget control 
and partial privatization were ways to improve efficiency. 
Foreign acquisition and stock listing are two major strategies for partial 
privatization without completely losing state control. Starting from 1999, the 
government had injected funds or stripped-off NPLs, which together totalled 
RMB 2.62 trillion from the three largest SOBs, enabling them to qualify stock 
listing requirements and become attractive to investors. By the end of 2008, the 
NPLs/total loans ratio of the SOBs had been reduced significantly from 
36.23% in 1999 to just 2.45%. Apart from the improvement of asset quality, the 
profitability of the major Chinese commercial banks was also enhanced. 
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Despite relying heavily on interest incomes, the ratios of return on equity (ROE) 
and return on assets (ROA) of the SOBs had risen almost three times from 
2002 to 2006, reaching 10.7% and 0.6% respectively. 
With a cleaned balance sheet and enhanced income generating ability, stocks of 
the banking sector were certain to be attractive when they list on the stock 
exchanges. In October 2005, the China Construction Bank (CCB) was listed 
successfully on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). It was followed by 
the Bank of China (BOC) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) in 2006. The initial public offering (IPO) of the ICBC on both the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the HKSE was the largest IPO in the 
history of global capital market to that date. Stock market reacted highly 
positive to these IPOs, in particular from the second half of 2006. 
As stock listing has been considered as an effective tool to improve the 
corporate governance of the firms and consequently their performance, we 
would like to investigate in detail that in what aspects have the corporate 
governance practises of listed banks been improved afetr IPO. Using CCB as 
an example, a case study will be conducted. As the first listed state-owned 
commercial bank, information of CCB before and after its IPO covers a 
relatively long period, which eases our comparison and analysis. The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004 will be employed as the 
analytical prism to examine the strengths and weaknesses of bank's corporate 
governance practices. 
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Since the end of 2007, the US credit crunch has disrupted the stability of the 
world financial markets. Share prices of some of the world's banking giants, 
such as Citigroup and Royal Banks of Scotland (RBS), tumbled by more than 
95% from 2007 to January 2009. However, its influence to the Chinese 
banking sector was quite limited as Chinese banks were more conservative 
than their foreign counterparts in derivatives investment. By early 2009, 
China's three biggest SOBs had supplanted the American and European 
banking giants to become the world's largest commercial banks in market 
capitalisation, barely two years after they were listed on the HKSE and SSE. 
Facing extremely volatile financial environment in 2008, the performance of 
Chinese commercial banks outshined the rest of the world. China's banking 
industry reported RMB 583.4 billion ($85.79 billion) in after-tax profit, up 
30.6% year-on-year. All the listed banks had made impressive improvements. 
For example, the net profit of the Pudong Development Bank (PDB), China 
CITIC Bank (CITIC) and Huaxia Bank (HXB) had increased by 127.6%, 61 % 
and 46.2% respectively year-on-year. Three of China's biggest SOBs were 
among the world's five most profitable banks in 2008. With an increase in 
profits of 35.2%, ICBC's total profit of RMB 111.2 billion took the first place. 
This was followed by CCB, whose net profit grew by 34% to RMB 92.6 billion. 
Despite negatively influenced by the relatively large exposure of the foreign 
market, BOC still managed to increase its net profit by 14.4% to RMB 64.4 
billion, locking its position in the fourth place. Therefore, it raised our research 
interest of assessing whether the efficiency/performance of Chinese 
commercial banks had been improved via stock listing. 
3 
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To compare bank efficiency before and after their IPOs, we will employ both 
non-parametric approach, DEA, and the parametric approach, SFA, to examine 
the efficiency levels of 14 listed Chinese commercial banks. According to our 
best knowledge, the effect of IPO on bank efficiency has not been well studied 
in the literatures because most banks have been listed on the stock exchanges 
for a rather short period of time, not to say using two different frontier 
approaches for measurement. The use of two estimation techniques allows us 
to assess the robustness of the tested efficiency ratings and to ensure the 
correctness of policy implications generated afterwards. Apart from the effect 
of IPO, a few other research questions will also be addressed. For example, 
how efficient are the Chinese listed banks currently? Have the SOBs become 
more efficient after a series of state supports? How is the scale efficiency of the 
Chinese SOBs? What are the key determinants of bank efficiency in China? 
Finally, the influence of the US credit crunch on Chinese banking sector will 
also be analyzed. Despite limited exposure of Chinese commercial banks to the 
US mortgage backed securities, as China's financial sector becomes more 
integrated into the world economy, questions have been asked about the 
influence of the US housing crisis on the Chinese banks and the wider 
economy. In 2008, the world financial market was enmeshed in bad news. 
Some of the US biggest names were either put up for sale, bought by the US 
government, or became bankrupt. Given similarities between the US, the UK 
and the Chinese housing markets, serious concern was triggered about how an 
exposure among Chinese banks might spillover into China's financial sector? 
And with the rapid growth in the market for domestic mortgages, another 
4 
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question was whether China might also experience a similar housing crisis in 
the future? 
In summary, this thesis will explore the development of Chinese financial 
system and its influence to the wider economy in three aspects: the reform of 
the Chinese commercial banks, in particular stock listing of the SOBs and their 
current performance; the development of corporate governance of Chinese 
listed commercial banks after stock listing; and finally, the influence of the US 
credit crunch on the Chinese banking system and its wider economy. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
Including the introduction and conclusion, this thesis has eight chapters. 
Chapter 1 discusses the research background and defines the research questions. 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed review of the development of the Chinese 
commercial banks. In Chapter 3, the existing literatures about the efficiency of 
the banking systems, especially Chinese banking sector, will be critically 
reviewed. A few concepts, such as the technical efficiency of the banks and 
their scale economy will be introduced. Chapter 4 will focus on analysing the 
effect of IPO on the corporate governance improvement of the banks using 
CCB as a case study. The following Chapter 5 will discuss the theories and 
mathematical calculation of the two efficiency measurement techniques, the 
non-parametric approach, DEA, and the parametric approach, SFA. Their 
relative advantages, limitations and the special issues that need to be 
considered when the two approaches are applied to bank efficiency studies will 
be explored. 
5 
Chapter I Introduction Dan LUO 
Empirical studies include Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 defines the input and 
output variables and assesses the efficiency of Chinese listed banks using DEA 
and SFA models. Factors that influence the efficiency level of the banks and 
the consistency of measured efficiency between the two approaches are tested 
as well. Chapter 7 assesses the impact and the possible spillover effect of the 
US credit crunch on China's financial system, housing market and its wider 
economy. Chapter 8 concludes the whole thesis, clarifying the contribution to 
the literatures and suggesting future research directions. 
6 
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Chapter 2 Background Review 
China's financial sector consists of banks, non-bank financial institutions and 
stock market. Economic reform since 1978 has fundamentally changed the 
Chinese banking sector, transforming it from a mono-bank model to a system 
with multi-financial institutions. The banking sector now serves as an 
important mechanism in resource allocation and risk diversification. This 
chapter will present a detailed review of Chinese banking system reform. 
Particular attention will be paid to the reform of the SOBs, participation of 
foreign investors and the stock listing of Chinese commercial banks. In 
addition, since 2005, China started to list the SOBs on the stock exchanges 
with the goal to make them subject to increased public scrutiny. The 
performance of the banking stocks after IPO and the relationship between 
banking stock prices and the overall market index will also be discussed in this 
chapter. 
2.1 Reform of the Chinese Banking System 
In 1948, the establishment of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) represented 
the beginning of China's contemporary banking system. The Chinese financial 
system thereafter had followed a mono-bank model for about 30 years, in 
which only one bank, PBOC, carried out two roles: policy lending and 
commercial operations simultaneously. China's comprehensive economic 
reform from 1978 also led to substantial fundamental changes to the banking 
system. The key objective of the banking reform was to transfer the sector from 
a centralized, state-owned, monopolistic and policy-driven system to a 
7 
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decentralized, multi-ownership, competitive and profit-oriented system (Yao et 
al, 2007). The whole restructuring process carried afterwards could be roughly 
divided into four stages. 
The initial banking reform period of 1979-1985 saw the establishment of a 
two-tier banking system. It was believed that a more specialized banking 
system could serve SOEs better and thus increase the overall productivity. 
Under the new system, PBOC was divided into two parts. One component 
retained name of PBOC and was responsible for supervising all specialized 
banks, non-bank financial institutions and insurance companies. The other part 
focused on commercial operations and was comprised of four specialized 
SOBs, namely, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction 
Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Bank of 
China (BOC). In the planned economy, these specialized banks served as the 
lending mechanism of the government, channelling funds to SOEs and other 
agencies under state plan. Instead of penetrating and competing across regions 
and sectors, they only provided funding to SOEs within designated sectors. For 
example, the ABC was mainly responsible for financing China's agricultural 
sector. It offered wholesale and retail banking services to farmers, township 
and village enterprises, and other rural institutions. The CCB was designed to 
provide medium and long-term credit for urban large specialized construction 
projects, such as infrastructure projects and urban housing development. The 
ICBC, which was the largest bank in China in terms of total assets, total 
employees and total customers concentrated on providing services to 
commercial and industrial activities in urban areas. And finally, the BOC was 
8 
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in charge of managing foreign exchange and dealing with foreign business 
transactions. These four specialized banks established provincial and local 
branches to facilitate the residents and local enterprises to access their services. 
However, these branch operations were under the guidance and administrative 
control of the respective local authorities rather than the central banks. 
Therefore, insensitive to profitability goals, they were effectively acting as 
lending mechanisms of local governments to fulfil the regional production and 
construction plans. 
Several years after the preliminary restructuring, PBOC and the other four 
specialized banks faced substantial public criticism. Driven by policy lending, 
the SOBs were used by the state as the "soft lenders" to support highly 
inefficient and loss-making SOEs and consequently accumulated a huge 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs). There was virtually no competition 
among the banks as they were given monopoly power over different sectors. 
Such arrangement breached the nation's original goal of establishing a 
market-oriented economy and thereby, it had been argued that greater 
autonomy in decision-making of the whole banking system should be given 
(Chen et al, 2005). As an effective financial intermediation, the banks should 
act more actively in economic development and resource allocation. As a result, 
restriction that a specialized bank should serve a designated sector was 
removed in 1985. The banks could then expand their business scope and 
compete with each other freely in areas such as loans and deposits services, 
fund raising and capital allocating. However, such competition remained quite 
limited as foreign participation was almost wholly restricted and all the SOBs 
9 
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were still subjected to frequent interventions by both central and local 
authorities (Yao et al., 2007). 
The second stage of banking reform from 1985 to 1996 can be characterized as 
the founding of three policy banks, implementation of banking legislations and 
further institutional restructuring. Three new policy banks, the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China (ADBC), the China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim) were established in 1994 to 
take over the government-directed lending functions of the "Big Four". These 
banks were especially responsible for financing economic and trade 
development and state-invested projects. In particular, the ADBC supports 
agricultural development projects in rural areas; the CDB focuses on financing 
infrastructure construction and pillar industries, and the Chexim is specialized 
in funding export and import of capital goods. 
After the foundation of the three policy banks, the former four specialized 
banks were officially renamed as "commercial banks" and were expected to be 
profit-oriented rather than policy-driven. In addition, the Central Bank Law and 
the Commercial Bank Law were passed in 1995 to strengthen the authority of 
PBOC and provide a legal framework for the operation of Chinese commercial 
banks (National People's Congress, 1995). 1 Under the new regulation system, 
the PBOC was given more autonomy and a legal base to formulate policy and 
1 "Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the People r Banks of China" had been adopted 
on 18 March 1995, at the Third Session of the Eighth National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China. President Jiang Zemin signed Presidential Decree No. 46 on the 
same day, approving the implementation of the law since the date of its promulgation. "Law of 
the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks" had been adopted at the 13th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 10 May 1995. The law 
became effective on 1 July 1995. 
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supervise the financial system. Meanwhile, all other commercial banks were 
granted a certain degree of operational independence only except certain 
emergency situations. However, such separation of commercial and policy 
functions of the banks was far from complete and neat. With limited branch 
network and capital sources, service and lending activities of the "Big Four" 
could hardly be fulfilled by the policy banks. Under the additional pressure 
from the central and local government, the commercial banks continued to be 
engaged in policy lending. 
This period also saw the emergence of the two-tier banking system. Although 
still dominated by the SOBs, smaller joint-equity commercial banks (JECBs) 
started to be set up and operate nation-wide. 2 These banks often took a mixed 
ownership structure including the state, SOEs, and private enterprises or 
individuals. In 1986, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM) was 
reestablished and another two banks, the Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB) 
and China Merchants Bank (CMB) were founded one year later. The later soon 
surpassed the ABC and became the fourth largest profit maker. In 1988, the 
Guangdong Development Bank (GDB) was established and it was listed on the 
SZSE stock exchange in 1992. The only private bank, China Minsheng Bank 
(CMINB) was established in 1996. All of its shareholders were from private 
industries and business. Meanwhile, some other JECBs, including China CITIC 
Bank (CITIC), China Everbright Bank (CEB), Huaxia Bank (HXB), Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank (PDB) and Fujian Industrial Bank (FIB) were set 
up or restructured. Thanks to their relatively independence from the central or 
2 In the literatures of Chinese banks, "joint-equity" and "joint stock" are equivalent in 
meaning. 
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local government, they were believed to have healthier asset quality, higher 
profitability and much lower NPLs compared to their state-owned counterpart. 
Since then, competition within the banking sector has intensified. 
The third stage of banking reform lasted for almost five years until China's 
admission to the WTO in 2001. Major events during this period included the 
reorganization of PBOC, restructuring of some urban cooperatives into city 
commercial banks (CCBs), the establishment of four Asset Management 
Companies (AMCs) and the first round of NPL disposal. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, some large cities consolidated their urban 
cooperatives into city commercial banks. They adopted a shareholding 
ownership structure and were restricted geographically within their own 
localities. The biggest ones in this group included Beijing Commercial Bank, 
Shanghai Commercial Bank and Shenzhen City Commercial Bank. By the end 
of 1998,88 such banks were operating in China, with total assets, deposits and 
loans outstanding of RMB 457 billion, RMB 364 billion and RMB 220 billion 
respectively (Li et al., 2001). Figure 2.1 below depicts the structure of the 
Chinese banking system by the end of 1998. 
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Figure 2.1 Structure of the Chinese banking system 
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Despite a rapid expansion of non-state banks, the four SOBs still 
overwhelmingly dominated the Chinese banking industry. The four firm 
concentration ratios of total assets, loans and deposits were 84.9%, 84.3% and 
88.5% respectively in 1998, whist their profit concentration ratio was only 
55.3% (Wong and Wong, 2001), indicating that the SOBs were large by size 
but much less profitable than the non-state banks. 
The PBOC fixed the interest rate available to different kinds of depositors, so 
banks with higher profitability and productivity cannot repay their customers 
with better than average interest. Such mechanisms effectively ruled out the 
price competition in the deposit market. With many branches operating in all 
provinces and cities, the four biggest SOBs could rapidly absorb the highest 
amount of deposits. By the end of 2000, they had about 103,000 branches 
distributed nationwide and employed more than two million employees 
(Country Profile, China, 2000). The JECBs and CCBs, however, were 
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constrained in the number of the new branches that they could set up each year 
and had to comply strictly with the PBOC quotas. Moreover, in order to 
maintain public confidence in the state banks, the Chinese central government 
had explicitly guaranteed their deposits. All these discriminated treatments 
helped the SOBs expand their territory rapidly over the whole banking sector. 
On the other hand, excessive interventions from the government also impaired 
the profitability of the SOBs. The PBOC set up mandatory credit quotas for the 
SOBs to control their lending activities (Mo, 1999). Not only had the credit 
ceiling been specified, but also the use of funds. Instead of making lending 
decision freely according to the assessed risk and profit, the SOBs were always 
expected to support government projects and provide funding to the enterprises 
that had "special relationships" with the government. As a result, long times of 
policy lending created large amount of NPLs to the SOBs and made their 
operations troublesome. Such problem resulted from direct lending also existed 
in JECBs and CCBs but much less severe. The degree of state interference to 
these banks was mainly depended on the relationship between the shareholders 
of the banks and the government, the closer the relationship, the more likely for 
them to engage in policy lending. For instance, Huaxia bank was privately 
owned by several big enterprises, such as Shougang Group, and its 
shareholders were distributed over the whole country. The bank was relatively 
free from both central and local intervention and thus had one of the cleanest 
balance sheets among all major Chinese commercial banks. By the end of 1999, 
the NPL ratio of Huaxia bank was only 5.7% compared with the national 
average of 17.1%; the mean ratio of the "Big Four" was as high as 36.2% 
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(Bankscope, 1999). Another JECB, the SDB, had a closer relationship with the 
local authorities and its NPL ratio reached 23.5% during the same period. 
In 1998, the PBOC abolished its credit quotas system and streamlined its 30 
provincial-level branches into regional representatives distributed in nine major 
cities, including Tianjin, Xi'an, Shanghai and Guangdong to enhance efficiency 
and reduce central control (Mo, 1999). The senior officials of these new offices 
were directly appointed by the PBOC rather than the local government. 
Meanwhile, the state started to clean up the balance sheets of the "Big Four". 
After more than 20 years of policy lending, NPLs of the state banks reached 
RMB 2.5 trillion in 1999. The ratios of NPL to total loans were as high as 45% 
and 39.5% respectively for ABC and ICBC. In order to unload the NPLs from 
the "Big Four", restore their financial health and make them more competitive, 
four AMCs were funded: Cinda Asset Management Company, China Great 
Wall Asset Management Company, Oriental Asset Management Company, and 
China Huarong Asset Management Corporation. They were paired with CCB, 
ABC, BOC and ICBC respectively. In 1999, RMB 1.4 trillion NPLs of the 
SOBs were stripped off, equivalent to almost 20% of China's GDP in the same 
year (Yao et al., 2007). Later in 2000, all domestic banks were required to 
adopt the five-category loan classification standard to control the creation of 
new NPLs. In April 2000, another banking rule, which required true names of 
depositors, took effect. It not only facilitated the tax collection but also enabled 
the establishment of personal credit record system. 
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The final step of the banking reform began with China's entry into the WTO in 
December 2001. Despite much progress had been made on reforming the 
banking system, the SOBs still faced many internal and external challenges, 
which made them less competitive than foreign banks. These included huge 
amount of NPLs and lack of operational experiences in a market-based 
economy. Compared with the foreign banks with immense financial muscles 
and international experiences, the competitive position of the Chinese banks 
was still weak. Table 2.1 compares the performance among the SOBs and three 
world-class banking groups in 2002. 
Table 2.1 Performance indicators of Chinese SOBs and world-class banks (%) 
Net income/ 
equity 
Net income 
/assets 
Net interest 
revenue/ 
assets 
Operating 
profit/ assets 
NPLs/ 
total 
loans 
Citibank 15.29 1.27 4.36 7.16 2.15 
HSBC 12.2 0.94 2.07 3.58 2.9 
CreditAgricole 7.18 0.42 1.24 2.69 4.1 
BOC 0.32 4.81 1.60 0.59 23.4 
ICBC 0.15 3.6 1.86 0.39 25.3 
CCB 0.2 4.0 2.2 0.7 15.2 
ABC 0.11 2.15 1.9 0.42 30.7 
Source: Bankscope. 
In all five key profitability and asset quality indicators, Chinese SOBs were 
greatly outperformed by the foreign banks. For example, with total assets of 
$1,098 trillion, Citibank generated more than $71 trillion operating income in 
2002 (Bankscope, 2002). The total assets of China's biggest SOB, ICBC, was 
about 52% of the Citibank's but it only generated 15% of the income as the 
Citibank's, indicating that the income generation ability of the ICBC was less 
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than one-third of the Citibank's. Hence, further reform the SOBs to improve 
their efficiency had become an urgent and important issue after WTO accession. 
Under the accession agenda, the whole Chinese banking system would be fully 
open for foreign competition by the end of 2006 (Table 2.4; Yao et al., 2007). 
Since then, the Chinese commercial banks will compete with their 
sophisticated foreign rivals on an international competitive market basis. 
Meanwhile, further reform was also expected to give the Chinese banks 
opportunities to enjoy their increasing weight in the global financial market. 
NPLs of the SOBs were further stripped off (Table 2.2). In 2003, the State 
Council set aside $45 billion from the country's foreign exchange reserves to 
help restructuring BOC and CCB into share-holding companies. A detailed 
plan which included strengthening the corporate governance, internal 
organization and risk management of the banks, applying international 
financial reporting standard, using external auditors and improving the 
legislation of the banking system had also been announced. Later in the year, 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was founded to supervise 
the banking industry more effectively and independently (Official Website of 
PBOC). 
17 
Chapter 2 Background Review Dan LUO 
Table 2.2 NPL disposal of the "Big Four" 
Year Amount of NPL Unloading or Capital Injection Assistance Mechanism 
1999 RMB 1.4 trillion of the NPLs from the "Big Four" NPLs transferred to AMCs 
$45 billion to BOC and CCB Granted by State Council to increase capital 
2003 RMB 56.9 billion NPLs of CCB NPLs written-off 
RMB 140.0 billion NPLs of BOC NPLs written-off 
RMB 128.9 billion NPLs of CCB NPLs transferred to AMCs 2004 
RMB 149.8 billion NPLs of BOC NPLs transferred to AMCs 
2005 RMB 705.0 billion NPLs of ICBC NPLs transferred to AMCs 
Source: Yao, et al., 2008. 
Transforming the SOBs into share-holding companies was not simply another 
round of recapitalization, but the first serious attempt to privatize them partially. 
It was expected that the new-shareholding banks would be no longer subject to 
government intervention, be entirely responsible for their own profits and 
losses, and be subject to the supervision and control of the shareholders rather 
than the government officials. Such a privatization strategy had also been 
proved to be successful in several developing countries, such as Argentina 
(Cull and Clarke, 1998). 
Following the similar process of two pilot banks, the state unloaded RMB 705 
billion NPLs from ICBC and injected $15 billion fresh capital to the bank in 
April 2005. After all these efforts, the NPLs ratio of the three biggest SOBs 
was reduced from 33.3% in 1999 to just below 6% by the end of 2005 (Table 
2.3). In particular, NPL ratios of the CCB and ICBC were reduced to 3.5% and 
4.5% respectively, well below the IMF requirement of 8% threshold for 
emerging economies. With a healthier balance sheet, the government pushed 
the banking reform to the final stage, partial privatization, by means of foreign 
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participation and stock listing. 
Table 2.3 NPL / total loans of three SOBs, 1999-08 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Banks ICBC 39.5 34.4 29.8 25.7 21.2 19.0 4.5 3.8 2.7 2.29 
(NPL 
Ratio BOC 37.4 27.2 27.5 22.5 16.3 5.1 9.6 4.0 3.1 2.65 
%) CCB 23.0 15.7 19.4 15.2 9.1 3.9 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.21 
Average 33.3 25.8 25.6 21.1 15.5 9.3 5.9 3.7 2.8 2.38 
Source: Yao et al., 2008, for 1999-2005; Bankscope for 2006-08. 
2.2 Foreign Investment and Participation 
The Chinese banking sector was officially opened to foreign banks in 1979 
when they were allowed to set up representative offices. However, various 
entry barriers and business restrictions, such as geographic constraints and 
entry requirements had been imposed to them (Ma, 2006). In 1982, foreign 
banks were allowed to open operational branches in special economic zones 
and such geographical restrictions were relaxed in 1994. Foreign banks were 
first permitted to do business with Chinese enterprises by offering deposit and 
loan services in local currency (RMB) in Shanghai Pudong New Zone (and 
later in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone) in 1996 based on individual licenses 
(Garcia-Herrero and Stantabarbara, 2008). In 1998, PBOC further allowed 
eight foreign banks to obtain local currency funding and later in 1999, foreign 
banks were permitted to conduct local currency business in neighbouring 
regions. 
Since China gained entry into the WTO, a new set of rules were enacted, and 
some existing regulations and laws, such as the 1995 Central Bank Law and 
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Commercial Bank Law were revised to align with international standards 
(International Financial Law Review, August 2002). Under the pledge of the 
WTO arrangement, restrictions on foreign currency business were removed 
upon accession in all parts of the country, whereas for the local currency 
business, the opening process was gradual in terms of time and locality 
(US-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, 2 February 2000). Foreign banks were 
allowed to provide local currency services to Chinese enterprises in designated 
regions since February 2004 while restrictions on the retail market were 
supposed to be removed in December 2006. In April 2007, four foreign banks, 
Citigroup, HSBC, Standard Charted and Bank of East Asia obtained approval 
from Chinese regulators and started to accept deposits in RMB from local 
residents (Areddy, 23 April 2007). 
The geographic restriction was phased out in six stages (Serrado and Sabadell, 
2003). At the beginning, foreign banks could only operate RMB business in 
four large cities, including Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. 
Geographical coverage was next expanded to Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, 
Nanjing and Wuhan in the year after accession and to another four cities in 
2003. In 2004 and 2005, six other cities were opened and finally by the end of 
2006, restriction was wholly removed (Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Schedule of the Chinese banking sector opening under WTO agreement 
Year Business Scope Geographic Coverage Cities Included 
2001 
No restriction on 
foreign currency RMB business Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and 
business in 4 large cities Dalian 
2002 RMB business to 9 cities Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing Chinese firms and Wuhan 
2003 13 cities Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu and Chongqing 
2004 16 cities Kunming, Beijing and Xiamen 
2005 20 cities Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang and Xi'an 
2006 Fully open RMB No restriction business 
Source: Serrado and Sabadell, 2003. 
Regulatory permission for foreign investors to hold minority stakes in domestic 
banks was progressed more slowly. Different from countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, which opened their banking systems by 
allowing full foreign control of local banks, China adopted a gradual approach. 
The first attempt was in 1996 when the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
bought a 1.9% stake in China Everbright Bank. This was followed by a 
purchase of 5% stake of Shanghai Commercial Bank by International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in 1998, the acquisition of 15% stake of Nanjing City 
Commercial Bank by ADB in 2001, and the purchase of 8% stake in Shanghai 
Commercial Bank by HSBC in the same year (Berger et al., 2009). However, 
as most of these foreign investors were non-for-profit international 
organizations and their shareholdings were quite limited, it was hard for them 
to generate any substantial impact on the operation of the investees. 
In 2003, the CBRC updated its guidelines to encourage foreign investment. 
Under the new rules, foreigner banks were allowed to own up to a quarter stake 
of the Chinese domestic bank, with an upper ceiling of 20% for any single 
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investor (EIU, 3 December 2003). Such policy encouraged the foreign 
investment significantly. Minority foreign investment was expected to be 
effective in diversifying central control and ownership structure of the banks 
and also enhancing their capital strength. Strategic investors shared their 
advanced management and technology expertises with the investees and 
thereby enhanced their performance. 
Examples of successful strategic foreign investment during post-WTO era 
included the Citigroup's purchase of 4.6% share of PDB and Hang Sheng Bank 
and the IFC investment of 24.98% stake of Industrial Bank. In 2004, 
Newbridge Capital bought 18% stake of SDB and this was the first time that a 
foreign shareholder took the largest and controlling stake of a Chinese 
domestic bank (Berger et al., 2009). In the same year, HSBC also finalized its 
transaction of purchasing 19.9% stake of China's fifth-largest bank, BCOM 
and secured the right to double this share when regulation permitted. 3 On 31 
December 2005, the first Chinese commercial bank born with foreign minority 
ownership (from Standard Chartered, 19.99% of shares), China Bohai Bank, 
was established (Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2005; Table 2.5). 
This partial privatization process through foreign strategic investment had also 
spread to three of the "Big Four" banks. Investment in the SOBs was 
historically deterred by the size of the investment for minority stake and 
concerns about the management, corruption and bad debt of the SOBs. On 17 
' However, after the investment, the Ministry of Finance increased its shares and reclassified 
BOCOM as a "large state-owned bank" instead of a "joint-equity bank". So the state remained 
as the largest shareholder, indicating that the Chinese government was quite cautious about foreign investment in domestic banks. 
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June 2005, Bank of America (BOA) initiated the investment of $3.0 billion for 
9% stake of CCB, marking the biggest foreign investment in the Chinese 
banking industry. The bank has also committed to spend another $500 million 
to maintain its share after the IPO of CCB in the second half of 2005 
(Financial Wire, 20 June 2005). This deal was described by the chief executive 
of BOA as paying an "entrance price" to establish a strategic partnership with 
the Chinese SOB (Wighton, 17 June 2005). According to the agreement, BOA 
would have one seat on the board of directors and have that candidate serve on 
the audit committee and nomination and compensation committee as long as 
BOA holds at least 5% of CCB's shares. In addition, BOA also agreed to 
provide approximately 50 professionals to assist the CCB in several areas, 
including risk management, corporate governance, credit cards, treasury 
services and consumer banking. This deal represented the Chinese government 
commitment of absorbing foreign investors to restructure their troublesome 
SOBs (Berger et al, 2009). Equity investment from the foreign banks was not 
the real concern of the Chinese SOBs, but the skills, technology and know-how 
the foreign banks could bring to them (McGregor, 17 June 2005). These 
intangible assets are more important for the future development of the Chinese 
commercial banks. Later in the same month, Temasek invested $2.5 billion for 
approximately 6% stake of the CCB. 
Later in September 2005, a group of investors, including RBS, Merrill Lynch, 
and Li Ka-shing, Hong Kong's richest man, announced their investment plan of 
$3.1 billion for 10% ownership of BOC. In the mean time, Singapore's 
state-run investment agency Temasek won the approval to buy a 5% stake in 
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BOC and United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) invested $0.5 billion for a 1.6% 
stake of the bank. All these foreign strategic investors were required to lock up 
their investment periods for three years. In January 2006, after ICBC finished 
financial restructuring process, it also attracted a combined investment of $3.78 
billion from Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express for a 10% stake of 
the bank. In connection with Goladman Sachs' share purchase plan, the 
investor obtained the right to nominate one director, as well as some 
information rights, anti-dilution rights, and registration rights (ICBC, 2006 
Annual Report). In addition, ICBC entered into a "strategic cooperation 
agreement" with Goldman Sachs and established "working procedures and 
process" as well as "a joint steering committee", aiming to improve the bank's 
operation in various areas including staff training, risk management, internal 
control and corporate governance. 
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Table 2.5 Foreign direct investment in Chinese commercial banks 
Year Target Name Acquirer Name Equity Investment 
2007 Qingdao CCB Intesa Sanpaolo $ 135m (19.9%) 
Rothschild $ 33m (5.0%) 
2007 Chongqing CCB Dah Sing Bank $ 89m (17%) 
2007 Dalian CCB SHK Financial $ 19m (10.0%) 
Bank of Nova Scotia and IFC $ 24m (24.9%) 
2006 CITIC BBVA $ 648m (5.0%) 
2006 Ningbo CCB OCBC $ 70.6m (12.2%) 
2005 ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express $ 3.78bi1 (8.5%) 
2005 GDB Citigroup $ 3. Obil (19.9%) 
2006 Tianjin CCB Australia and New Zealand Bank $ 110m (19.9%) 
2005 Nanchong CCB German Investment and Development Bank $ 6m (13.3%) 
2005 BOC RBS, Merrill Lynch, Li Ka-shing, $ 3.1bil (10.0%) 
UBS $ 500m (1.6%) 
ADB $ 75m (0.2%) 
Temasek $ 1.5b11(5.0%) 
2005 CCB BOA $ 2.5b11(9%) 
Temasek $ 1.46bi1(5.1%) 
2005 BOCOM HSBC $ 1.75bil (19.9%) 
2005 Bohai CCB Standard Chartered Bank $ 123m (19.9%) 
2005 Huaxia Bank Deutsche Bank $ 233m (9.9%) 
2005 Hangzhou CCB Commonwealth Bank of Australia $ 78m (19.9%) 
2005 Bank of Beijing ING and IFC $ 270m (24.9%) 
2005 CEB IFC $ 19m (4.9%) 
2004 Jinan CCB Commonwealth Bank of Australia $ 17m (11.0%) 
2004 CMINB IFC $ 23m (1.1%) 
Temasek $ 100m (4.6%) 
2004 Xi'an CCB IFC $ 20m (12.4%) 
Bank of Nova Scotia $ 20m (12.5%) 
2004 SDB Newbridge Capital Ltd. $ 150m (18.0%) 
General Electric $ 100m (7.3%) 
2004 Minsheng Bank IFC and Temasek $ 458m (6.2%) 
2004 Industrial Bank Hang Seng Bank, IFC and GIC $ 326m (24.98%) 
2002 PDB Government of Singapore Investment Co. $ 65m (5.0%) 
2002 Nanjing CCB Citigroup $ 73m (4.6%) 
IFC $ 27m (15.0%) 
2002 CEB BNP Paribas $ 84m (19.2%) 
2002 Shanghai CCB IFC $ 19m (4.9%) 
IFC, HSBC, HK Shanghai Com. Bank $ 133m (18.0%) 
Total Approximately $ 21.14billion 
Source: Ma, 2006; Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2008; 
Notes: RBS: Royal Bank of Scotland; IFC: International Finance Corporation; ING: 
International Nederlanden Groep; ADB: Asian Development Bank; BOA: Bank of America; 
CCB: City Commercial Bank. 
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2.3 Current Performance of the Chinese Banking Sector 
After a series of state interventions, the amount of NPLs of the state owned 
commercial banks decreased significantly in recent years. The NPL ratio of the 
SOBs had been reduced significantly from 36.23% in 1999 to just 2.45% by 
the end of 2008 (Table 2.6; Table 2.7). The same ratio of JECBs had also 
decreased sharply to 1.51%, indicating that most of the Chinese commercial 
banks had improved their risk management and credit control abilities. 
Table 2.6 NPLs in major Chinese commercial banks (RMB billion, %) 
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
17.8% 13.21% 8.61% 7.09% 6.17% 2.45% 
NPUTotal Loan 
2440.6 1717.6 1313.4 1254.9 12684.2 5681.8 
20.1% 15.6% 10.49% 9.22% 8.05% 2.81% 
SOBS 
1852.7 1575.1 1072.5 1053.5 11149.5 4208.2 
8.1% 5.0% 4.22% 2.81% 2.15% 1.51% 
JECBs 
197.0 142.5 147.2 116.8 860.4 736.6 
Source: CBRC 2003-2008; Bankscope, 2003 and author's calculations. 
Table 2.7 NPLs of the "Big Four", 1999-08 (RMB billion, %) 
ICBC BOC CCB ABC 
Year NPL ratio Total NPL NPL ratio Total NPL NPL ratio Total NPL NPL ratio Total NPL 
1999 39.5 958.0 37.4 605.5 23.0 281.0 45.0 680.0 
2000 34.4 831.0 27.2 409.6 15.7 218.2 33.2 493.4 
2001 29.8 792.0 27.5 436.0 19.4 291.4 42.1 693.4 
2002 25.7 759.9 22.5 408.5 15.2 268.0 36.7 701.1 
2003 21.2 720.8 16.3 351.7 9.1 193.5 30.7 695.5 
2004 19.0 703.6 5.1 109.9 3.9 87.3 26.7 692.3 
2005 4.5 210.0 9.6 195.0 3.5 86.1 23.5 740.4 
2006 3.8 137.8 4.0 98.2 3.3 94.4 23.4 735.6 
2007 2.7 111.8 3.1 88.8 2.6 85.2 23.5 818.0 
2008 2.3 104.5 2.7 87.5 2.2 83.9 4.32 134.1 
Source: Bankscope, 1999-2008. 
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After the conversion of the three biggest SOBs into joint stock companies, 
reform of ABC was also initiated. With NPL ratio of 23.5% by the end of 2007, 
ABC was believed to be worst hit by massive policy lending to country's 
impoverished rural sector (Bankscope, 2007). Moreover, the bank also had the 
largest workforce of any bank, which added to the heavy burden in organising 
the restructuring process. 4 The shareholding reform of the ABC was expected 
to be pushed forwards in a smooth and steady manner because of the nature of 
the bank's operation (Dyer et al., 2 February 2009). In the past, the ABC was 
directed to support the agricultural sector and thereby, its transformation would 
be carried out in line with the overall rural financial institution reform. In 
addition, it was also the least transparent bank among all the SOBs, so the state 
was quite cautious (Podpiera, 2006). From 2003, the restructuring of rural 
credit cooperatives (RCCs) had been implemented to provide some references 
to the following ABC reform. On 21 October 2008, the State Council finalized 
the comprehensive shareholding reform plan of the ABC and injected RMB 
130 billion ($19 billion) into the bank, reducing its NPL ratio sharply to 4.32% 
(Areddy, 24 October 2008). Following the steps of government capital 
injections, dealing with NPLs, and transforming into shareholding companies, 
the ABC has also sought strategic foreign investors. However, the collapse of 
western banking giants and cash-depletion of world financial institutions made 
such arrangement hard to realize. Further capital injection was expected and 
the bank is being prepared to list on the SSE and HKSE in the near future 
(Dyer et al., 2 February 2009). It marks the final stages of country's banking 
reform which started decades ago. 
By the end of 2008, ABC had 441,883 employees while the number of employees of CCB, 
BOC and ICBC were 298,581,249,278 and 385,609 respectively. 
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Apart from the improvement of asset quality, the profitability of major Chinese 
commercial banks has also been enhanced (Table 2.8). Despite relying heavily 
on interest incomes, ratios of ROE and ROA of SOBs had raised almost three 
times from 2002 to 2006, reaching 10.7% and 0.6% respectively (Bankscope, 
2002-06). Compared with banks in other developed nations, the ratio of 
non-interest income to asset (NIROA) of the Chinese commercial banks 
remained quite low. For instance, the average NIROA ratio of the three major 
UK banks 
-RBS, Standard Chartered and HSBC was 1.35% in 2006 while 
such ratios for the Chinese SOBs and JECBs were only 0.24% and 0.21% 
respectively (Bankscope, 2006). Therefore, the Chinese commercial banks 
would have to explore new income sources continuously to enhance their 
competitive strength and overall efficiency. 
Table 2.8 Profitability ratios of major Chinese commercial banks, 2002-06 
Visor 
ROE (%) ROA (%) IROA (%) NIROA (%) 
1 GQI 
SOBS JECBs SOBS JECBs SOBS JECBs SOBS JECBS 
2002 3.84 13.91 0.23 0.43 2.01 1.74 0.10 0.04 
2003 4.89 15.62 0.37 0.37 2.14 1.73 0.09 0.03 
2004 8.82 9.48 0.45 0.32 2.19 2.22 0.13 0.03 
2005 10.85 16.35 0.56 0.45 3.11 3.77 0.12 0.04 
2006 10.68 15.96 0.63 0.56 3.74 3.92 0.24 0.21 
Source: Bankscope 2002-2006. 
Notes: ROE: return on equity; ROA: return on assets; IROA: interest income to asset and 
NIROA: non-interest income to assets. 
With a cleaned balance sheet and enhanced income generating ability, stocks of 
the banking sector will doomed to be attractive when they list on the stock 
exchanges. Such strategy is also welcomed by the authorities because foreign 
acquisition and stock listing are the two major ways to realize quasi- or partial 
2S 
Chapter 2 Background Review Dan LUO 
privatization without completely losing state control. On 20 October 2005, 
CCB became the first SOB which listed on the stock market. It issued 26.49 
billion shares in the HKSE, raising approximately $8 billion. This was 
followed by BOC, which listed on both the HKSE and SSE simultaneously in 
May 2006, raising $11.2 billion. The last but the most important one was the 
IPO of the ICBC in October, 2006. It was regarded as a cornerstone of China's 
banking reform. The IPO of ICBC raised $21.9 billion and set a new world 
record, surpassing the $18.4 billion record set by Japan's NTT Mobile 
Communications Network Inc. in 1998 (Yao et al., 2008). This period also saw 
the listing of several JECBs (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.9 IPO of Chinese commercial banks 
Name of the Bank IPO Date Name of the Bank IPO Date 
Shenzhen Development Bank 03/04/1991 Bank of China 05/07/2006 
Pudong Development Bank 10/11/1999 ICBC 27/10/2006 
Minsheng Bank 19/12/2000 Industrial Bank 05/02/2007 
China Merchant Bank 09/04/2002 CITIC 27/04/2007 
Huaxia Bank 12/09/2003 Ningbo Bank 19/07/2007 
China Construction Bank 27/10/2005 Nanjing Bank 19/07/2007 
China Bank of Communications 23/06/2005 Beijing Bank 19/09/2007 
Stocks of the banking sector contributed greatly to the rocketing market index 
especially after the double listing of ICBC. By the end 2006, the domestic 
market value of ICBC reached $250 billion, more than 20% of the SSE 
Composite Index. Aggregated by other nine listed banks, they accounted for 
about half of the index. 
Besides the high share of market capitalization, price performance and trading 
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volume of banking stocks were also strong. Figure 2.2 depicts the share price 
movements of ICBC and two other fast growing JECBs, PDB and CMB. Share 
price of CMB increased from about RMB 15 to more than RMB 40 within a 
year whilst the share price of PDB doubled to almost RMB 50 over the same 
period. Although share prices of ICBC did not rise as much as those of the 
JECBs, it had increased more than two times since its IPO. It is worth noting 
that on 23 July 2007, ICBC's A share price reached RMB 5.75, which made it 
the world's biggest bank by market value of over $251 billion, overtaking the 
US's Citigroup. As for trading volumes on the SSE, banks were among the 
most traded stocks during 2006-2007. For instance, CCB, BOC, CMINB and 
ICBC with a total traded value of RMB 167 billion were among the top 10 
most active shares by transaction value in the A-share market, accounting for 
7% of the total market transaction values (SSE Statistic Yearbook, 2007). 
Figure 2.2 Share prices of three representative banks 
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On 25 March 2008, BOC and ICBC issued 2007 annual reports simultaneously 
and later followed by CCB. It was their first complete financial year after IPO. 
All the banks showed significant improvements by all means of performance 
measurements (Table 2.10). 
Table 2.10 Key performance highlights of CCB, BOC and ICBC in 2007 (billion, %) 
Financial Indicators CCB BOC ICBC 
Total Assets 6598 (21.1) 5996 (12.4) 8684 (15.6) 
Total Loan 3183 (13.8) 2754 (17.8) 3958 (12.0) 
Interest Income 285 (32.4) 262 (21.6) 357 (31.5) 
Profit before Tax 113 (51.5) 99 (33.2) 130 (56.1) 
Cost / Income (%) 39.4 (3.1) 38 (-8.2) 36.8 (-2.9) 
NPL /Total Loan (%) 2.6 (-20.7) 3.1 (-22.8) 2.74 (-38.3) 
Capital Adequacy (%) 12.6 (4.1) 13.3 (-2.2) 13.1 (-7.1) 
ROA(%) 1.15 (25) 1.1 (15.8) 1.01 (42.3) 
ROE (%) 18.38 (22.5) 14.2 (0.6) 16.1 (20.0) 
Source: Bankscope, CCB, ICBC and BOC, 2006,2007. 
Note: figures in the brackets represent the percentage change of 2007 to 2006 data; the 
negative sign, "-", means a decrease in 2007 compared with 2006. 
In 2007, net profit of CCB, ICBC and BOC were RMB 69.1,82.3 and 56.2 
billion respectively, representing an increase of 49.3%, 64.9% and 31.3% 
year-on-year. Such outstanding improvement was mainly attributed to the rapid 
increase of banks' fee-based service charges and commission incomes. By the 
end of 2007, China had issued 1.5 billion bank cards, growing by 32.6% on the 
same period of last year. The total included 1.41 billion debit cards and 90.26 
million credit cards, up by 30.4% and 82% respectively. Increased market 
competition after foreign entry forced Chinese commercial banks to expend 
their services into more profitable emerging areas rapidly. 
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The global credit crunch since the second half of 2007 had disrupted the 
stability of the world financial market. However, its influence on the Chinese 
banking sector was quite limited as Chinese banks were more conservative 
than their foreign counterparts in derivatives investment. The BOC was 
believed to hold the largest portion of the US Mortgage-backed Securities 
(MBS). Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, it had already settled most of its 
MBS and entire Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). 5 The remaining MBS 
balance was just $4.99 billion (RMB 36.4 billion), representing only 2.13% of 
the group's total securities investment and 0.61% of the total assets. The bank 
had provided $1.3 billion (RMB 9.5 billion) loan loss provisions to cover the 
expected losses and it was no doubt that future performance of the bank would 
remain stable (BOC Annual Report, 2007). For the other banks which engaged 
limited foreign transactions and business settlements, influence of the US 
credit crunch was less obvious. 
Facing extremely volatile business environment in 2008, the performance of 
Chinese commercial banks outshined the rest of the world. China's banking 
industry reported RMB 583.4 billion ($85.79 billion) in after-tax profit, up by 
30.6% year-on-year (Xinhua Net, 14 April 2009). All the listed banks had made 
impressive improvements. For example, compared with 2007, net profit of 
PDB, CITIC and HXB had increased by 127.6%, 61% and 46.2% respectively 
in 2008. Three of China's biggest SOBs were among the world's five most 
profitable banks in 2008 (The Banker, July 2009). Increased by 35.2%, ICBC 
5 CDO is an unregulated type of asset-back security and structured credit product. It is 
constructed from a portfolio of fixed-income assets. On 30 June 2007, the balances of BOC's 
MBS and CDO were $8.965 billion and $0.682 billion. On 31 March 2008, the balances of 
BOC's MBS and Alt-A were $4.43 billion and $2.21 billion respectively. 
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with total profit of RMB 111.2 billion took the first place (Hawser, 2009). This 
was followed by CCB whose net profit grew by 34% to RMB 92.6 billion. On 
25 March 2009, BOC disclosed that net profit of the group was up by 14.4% to 
RMB 64.4 billion, far inferior to other two SOBs due to bank's relatively larger 
exposure to foreign markets but still locked its ranking in the fourth place 
(Piggott, September 2009). 
Meanwhile, the world financial crisis reduced the stature of some world's 
banking giants, such as Citigroup and RBS, as their share prices tumbled by 
more than 95% from 2007 to January 2009. China's three largest SOBs had 
replaced the American and European giants to become the world's largest 
commercial banks in market capitalisation in early 2009 after they were listed 
on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges only two years earlier 
(Anderlini, 17 March 2009; Table 2.11). 
Table 2.11 Market value of selected world largest banks 2005-09 ($ billion) 
Banks Dec-05 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mar-09 
BOC n. a. 229.7 110.3 129.6 
ICBC n. a. 371.8 173.0 192.5 
CCB n. a. 315.1 131.0 147.7 
RBS 31.2 99.6 11.9 5.8 
HSBC 177.1 195.0 112.3 94.7 
Citigroup 265.8 147.1 38.9 13.9 
BOA 156.9 183.1 70.6 43.7 
Source: http: //finance. yahoo. com; http: //wwNv. google. com/finance; 
Note: RBS = Royal Bank of Scotland; HSBC = Shanghai and Hong Kong Bank; BOA = Bank 
of America; All the values are measured in US dollars using official foreign exchange rates at 
each of the time period. 
In 2009, continue worsening global financial crisis, sluggish capital markets 
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and interest rate adjustment had added greater downward pressure to Chinese 
banking sector. Banks needed to accelerate business innovation, adjust 
corporate structure, broaden income sources and cut expenditures to maintain 
healthy and robustness growth. In response to the current situation, government 
unveiled a series of key adjustment policies to expand domestic demand and 
promote development, which also in turn proposed great opportunities to the 
further development of banks. For instance, increased investments in 
infrastructure were especially beneficial to banks advantage business, such as 
infrastructure loans and engineering cost consultancy business. An increase in 
money supply in 2009 enabled the banks to absorb more deposits from wider 
founding sources under more favourable market conditions. In the process of 
continued globalisation, Chinese commercial banks need to further strengthen 
their risk management ability to become more resistant to the increasingly 
complicated and volatile business environment. Table 2.12 summarized the 
major events of the Chinese banking sector since its evolution. 
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2.4 US Credit Crunch and Its Influence to the Chinese Banking 
Sector 
Triggered by the US housing crisis, the year 2008 saw a sequence of adverse 
financial news around the world. Some of the largest US financial institutions, 
including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and AIG, 
were either put up for sales, bought by the US government or became bankrupt. 
Meanwhile, the prices of Chinese banking stocks also plummeted because of 
the collapse of the Chinese stock market and the world financial turmoil. 
Within 12 months to September 2008, the share prices of three biggest SOBs 
lost more than 60% of their value (Figure 2.3). In particular, share price of 
BOC dropped from RMB 7.31 per share to just RMB 2.92 per share, a level 
which was 25% lower than its IPO price. 
Nevertheless, compared with those fragile Wall Street giants making huge 
losses due to the US credit crunch, the performance of the Chinese banks was 
encouraging. Banking stocks still dominated Chinese stock market and were 
traded most actively in 2008. With total trading volume of 81 billion, ICBC, 
CMINB and CCB accounted for more than 5% of the total trading volume of 
SSE in the year. Table 2.10 summarises the importance of banking sector 
stocks in terms of issued volume, market capitalization, tradable volume and 
tradable share capitalization in 2008. In each of the measurement, banking 
stocks took at least four positions among the top ten listed banks on the SSE. 
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Table 2.13 Importance of banking stocks in the overall stock market, 2008 
(billion shares and billion RMB) 
Market weight 
Four All 
Issued Volume ICBC BOC CITIC BOCOM banks banks 
Number of shares 2510 178 27 26 
Weight (%) 16.4 11.6 1.74 1.7 
Rank 1 2 5 6 32.67 52.0 
Market ICBC BOC CMB BOCOM 
capitalization 
Market value 888 528 146 123 
Weight (%) 9.17 5.45 1.51 1.27 
Rank 2 3 7 10 17.4 49.2 
Tradable volume 
Tradable shares 
Weight (%) 
Rank 
Tradable share 
capitalization 
CMINB BOCOM ICBC CCB 
18 16 15 9 
3.7 3.3 3.12 1.88 
1 3 4 7 13.5 25.11 
CMB BOCOM CMINB PDB 
Tradable value 88 76 73 66 
Weight (%) 2.76 2.37 2.28 2.08 
Rank 4 6 7 9 11.31 25.85 
Source: SSE year statistic, 2008, http: //www sse com cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/yicb/tini/ttii j_2008. pdf 
Note: "All banks" represents the market weight of all top ten banks within each measurement; 
CMINB, with issued volume of 19 billion (1.23%), ranking 10th among banks with largest 
issued shares, BOCOM, with total market value of RMB 123 billion (1.27%), ranking 10`h 
among banks with largest market capitalization and Industrial Bank, with tradable market value 
of RMB 58 billion (1.82%), ranking 100' among banks with largest tradable market 
capitalization were not listed but were included in the sum weight of "four banks"; Market 
value was derived from the number of issued shares and the current price per share, while the 
tradable value is the value of traded-only shares at current prices. 
Starting from March 2009 after the state's implementation of a series of rescue 
schemes and the stabilization of world financial market, the stock market in 
China started to recover. Banking stocks rebounded rapidly. The share prices of 
CCB, BOC and ICBC had increased by 65%, 58% and 55% respectively from 
their lowest points between March and July 2009 (Figure 2.3). Thanks to their 
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risk-averse nature, the Chinese listed SOBs turned out to be the least affected 
by the current financial crisis among all other big banks in the world, 
outperforming their counterparts in the US and other major industrialized 
countries. This leads to an important research question of whether the 
performance of the Chinese commercial banks was improved via stock listing. 
Figure 2.3 Share prices of CCB, BOC and ICBC, July 2007-July 09 
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Source: Yahoo Finance, http: //finance. yahoo. com. 
Tough conditions in the housing market had imposed extra pressure on Chinese 
banks operation and profitability. During the past five years, home mortgages 
had grown to become an important revenue source for the banks. However, the 
banks could no longer rely on expanding mortgage lending business to boost 
profit in 2009. Worsened financial markets combined with a deteriorated 
trading environment raised the serious concern of whether China could 
decouple from the rest of the world and maintain its fast development pace and 
39 
Chapter 2 Background Review Dan LUO 
whether the US housing crisis would be replicated in China in the near future. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
Along with China's comprehensive economic reform from 1978, the Chinese 
banking system had experienced substantial transformation of the ownership 
structural and fundamental change in operations. It had evolved from a 
monopolistic state agent to one with more than a hundred commercial banks, 
urban cooperatives and financial institutions coexisting in the market. After a 
series of reforms, the profitability, asset quality and productivity of the banks 
had been enhanced significantly. In October 2005, the CCB was listed on 
HKSE successfully and it was followed by the BOC and ICBC in 2006. The 
market reacted positively to these TPOs, in particular from the second half of 
2006. As stock listing has been widely argued as an effective tool to improve 
the corporate governance of the firms, the impact of IPO on Chinese banks' 
corporate governance practice will therefore be comprehensively analysed. 
Nevertheless, triggered by the US credit crunch, both the Chinese stock and 
housing markets were hit badly. The prices of Chinese banking stocks 
plummeted, despite their profitability. Compared with the huge losses of the 
Wall Street giants, the Chinese listed SOBs turned out to be the least affected 
by the 2007-2009 world financial crisis. Therefore, it raised our research 
interest of assessing whether the efficiency of Chinese commercial banks had 
been improved via stock listing. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
The basic concept of "efficiency" could be explained as the ratio of the output 
(goods and services) to input resources under certain conditions. In the banking 
environment, the overall banking efficiency is usually divided into two 
components, scale and scope economies on one hand and cost efficiency on the 
other. And the latter could be further decomposed into technical and allocative 
efficiency. This section will review past bank efficiency literatures according to 
the type of efficiency been studied. In addition, I will also discuss the literature 
about Chinese stock and housing markets. 
3.1 Scale and Scope Economies of the Banking Industry 
Bank efficiency studies have grown since the late 1980s in parallel with the 
improved bank technologies and regulatory policies. Most of the early studies 
were focused on scale and scope economies (Yao et al, 2007). Economy of 
scale relates to firm size, and can be realized when the average costs decline as 
output rises. The bank can be said to have scale efficiency6 when it operates in 
the range of constant returns to scale (CRS). Scope economy deals with joint 
production. It appears when two or more products or services are produced at a 
lower cost than when produced separately. These two types of economies were 
widely used by the banking industry to justify mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) and product mix changes. 
6 The term "scale efficiency" and "scale economy" can be used interchangeable. 
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3.1.1 Scale Economies 
The earliest bank efficiency studies applied basic methods such as ratio and 
Tabular analysis to investigate the variations between bank costs and size 
(Alhadeff, 1954). They established the existence of scale economies in banking, 
but the choice of variables compromised the robustness of their conclusions 
(Benston, 1972). More comprehensive models, which took into account many 
factors that affected costs other than bank size, found that banks with larger 
accounts and lower cost per dollar were more efficient (Scheiger and McGee, 
1961). However, the models simply related costs to dollars of output, which 
neglected the effect of differences in the number and activities of the deposit 
accounts. 7 
Later studies of Benston (1965) and Betl and Murphy (1968) also confirmed 
the positive relationship between scale economy and size of the bank. They 
applied multiple regression models to estimate the direct and indirect operating 
costs of individual banking services and concluded that a doubling in the size 
of a bank would lead to a 5-8% reduction in average costs, ceteris paribus. 
Unfortunately, their conclusions were challenged by four issues. First and for 
most, the assumption that banks would produce one output with the same 
inputs and technology was impractical because the products and services 
provided by the banks were quite diversified. Secondly, most of the early 
samples were composed primarily of small banks and thus underestimated the 
industry average. Thirdly, separated cost functions were applied for individual 
bank business and consequently neglected the effect of inter-product cost 
Such treatment assumes that the wholesaler is more efficient than a retailer because his costs 
per dollar of sales are lower. 
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complementarities in assessing the scale economies of the multi-product banks 
(Adar et at., 1975; Osborne, 1982). Finally, no distinction between scale 
economy at the branch or the firm level led to misleading results. Later 
researches found that even though scale economies might exist at the branch 
level, these could disappear when the whole bank was under consideration 
(Benston et al., 1982; Beger et al., 1987; Beger and Humphery, 1991). 
After addressing aforementioned issues, the recent literatures reached a 
relatively consensus view that in the US, the average cost curve of the banks 
was flat U-shape with medium-sized banks more efficient than either large or 
small banks (Humphrey, 1990). Only the small or medium banks were found to 
have the potential of benefiting from scale economies and their gain was quite 
small, less than 5% (Mester, 1987; Humphery, 1990; Berger et al, 1993). 
Studies of European banks reported similar results (Cavallo and Rossi, 2001; 
Zardkoohi and Kolaris, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the identification of the scale-efficient point, the bottom of the 
U-curve, was difficult. For the US studies, when the sample was confined to 
banks with $100 million to $1 billion in assets, the cost minimisation point was 
identified somewhere between $75 and $300 million (Berger et al., 1993; 
Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). Whereas Berger and Humphrey (1991) argued that 
even when the banks of all size were included, the peak of the scale efficiency 
was likely to present at $100 million and decline monotonically thereafter for 
larger banks. Researches outside the US found mixed results. For the Spanish 
banks, the scale efficiency point was found to be $100 million while for the 
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French banks the threshold was $300 million in assets (Altunbas and Molyneux, 
1996). However, all these findings needed to be interpreted with cautious 
because few big banks were included. With different product mix and more 
sophisticated technologies, the larger institutions might have different types of 
cost distribution, which might confuse the measurement of their scale economy 
(Berger et al., 1993). 
Several researchers since the 1990 included large US banks in their studies 
(Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990; Evanoff and Israilevich, 1990, Hunter et at., 
1990; Noulas et al., 1990; Berger et at., 1993; Saunders and Walter, 1994; 
Hunter, 1995; Jagtiani et al., 1995; Jagtiani and Khanthavit 1996; Miller and 
Noulas, 1996; Rogers, 1998). They found that when the sample was restricted 
to banks with more than $1 billion in assets, scale efficiency could increase 
substantially to $2 to $10 billion. Some other cross-country studies were also 
published during the same period (Allen and Rai, 1996; Sheldon, 1999). A 
study of 1783 large European commercial and saving banks concluded that the 
optimal scale was in the range of $0.5 to $1.5 billion (Sheldon, 1999) and 
banks that provided a variety of financial products performed better than the 
banks offering selected financial services (Allen and Rai, 1996). 
When banks of different size were considered in the model, results were 
different, which raised concerns that some limitations might exist in the 
estimated cost functions. McAllister and McManus (1993) suggested that the 
commonly used Translog cost function could be misspecified when the product 
mix is too complicated, and this was especially the case for large banks. 
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Moreover, the scale economy calculated based on all sample banks was also 
inappropriate because such estimation effectively mixed the scale 
diseconomies8 and cost inefficiencies together. The scale economy should be 
applied on the technical efficient banks only. 
Meanwhile, other studies argued that no matter what kind of estimation 
approaches were applied or whether the off-frontier banks were excluded, scale 
economies were more helpful to smaller banks (Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; 
McAllister and McManus, 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Bauer et al., 
1993; Mester, 1993). Despite differences in the scale-efficient point, the fact 
that almost all these estimated points were well below the size of the largest US 
banks clearly indicated that no significant overall scale economies had been 
gained through continued bank M&As (Berger and Humphery, 1993). Over 
expansion led to scale diseconomies eventually. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) defended their findings by including another 
factor, risk, into the calculation. As a financial intermediation, banks needed 
capital which was regarded as the most expensive source of funding to shield 
creditors from risks in banks' asset portfolio. The requirement for such input 
was affected by the degree of portfolio diversification. After accounting for 
financial return to scale, substantial scale inefficiencies were found for smaller 
banks. Full-scale efficiency was realized by banks with $500 million in assets, 
and approximately constant average cost thereafter up to $10 billion in assets, 
which was also the upper limit of their sample. Large banks that operated 
e The term "scale diseconomy" is opposite to "scale economy" and it can be caused by 
insufficient incentive, bureaucracy effects, spreading specialized resources too thin and conflict 
of interest (Besanko et al., 2000). 
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across wider geographical regions with diversified borrowers could fund with 
less financial capital input and were more likely to achieve scale economies. 
Altering the path from assessing scale economy by calculating cost incurred, 
some studies were conducted from the revenue or the profit side (Pulley et al., 
1993; Berger et al., 1993). They generally agreed the existence of scale 
economies but argued that such positive effect could disappear when the size of 
the bank was too big. Instead of cutting costs, it was easier for large banks to 
realize scale economy via increasing revenue. 
3.1.2 Scope Economies 
The scope economy comes from lower costs achieved through joint production. 
Berger et at. (1987) summarized the potential benefits of joint-production for 
commercial banks in three areas. Firstly, "spreading fixed costs", as long as 
excess capacity exists, fixed costs like data processing, office construction and 
maintenance could be spread over the expanded product mix. Secondly, 
"information economies" which could also be illustrated as cost 
complementarities. For example, the payment flow information generated from 
deposit services could be used to assess the credibility of customers and 
monitor loans to the same customer. And finally, "reducing risks and customer 
costs", joint production enables banks to realise asset diversification and 
thereby reduce their risk exposure. Through providing multi-services, such as 
deposits, loans and other financial services, to the customers jointly, costs due 
to transportation and inter-account transfers can then be saved. 
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However, empirical researches showed a complex picture. While studies of 
Gilligan et al. (1984), Gilligan and Smirlock (1984), Murray and White (1983) 
and Edirisuriya and Brien (2001) identified significant cost complementarities 
across the deposit, loan and investment activities of the banks, evidence from 
other studies were less clear (Lawrence and Shay, 1986; Kim, 1985; Mester, 
1987; Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996). In the European banking market, scope 
economies were found to be realized by banks with different size in asset 
(Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996; Steinherr and Huveneers, 1992; Dietsch, 1993). 
For example, in Germany, economies of scope were found for large banks with 
more than $1 billion in asset whereas such positive effects for the French banks 
was found to exist with an asset range from as low as $100 million to $5 
billion. 
A later study of Berger et al. (1993) argued that such inconsistent measured 
scope economy was caused by model misspecification. It was hard to identify 
all the product complementarities of the banks and even if they were identified, 
the measurement of a simple Translog function might not be appropriate. In 
addition, similar to the scale economy studies, scope economy was also 
estimated based on the whole sample observations, rather than purely focusing 
on those cost efficient observations. Consequently, tested result was virtually a 
reflection of combined influence of scale and scope diseconomies and cost 
inefficiencies (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Mester, 1993). 
Some other studies assessed the scope economy of the banks from revenue 
generation or profitability (Pulley et at., 1993; Berger et at., 1993; Vander 
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Vennet, 1999; Bos and Kolari, 2005). Nevertheless, results were still mixed. 
Berger et al. (1993) proposed a new concept of "Optimal Scope Economies" in 
their US banks analysis and concluded that although joint production was 
better for most banks, circumstances under which specialization were optimal 
still existed. lt seemed that in the whole industry, room for both large and small, 
and supermarket and boutique banks was coexistent. 
3.2 Cost Efficiency Studies 
3.2.1 Efficiency Concepts 
While scale and scope efficiencies had been extensively studied, relatively little 
attention had been paid to what appears to be a much more important source of 
efficiency differences, cost efficiency. Cost efficiency, also known as economic 
or overall efficiency, refers to the deviations from the cost frontier, where the 
output bundle is produced at the minimum cost for given input prices. It is 
different from the previous two forms of economies because it takes the output 
package as given, whereas the scale and scope economies estimate the cost 
minimization scale and output mix, assuming that the firms are on the efficient 
frontier already. 
The overall cost efficiency can be further divided into two components, 
technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). The former one refers 
to the optimal utilization of all available resources either by producing 
maximum output for a given input mix or by using minimum inputs to produce 
a given output, while the latter one refers to the ability to achieve the optimal 
combination of inputs and outputs facing fixed prices (Lovell, 1993; Yao et al., 
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2007). Therefore when input prices are given, a technically efficient unit is not 
necessarily cost efficient as the mix of inputs can be quite costly. Figure 3.1 
depicts the relationships among the overall efficiency, the technical efficiency 
and the allocative efficiency. 
Figure 3.1 Technical, al locative and overall efficiency 
Xz 
0 
A 
Source: Cooper et al., 2006. 
Two inputs, X, and X2, are used to produce a single output. The space above 
the piece-wise linear curve ABCD and its vertical and horizontal extensions 
contains all feasible levels of input mix to secure a unit of output. The curve 
ABCD is the locus of technical efficient input levels because on that curve 
lowering one input level would require the raising of the other. The cost line is 
labelled PC, tangential to ABCD at C. Thus the point C has the combination of 
input levels which can deliver a unit of output at the lowest aggregate cost 
feasible. If unit R were to become technically efficient, it would operate at Q. 
OQ/OR is therefore the technical input efficiency. As the aggregate cost of the 
inputs at Q can be lowered to P, the allocative efficiency of unit R is OP/OQ 
and the overall efficiency can then be calculated as OP/OR. 
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However, the above equation is only appropriate when constant return to scale 
holds. Under various return to scale (VRS) assumption, technical efficiency 
can be further decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale 
efficiency (SE) and (E3.1) is then transformed into: 
CE=AE * SE * TE (E3.2) 
That is, cost efficiency (CE) or the overall efficiency is a product of allocative 
efficiency (AE), scale efficiency (SE) and pure technical efficiency (PTE). 
3.2.2 Approaches of Cost Efficiency Measurement 
Five approaches are widely used to study cost efficiency, stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA), distribution-free approach (DFA), thick frontier approach 
(TFA), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH). 
According to the different assumptions imposed on the sample data in areas 
like the functional form of the best-practice frontier, the treatment of the error 
terms, and the distributions assumed for inefficiency and random errors, the 
former three approaches are classified as parametric, while the latter two 
belongs to the non-parametric group. All these frontier methods are better than 
the ratio analysis because the estimated efficiency ratings and the ranking of 
the firms are more comprehensive and robust. 
SFA, also referred to as the econometric frontier approach (EFA), was 
independently developed by Aigner et al. and Meeusen and Broeck in 1977. It 
pre-specifies a functional form for estimation and proposes a composed error 
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term, which comprises the random error and inefficiency. The random error is 
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, whereas the inefficiency 
term follows an asymmetric distribution, usually half-normal, since it cannot to 
be negative (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Timme and Yang, 1991). However, such 
restrictions limited the inefficiency distribution and consequently 
inappropriately forced the estimated efficiency scores to cluster towards unity. 
DFA has been introduced to relax the strong assumptions imposed on the 
distributions of inefficiencies. It assumes that the efficiency of each firm is 
stable over time and the mean random error tends to average out to zero over 
time. Such a measure makes it possible for the inefficiencies to follow almost 
any distribution, even the one that is fairly close to symmetric as long as it is 
non-negative. The third parametric approach, TFA, also predetermines a 
functional form for estimation. Nevertheless, it assumes that the random error 
is represented by the deviations from the predicted performance values within 
the highest and lowest performance quartiles of the observations, while the 
deviations in predicted performance between the highest and lowest quartiles 
represent inefficiencies. Instead of providing efficiency measurement for 
individual firms, TFA assesses the overall efficiency level of the whole sample. 
Compared with the parametric approaches, the non-parametric methods have 
fewer restrictions on the frontier functional forms. The production frontier of 
DEA is created based on observations within the sample and it assumes that no 
random fluctuations exist. All the deviations from the estimated frontier are 
interpreted as inefficiencies (Rangan et al., 1988). The other method, FDH is 
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virtually a special case of DEA. It supposes that points on lines connecting the 
DEA vertices are not included in the frontier and thereby its production 
possibility set is only composed with the DEA vertices and points interior to 
them. 
The debate over which approach offers a better efficiency measurement 
persists (Bauer at al. 1993; Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Beger and Mester, 1997; 
Resti, 1997; Eisenbeis et al., 1999; Weill, 2004). Unavoidable limitations are 
associated with whichever approach is chosen. On one hand, parametric 
approaches impose particular functional forms to pre-specify the shape of the 
frontier. However, when it has been misspecified, measured efficiency can be 
confounded with specification errors. On the other hand, non-parametric 
approaches allow the measured efficiencies to vary over time and have no prior 
assumptions on the functional forms. However, the exclusion of random error 
from estimation is inappropriate. If the errors do exist, the calculated efficiency 
scores would be mixed with these random effects. In addition, DEA suffers 
another serious drawback, self-identifiers and near-self-identifiers (Bauer et al., 
1998). A firm can be recognised as fully efficient not because it dominates 
other firms in the sample, but simply because none of the other firms or their 
linear combinations is comparable. 
Consistent with most of the prior literature, both SFA and DEA methods will be 
applied in this study. 
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3.2.3 Literatures of the Cost Efficiency Study 
Despite the concept of cost efficiency dating from the 1960s (Leibenstein, 
1966), it was not widely applied to analysis of financial institutions until the 
late 1980s. Instead of spending efforts to realize some optimal level of scale 
and scope economies, the study recognised banks could improve their cost 
efficiency more easily by simply reducing frontier inefficiencies (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). Later literatures supported this conclusion and confirmed 
that cost efficiency differences across banks were actually larger and 
dominated scale and scope economies. It accounted for about 20% of the banks 
costs, while the other two diseconomies only took a jointly 5% of the total 
costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Hunter and Timme, 1986,1991). 
Summarizing the previous frontier efficiency studies, average efficiency scores 
of 88-94% for the US banks, about 85% for the developed economies, 76-82% 
for the EU banks and around 68% for the emerging markets were usually 
identified (Fu and Heffernan, 2007). In summary, these studies were focused 
on three aspects: the comparison of ownership structure (Weill, 2003; Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu, 1998; Taci and Zampieri, 1998; Opiela, 2000; Hasan and Marton, 
2003); the effects of mergers and acquisitions (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; 
Rhoads, 1993; Shaffer, 1993), and the influence of financial liberalization and 
deregulation (Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Chen, 2001; Claessens et al, 2001; Hao 
et al., 2001). 
For the ownership-performance of banks, privatization was considered to be an 
effective way to improve corporate governance, increase bank competition and 
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to realize an optimal allocation of scarce financial resources. One specific form 
of such private ownership, foreign participation was particularly welcomed 
because it had the merit of private ownership and other advantages, such as 
diffusion of their know-how in the host organization. In addition, it was hard 
for the local managers to build up any close relationship with foreign 
shareholders and thereby a healthy environment for corporate control could be 
constructed. However, findings from previous empirical studies were not fully 
in favour of private ownership and foreign control. 
Researches focusing on transition countries had confirmed a positive 
relationship between private ownership and efficiency improvement in Poland, 
Czech Republic, Turkey, Greece and Hungarian (Taci and Zampieri, 1998; 
Opiela, 2000; Jackson and Fethi, 2000; Noulas; 2001; Isik and Hassan, 2002; 
Weill, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003). The majority of the foreign banks 
performed most efficiently, followed by domestic private-owned banks while 
SOBs were the least efficient (Fries and Taci, 2005). A higher percentage of 
foreign ownership was normally associated with higher efficiency (Hasan and 
Marton, 2003). However, when profit and cost efficiency were considered 
separately, the results were mixed. A study of 12 Central and Eastern Europe 
transition economies concluded that foreign banks were more cost efficient but 
less profit efficient than either domestic private or SOBs (Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007). A similar finding was reached for a study of Polish banks 
(Nikiel and Opiela, 2002). Another study employing 28 developing nations 
from various regions found that foreign banks were most profit efficient, 
followed by domestic private banks and SOBs, whereas in terms of cost 
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efficiency, private banks were among the best performers (Berger et at., 2004). 
Employing data for Pakistani banks, the study of Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy 
(2005) confirmed the dominated position of foreign banks in profit efficiency. 
Nevertheless, all banks in their sample were found to have similar cost 
efficiencies regardless of ownership structures. 
Researches carried out using data for developed European countries and the US 
showed contrary results (Tulkens, 1993; DeYong and Nolle, 1996; Mahajan et 
al. 1996; Chang et al., 1998; Berger et at., 2000; Altunbas and Molyneux, 2001; 
Borovicka, 2007). Little evidence was found in favor of an efficiency 
difference for foreign ownership irrespective of which approach was applied 
and the kind of efficiency, either profit or cost efficiency that was measured. In 
a study of the Indian banking sector, though foreign banks were found to be 
somewhat more efficient than domestic banks held by private sector investors, 
but both of them were poorer performers compared with domestic banks held 
by the government (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997). 
Inconsistent evidence in support of foreign ownership could be explained as 
the excessive cost incurred when foreign banks combined their own 
management pattern with local banks or due to their inability to integrate into 
the local markets. Distinguishing the efficiency of banks simply by their 
ownership structure was not appropriate (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Bonin 
et al., 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005). Newly established banks were found to be 
more efficient than either old privatized banks or old state banks (Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu, 1998). Bonin et al. (2005) summarised the impact of ownership 
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structure more objectively in their study of 225 banks across II countries. They 
argued that privatization by itself was insufficient to enhance bank efficiency 
as SOBs were not necessarily less efficient than domestic private banks. 
Foreign strategic participation was the vital additive that helped the banks 
enhance their performance, confirmed in another study of 15 East European 
countries (Fries and Taci, 2005). In general, a higher percentage of foreign 
(domestic) ownership in privatized banks was associated with a better (worse) 
performance. 
M&A is another route by which bank efficiency can be raised. The M&A wave 
among the US banks in 1980s and its subsequent effect of sweeping 
international mergers over the European and other continents was expected to 
eliminate duplicate investments and improve cost efficiency of the banks. 
Meanwhile, consolidation enabled the banks to expand their operation to other 
business areas and geographical regions to generate more revenues. 
Focusing on the US banks, earlier studies based on the 1980s data identified 
little improvement, around 5% after consolidation (Berger and Humphrey, 
1992; Peristiani, 1997; Rhoades, 1993) while later studies employing 1990s 
data showed a more positive effect, greater than 10% (Akhavein, et al., 1997; 
Berger and Mester, 1999). When the mergers happened among relatively large 
institutions with substantial market overlap, objectives such as cost cutting 
could be realized fairly quickly (Rhoades, 1998). However, if the banks in a 
merger deal had roughly equal size, same efficiency gains were more difficult 
to be achieved due to policy intransigence or capacity limitations (DeYoung, 
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1997). Instead of assessing the effects of M&A that had happened in the past, 
Shaffer (1993) estimated the efficiency variation after M&A from the pairing 
of 210 banks randomly. Their results showed that the potential efficiency gains 
or losses could be considerable. When the banks in the most efficient quartile 
acquired other banks, the predicted cost savings could be as high as 21 %, while 
if banks in the least efficient quartile spread their inefficiencies to other banks 
through mergers, the efficiency losses could also reach 21%. Therefore, the 
management should examine the performance of the acquiring banks carefully 
before merger. 
Results outside the US were mixed. Efficiency outcomes could be heavily 
influenced by the characteristics of the merged banks and the economic 
environment of the country during examination period (Vander Vennet, 1996; 
Lin, 2005; Resti, 1998; Avkiran, 1999; Drake and Hall, 2003). For example, 
Avkiran (1999) study of the Australian banks during the period 1986 to 1995 
observed that only the mergers accomplished before 1991 presented positive 
effects whereas serious bad debt problem deteriorated the post-merger 
performance of the banks afterwards. A more recent study of Drake and Hall 
(2003) also cast strong doubts on the commercial logic of the M&As among 
Japanese banks. Their analysis suggested that large banks in Japan were 
already too big to realize and further efficiency gains through M&A. For the 
smaller banks, despite clear evidence of improvement in scale economy, cost 
efficiency tended to be damaged as soon as the size reached the threshold of 
medium level (about JPY 8291 billion). Hence, mergers needed to be planned 
and managed cautiously to ensure that any cost savings from scale economy 
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were not counteracted by worsened cost efficiency. 
Efficiency studies of financial liberalization and deregulation generally 
confirmed obvious positive effects, as high as 25% in Canhoto and Dermine's 
study of Portugal banks during the deregulation period of 1990 to 1995 (Berg 
et at., 1992; Zaim, 1995; Chen, 2001; Canhoto and Dermine, 2003; Girardone 
et al., 2004; Sturm and Williams, 2004). It was consistent with the expectations 
that a more competitive system would lead to efficiency improvement as banks 
strived to cut costs and increase profitability. Large banks and smaller banks 
respond differently to deregulation to achieve efficiency gains (Humphrey and 
Pulley, 1997). The former adjusted deposit and loan output prices and use of 
labor and capital inputs actively to minimize the negative impact of 
deregulation while the latter were more likely to rely on an improved business 
environment. 
From 2002, European banking system had experienced a fundamental 
restructuring process. Extensive integration and EU legislative harmonization 
were expected to bring in more competitions among banks and consequently 
force them to improve performance. However, the effects were less clear 
(Grifell and Lovell 1996; Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Casu and Philip, 2003; Caus 
and Girardone, 2004). Casu and Philip examined five major EU developed 
nations over the period 1993 to 1997, immediately following the completion of 
the Single Market Programme in 1992. With the exception of Italy, only 
slightly efficiency improvement of sample banking systems had been identified 
and country-specific factors were found to be more important in determining 
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the efficiency levels. The later study of Caus and Girardone (2004) argued that 
even such little improvement was not caused by EU deregulation but mainly 
attributed to technological progresses. 
Recently, some researchers began to compare the efficiency among different 
nations or to test the consistency among different frontier methods (Allen and 
Rai, 1996; Pastor et al., 1997; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Berg et al., 1993; Ferrier 
and Lovell, 1990; Ferrier et al., 1993; Bauer et al., 1998; Weill, 2004). Berg et 
al. (1993) earlier study of three Nordic countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
found that Sweden had the most efficient banking system while Finland had the 
worst. Other studies compared the efficiency of the US and European banks. 
Pastor et al. (1997) found that banking system of France, Spain and Belgium 
appeared to function better than their UK, Australia, German and US 
counterparts. When banks of Japan were included, US banks were still among 
those least efficient quantile (Allen and Rai, 1996). Whereas Bos and Kolari 
(2005) argued that on average, multibillion European banks had lower cost and 
profit efficiency than large US banks measured by either profit or cost model. 
For the studies testing the consistency among different efficiency 
measurements, earlier works generally identified higher efficiency scores 
generated by DEA as it neglected the allocative inefficiencies while later 
studies addressed the issue by using cost-based DEA model (Allen and Rai, 
1996; Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Ferrier et al., 1993). The non-parametric 
approach, DEA, was originally designed in particular for estimating the 
technical efficiency of public and non-for-profit sector, where price 
59 
Chapter 3 Literature Review Dan LUO 
information might not be readily accessible or reliable. It did not consider 
allocative inefficiency and thereby granted higher efficiency scores to the 
observations. So in practice, only after the price information were taken into 
account, results estimated by DEA and other parametric approaches were not 
directly comparable. 
Studies testing the consistency issue among different parametric approaches 
generally confirmed comparable efficiency scores and ranking of the 
observations estimated (Bauer at al. 1993; Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Beger and 
Mester, 1997). More dissimilarity was found when efficiencies between 
non-parametric and parametric approaches were studied (Ferrier and Lovell, 
1990; Eisenbeis et al., 1999; Bauer et al., 1998). The DEA technique was found 
to grant lower efficiency ratings to the observations with higher variance. This 
might result from the "self-identification" problem and the confusion of 
random errors with inefficiencies of DEA. For ranking consistency, results 
from the literatures were contradictory. Very high rank-order correlations 
between DEA and SFA of 0.73 to 0.89 were found by Resti (1997) whilst 
Eisenbeis et al. (1999) also identified fairly high rank correlations ranging 
between 0.44 and 0.59. However, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) concluded that 
rank-order correlation in their study was only 0.02, which was not significantly 
different from zero. 
Using four frontier approaches, DEA, SFA, TFA and DFA, Bauer et al. (1998) 
study of 683 US banks confirmed that the distributional characteristics of the 
efficiency scores were quite similar across parametric approaches with 
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relatively comparable values for means and standard deviations, while the DEA 
ratings had lower mean and larger standard deviation. Efficiency rating 
discrepancy between non-parametric and parametric approaches was as high as 
0.5. For the rank-order correlation, it was high and positive across parametric 
approaches but negative between DEA and parametric approaches. The 
identification of best and worst banks again led to very weak correspondence 
between DEA and parametric measurements. In addition, they found that the 
parametric approaches were more consistent with the standard performance 
indictors such as ROA and ROE. 
A more recent study (Weill, 2004) using five European country data 
summarized similar findings. The efficiency scores were positively correlated 
between parametric approaches for all countries, while no statistically 
significant relationship between any parametric approach and DEA was 
identified. Moreover, he argued that no consistent conclusion could be drawn 
in favour of one group of approaches when compared with traditional 
performance indictors. The DEA efficiencies had clearly advantages in 
correlation with the total cost/ total asset and ROE ratios whereas the 
parametric methods were better representations of total cost/ total income and 
ROA ratios. All approaches were proved to be related to the traditional 
performance measures to some extent. 
Other studies comparing parametric approaches noticeably included Drake and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) on British building societies and Dietsch and Weill 
(2000) on US and European banks. In summary, comparable mean values 
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among parametric approaches had been concluded whereas differences 
between parametric and non-parametric methods were substantial. Unlike the 
US studies, European evidence tended to show higher rank correlations 
between SFA and DEA estimations. 
3.3 Efficiency Studies of the Chinese Banking Sector 
Studies of banks in emerging economies, especially China, have become more 
common in recent years. These studies mainly focused on analysing the history 
of banking reform and its consequences (Shirai, 2001; Lin, 2001; Podpiera, 
2006), the relationships between banks' performance and foreign banks 
participation and determinants and timing of foreign banks entry to China 
(Leung, 1997; Leung et al. 2003a, b). For the literatures on China comparing 
bank performance, early studies usually adopted ratio analysis. Measured by 
ROA and ROE, Chinese banks were found to generate lower returns with 
higher financial risks than their Western counterparts (Li et al., 2001). However, 
ratio analysis could only evaluate performance of banks from a particular 
aspect, such as profitability and liquidity, but was unable to generate one single 
comprehensive indictor that differentiates "good" entities from the whole 
population. It does not control for outputs, input prices, and exogenous factors 
associated with an individual bank and hence may generate misleading results. 
Studies using frontier methods to analyse overall efficiency level of Chinese 
commercial banks are quite limited. This may be caused by the scarcity and 
poor quality of data, which are not widely accessible and generally doubted in 
areas of NPLs and profitability. For instance, the official website of CBRC 
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shows that by the end of 2003, NPL ratio of the Chinese banking sector was 
17.8%, while the S&P estimate was around 45% (Asia Pacific Banking 
Outlook, 2004, cited in Jia, 2009). The limited number of publicly accessible 
literatures in general found that the overall efficiency of the Chinese 
commercial banks had been enhanced substantially after a series of reforms 
and the JECBs were more efficient than their state-owned counterparts (Chen 
et al. 2005b; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Ariff and Can, 2008; 
Lin and Zhang, 2009, Berger et al., 2009). 
Using frontier measurements, most of the studies identified that the Chinese 
commercial banks were technically inefficient, though the efficiency level had 
improved over the years. The technical efficiency of the JECBs were 10-20% 
higher than that of the SOBs (Wei and Wang, 2000; Zheng and Zhang, 2004; 
Li and He; 2005; Zhao et al., 2002; Zhang, 2003; Li et al., 2005). However, 
Chen et al. (2005b) argued that large SOBs and smaller banks were more 
efficient than medium-sized banks. Laurenceson and Zhao (2008) found that 
differences in efficiency levels between the two groups were small. The 
inefficiency of the JECBs stemmed mainly from their failing to realize scale 
efficiency, while for the SOBs, pure technical inefficiency accounted for a 
bigger percentage (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005; Wang and Wei, 2000). Unlike 
the US banks, which had a flat U-shape average cost curve, the large- and 
small-sized banks in China appeared to be more efficient than the medium 
ones. 
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For the effects of deregulation and banking reform, the studies also had mixed 
implications. Chen et al. (2005b) found that the financial deregulation of the 
mid-1990s improved cost efficiency levels including both technical and 
allocative efficiency significantly. Dividing this sample into two sub-periods, 
the deregulatory period (1993-1998), and the post-deregulatory period 
(1999-2002), Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) failed to find evidence to support 
the effectiveness of deregulation as a means to improve banks efficiency, a 
conclusion consistent with Fu and Heffernan (2007). Both the JECBs and 
SOBs experienced a decline in technical efficiency between the first 
(1985-1992) and second stages (1993-2002) of bank reform. WTO accession 
was found to be associated with a decline in overall, pure technical and scale 
efficiencies (Hu et al., 2008). Berger et al. (2009) tested the efficiency effects 
from reforms that reduced state ownership of Chinese commercial banks and 
increased the role of foreign participation. They concluded that by bringing in 
foreign investors, both profit and cost efficiencies of SOBs and JECBs could 
be improved. When the foreign bank acted as a strategic investor, its positive 
effect on bank performance was more obvious than compared with purely 
financial investors (Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2008). 
Previous studies had also explored the relationship between the efficiency of 
the banks, profitability, risks and ownership structure (Yao et al., 2004; Yao et 
al., 2007; Zhang, 2003; Qian, 2003; Zheng and Cao, 2005; Wang and Tan, 
2007; Laurencenson and Qin, 2008). Banks that were more profitable, with 
higher ROA and ROE, appeared to be more efficient, whereas banks with poor 
cost control, with higher ratios of cost-to-income or total cost to total assets, 
were less efficient (Yao et al., 2004). Banks with higher credit risks, evidenced 
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by higher ratio of NPLs to total loans or loan loss reserves to total loans, were 
less efficient (Yao et al, 2007; Chang and Chiu, 2006). Results on the 
correlation between bank efficiency and capital risk were mixed. Interpreted in 
conjunction with the budget constraint theory, banks with higher equity to asset 
(E/A) ratio were more efficient (Jiang et al., 2009). Ariff and Can (2008) to the 
contrary found that E/A ratio were negatively related to bank efficiency 
because of the high transaction cost of share issuing. Despite more than a 
decade of reform focusing on the SOBs, they remained disadvantaged because 
of their heavy burden imposed by the toxic assets and various political 
interferences. However, one study proposed that reason for the JECBs and 
CCBs outperforming the SOBs was also the result of their geographical 
location (Ferri, 2009). Rather than spreading all over the country, like the 
SOBs, they were more concentrated in the prosperous provinces. Moreover, 
external factors, such as the Asian financial crisis, WTO accession and GDP 
growth were also found to influence the bank efficiency significantly (Yao et 
at., 2004; Hu et at., 2008; Jiang et at., 2009; Ariff and Can, 2008). 
In addition to assess the cost efficiency of the Chinese banks, Matthews et al. 
(2007) introduced the concept of rent-seeking inefficiency. They assumed that 
a protected banking market, like China, would not only encourage technical 
inefficiency, but also lead to moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. 
Employing data for four SOBs and 11 JECBs between 1997 and 2004, they 
observed that under the pressure of opening up the banking system imposed by 
WTO agreement, the cost inefficiency of Chinese banks was reduced 
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significantly. By the end of 2004, it had virtually declined to zero. All the 
leftovers in the overall inefficiency were caused by the cumbersome 
bureaucratic management system. Further transformation of management 
structure to improve corporate governance was demanding for the future 
development of Chinese banking sector. 
Chinese government reformed the SOBs by partially privatizing through 
minority foreign ownership and subsequent IPO. Stock listing was expected to 
improve the accuracy and transparency of the banks' financial records, and also 
to bring additional market discipline. However, whether such mechanism is 
effective still remains doubtful as only few studies have been conducted 
recently. Liu and Song's (2004) observed that within those JECBs, listed banks, 
such as CMB and PDB, had a higher than average efficiency score. However, 
due to data constraints, they were unable to track the efficiency changes of a 
particular bank before and after listing, which impeded effort to prove the 
effectiveness of IPO in banks efficiency improvement. A recent study 
identified that banks which had listed recorded better pre-event performance 
than those which had not (Lin and Zhang, 2009). Nevertheless, after the IPO, 
no significant efficiency changes were found in either the short or long term. 
As most of the Chinese commercial banks were listed on the stock exchanges 
in 2006 and 2007, data of post-IPO period were limited. Insufficient empirical 
work made it hard to evaluate the effectiveness of stock listing on banks 
efficiency improvement, a gap this study aims to fill. 
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In accordance with the revitalization of Chinese stock market, the real-estate 
market in China had been heated up again since the end of 2005 (Shi, 2007a). 
To assess the role of bank lending in house price rise, some studies investigated 
capital support offered by the banks. As an important revenue generation 
component, banks expanded their personal loan business, in particular 
mortgage lending rapidly. These studies tried to estimate the risks associated 
with such fast expansion and proposed several suggestions of bad debt control 
and credit risk management (Han, 2002; Wang and Wang, 2007; Shi, 2007a; 
Hu, 2007). In 2008, the US housing crisis destabilised the world financial 
market, which raised an important question for our study of assessing the 
extent of the risk exposure of Chinese commercial banks. 
3.4 Chapter Summary and Hypothesis of the Research 
Despite the increase in studies of the Chinese banking sector and financial 
system in recent years, these analyse inadequately the restructuring of SOBs 
and the effect of IPO on banks corporate governance and efficiency 
improvements. In the following Chapter 4, using CCB as an example, a case 
study will be conducted to get a detailed understanding of the role of stock 
listing on banks' corporate governance improvement. Then in Chapter 6, 
employing panel data for 14 listed Chinese banks over the period 1999-2008, 
two econometric methods, DEA and SFA will be used to examine the 
relationship between stock listing and efficiency enhancement quantitatively. 
Moreover, in the process of continued globalisation, the influence of the US 
credit crunch to the Chinese banks and its financial market will also be 
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addressed in Chapter 7. To what extent is the Chinese banking sector exposed 
to the US sub-prime mortgage market? Might such an exposure spillover into 
China's financial sector? With rapid growth in domestic mortgage market, is it 
possible for China to experience a similar housing crisis in the future? 
In summary, focusing on the Chinese financial system, in particular its banking 
and stock market, this thesis will test the following research hypothesis: 
" IPO is an effective tool to improve corporate governance practice of 
Chinese listed banks, in particular if the bank choose dual-listing to 
show their commitment to fulfilling higher level of regulatory 
requirement; 
" The overall efficiency of Chinese commercial banks has been improved 
after more than decades banking reform. The efficiency gap between 
the SOBs and private-owned commercial banks have been reduced; 
" Stock listing is an effective way to improve efficiency of the Chinese 
commercial banks; 
9 Efficiency estimations generated by two frontier techniques, the 
non-parametric approach, DEA, and the parametric approach, SFA, are 
comparable; 
" Given the specific nature of Chinese economy and culture, the US 
credit crunch is unlikely to be replicated in China. However, some 
negative impacts on Chinese commercial banks operation and the 
overall economy are hardly to be avoided. 
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Stock Listing on 
Corporate Governance Improvement 
As it has been widely believed that IPO could improve the corporate 
governance of listed firms, a case study approach will be applied in this chapter 
to get a detailed understanding of in what aspects had the corporate governance 
of the listed banks been enhanced? As the first listed state-owned commercial 
bank, CCB will be chosen for the case study because information before and 
after its IPO covers a relatively long period, which eases our comparison and 
analysis. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004 is employed 
as the analytical prism to examine the bank's degree of compliance and its 
strengths and weaknesses in corporate governance practices. 
4.1 Stock Listing, Corporate Governance and Performance 
Improvement 
Corporate governance can be interpreted as the set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws, and institutions that affect the way a company is directed, 
administered or controlled. It also includes the relationships among various 
stakeholders and the goals for which the corporate is governed. Debate over 
which constitute a good corporate governance can be dated back to the late 
1970's, when the needs and desires of shareholders to exercises their rights of 
corporate ownership and to increase the value of their shareholding increased. 
Since the late 1990s', the collapses of Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia 
financial markets during the East Asian Financial Crisis and the massive 
bankruptcies of a number of high-profile US corporations, such as Enron and 
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WorldCom renewed interest in the corporate governance practises of modern 
corporations. In response, the US federal government passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, intending to restore public confidence in 
corporate governance (Delucia, 2004). 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject and it was initially proposed to 
address the problem of conflict of interest between widely-spread shareholders 
and powerful managers (the principal-agent problem). Later it started to 
incorporate other issues, such as shareholders' welfare and corporate social 
responsibilities. The principles and codes of corporate governance had evolved 
over years and one of the most influential guidelines was the 1999 OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. It was further revised in 2002 and 
finalised in April 2004. 
According to the 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (p. 2): 
"The principles are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD 
governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in 
their countries and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock 
exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a 
role in the process of developing good corporate governance. " 
Good corporate governance is supposed to be able to provide effective 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interest of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring. The presence of an effective corporate governance system, either 
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within a particular company or across an economy as a whole, should help to 
provide a degree of confidence that the market is functioning properly. This in 
turn reduces the cost of capital, encourages the efficient resource usage of the 
companies and thereby underpins growth. 
Extensive studies in the past literatures had documented the positive effect of 
good corporate governance and the improvement of firm performance 
(Agrawal and Knoeber; 1996; Maug, 1998; Emmons and Schmid, 1999; 
Dockery et al., 2000; Gompers st al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Fan et al., 
2007; Sapovadia and Rehman, 2007; Li at al., 2008). Through careful designed 
monitoring and incentive system, managerial performance and overall 
corporate performance can be aligned and thereby mitigating the problem of 
divergence of interests between owner and management (Maug, 1998; Dockery 
et at., 2000). Moreover, by appointing independent directors sitting on board, 
they could not only monitor the management of the company more effectively, 
but more importantly, they are expected to share they professional expertise in 
problem solving and project management (Cai, 2007). Last but not least, the 
establishment of three independent subcommittees under the board could 
introduce more effective control and improve communications among various 
parties related to the firm. 
Compared with corporate governance study on general firms, researches 
focusing on banks are relatively late. It was the serious problems occurred in 
three fourths of IMF member banks during 1980 to 1997 and the following 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 that induced people's attention to the self 
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corporate governance of commercial banks (Ding and Hu, 2008). In September 
1999, Basel Committee issued the guidance of "Enhancing Corporate 
Governance for Banks', emphasising the importance of corporate governance 
in the bank management and finance supervision and consequently prorogued 
the study on the banking sector (Ding et al., 2005; Sun and Tobin, 2005; 
Vernikov, 2007; Ding and Hu, 2008; Lo and NG, 2009). 
Among various mechanisms aiming at achieving good corporate governance, 
diversifying the ownership structure and listing the companies on the stock 
exchanges with higher disclosure standards were considered to be one of the 
most effective ones. Historically, the main direct contribution of exchanges to 
corporate governance had been exercised through the issuance of listing, 
ongoing disclosure, maintenance and de-listing requirements. Since the 
promulgation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, stock 
exchanges have often enlarged their regulatory role to embrace a wider palette 
of corporate governance concerns. Although the enforcing power of the 
exchanges can be mitigated as some requirements for the listed companies are 
based on legislation or regulatory rules rather than the stock exchange 
standards, by bringing the case to the attention of the public and securities 
regulators, the exchanges have the capacity to prevent fraud and other abusive 
practises effectively. In essence, by raising transparency and discouraging 
illegal or irregular practices, exchanges help the listed companies build up their 
"reputational capital", which in turn increase the value of the companies 
(Christiansen and Koldertsova, 2008). The market would rewards companies 
with better corporate governance and punishes those without automatically, 
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especially in countries where legal and cultural constraints on corporate 
behaviour are weak (Black, 2001; Cai, 2007). 
According to an investigation of McKinsey (2002) on global investors, about 
80% of the respondents in all surveyed countries would pay a premium for 
firms with effective corporate governance. The premiums range from 12 to 
14% in North America and Western Europe, 20-25% in Asia and Latin America, 
and over 30% in Eastern Europe and Africa (Lo and Ng, 2009). It is apparent 
that investors perceive effective corporate governance as a particular important 
factor in regions with inadequate regulatory underpinnings (Black, 2001). This 
is also the case for the Chinese firms as the formal regulatory and legal 
framework are relatively weak and a large number of CEOs of China listed 
SOEs are government bureaucrats (Bai et at., 2004; Fan et at., 2007). As stated 
by the Chinese government, the main purpose for the establishment of stock 
market is to help listed companies to raise funds and improve corporate 
governance (Ding et at., 2005). It is possible that even when the state remains 
the controlling owner of a privatized firm, the stock market could still play a 
monitoring role and improve performance of the firm (Fan et at., 2007). 
Obtaining stock listing, especially cross-listing in overseas market, shows the 
firms' determination of voluntarily subject to higher disclosure standards and 
more stringent legal liability and therefore ensures the investors of their 
commitment to follow good corporate governance practise (Sun and Tobin, 
2005; Cai, 2007). In the flowing part, a case study of China Construction Bank 
(CCB) will be conducted to compare the improvement of its corporate 
governance practises since the bank obtained stock listing in October 2005. 
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According to 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, a listed company 
should ensure: (1) the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
exist, (2) the right of shareholders, (3) the equitable treatment of shareholders, 
(4) the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (5) disclosure and 
transparency are adequate, and (6) the responsibilities of the board are fulfilled 
(OECD, 2004). Although China is not a member of OECD, these principles 
were designed to offer general guidance to all companies worldwide to 
improve their corporate governance practices. In particular, since CCB was 
initially listed on HKSE, it makes the OECD principles more appropriate for 
reviewing its corporate governance practice. The international listing itself was 
aimed at ensuring the principles from one to three, which do not convey much 
requirement at individual company level for radical improvement after 
qualifying the listing requirements. Therefore, in this case study, only the 
remaining three principles will be compared and analysed in detail. 
4.2 Corporate Governance Practice of CCB 
4.2.1 Improvement in Disclosures and Transparency 
The main objective of the Disclosure and Transparency Principle is to "ensure 
that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding 
the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company" (OECD, 2004: pp. 11). This goal affects a wide 
range of corporate areas including financial and operating results of the 
company, company objectives, major share ownership and voting rights, 
remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, information 
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about the board members and their independency, related party transactions, 
foreseeable risk factors, issues regarding employees and other stakeholders and 
governance structures and policies which the company is required or 
voluntarily adheres to. In the case of CCB, the comprehensiveness of the 
information it disclosed had improved significantly over the period 1999 to 
2008. This is most directly signified by the increased pages of its annual report. 
From 1999 to 2003, annual reports of CCB were about 70 pages and then 
increased to about 150 pages in 2004. Since its IPO in 2005, page number of its 
annual reports almost doubled to about 300 pages. However, apart from the 
major areas of the business, we could find that other facts of the organisation 
were still relatively vague. 
Firstly, regarding the financial and operating results of CCB, before its IPO in 
2005, no clear definition had ever been given about what specific accounting 
standard had been adopted by the bank to prepare its financial statements. 
Although CCB mentioned that the "accounting policies adopted by the bank 
are based on the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises" in its 2004 
report (CCB Annual Report, 2004), the abbreviation of "PRC GAPP"9 was 
first introduced in 2005. In addition, before stock listing, the section, "financial 
statements", was about 10-15% of the whole report but it increased 
significantly to more than 50% of the overall length since 2005. Besides the 
general required three statements, the balance sheet, the income and cash flow 
9 According to the definition of "PRC GAAP", the consolidated financial statements prepared 
need to be in accordance with the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, the 
Accounting Regulations for Financial Enterprises (2001) and othe relevant regulations issues 
by the Ministry of Finance of the PRC (the "MOF"). On 15 February 2006, MOF updated the 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, so the financial statements of CCB in 2007 and 
2008 were prepared under the 2006 new constitution. 
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statements, the CCB added more explanations to its financial statement to help 
the investors get a better understanding of the bank's operation, the prospect 
and the risks involved. With more accurate interpretation of the financial 
information, investment decisions made by the investors are expected to be 
more rational. Last but not least, we also saw an improvement in CCB's choice 
of auditors. Two audit companies, Zhongtianyin (originally named as Zhongyin) 
and KPMQ were employed during the sample period 1999 to 2008. The first 
one is a mainland audit company based in Beijing and it was responsible for 
the auditing work during the period 1999 to 2004. However, as the audit firm 
was directly founded by the People's Bank of China in 1993, its independence 
was questionable. To enhance the public confidence about the audited financial 
statements, CCB started to employ KPMG Huazhen as the domestic auditors 
and KPMG as the international auditors (in 2004, only the KPMG Huazhen 
was appointed) since 2005, right after its IPO in HKSE. Such arrangement 
signified the banks' determination of becoming the world's leading banking 
giant, subjecting to stricter scrutinises and integrating more closely with the 
international standards. 
A major drawback of the CCB disclosure regime is that it only uses RMB as its 
reporting currency in the financial statements. Since the CCB was listed on 
both HKSE and SSE and its operations were extended worldwide, the use of a 
single currency might confuse the investors when they compare the absolute 
figures in certain business. For example, the CCB disclosed its holding of the 
US sub-prime mortgage loan backed securities in the 2008 annual report. 
However, all these figures were based on US dollars. So if an investor wants to 
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evaluate the influence of the sub-prime backed securities to the profitability of 
the bank, the choice of appropriate exchange rate would make such analyses 
process painful. On the other hand, if foreign investors want to invest into 
H-share of the bank, lack of comparable report denominated in HK dollar 
would also incur extra costs and trouble to the investors and may finally cause 
them to forgo such investment opportunities. Therefore, to increase 
transparency and comparability, the CCB could use multiple currencies in its 
annual report, facilitating invertors' review of the financial statements and 
consequently encouraging their investments. Such mode had already been 
adopted by some internationally listed Chinese companies, such as China 
Mobile and it had proved to be welcomed by the investors (Madera and Sun, 
2005). In summary, the financial reporting of CCB has some limitations, but it 
is generally consistent with the disclosure requirements set out in the OCED 
Principles. 
For the remuneration disclosure requirement, the Principle clearly specified 
that all the information related to the remuneration for the directors needed to 
be disclosed on a personal basis (including termination and retirement 
provisions). Therefore, the investors could assess the costs and benefits of the 
remunerations plans and the contribution of incentive schemes, such as stock 
option schemes, to the performance of the company. However, despite such 
requirement had been laid down since the first draft of the OECD Principles in 
1999, the CCB did not disclose these information until it obtained the stock 
listing. In the 2005 annual report, the bank published all the information about 
the emoluments to its directors, supervisors and highest paid individuals for the 
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first time. Consistent with other big international companies, the remuneration 
package of the directors is comprised of basic salary, annual bonus and other 
long-term incentive and subsidies to provide sufficient disciplines and 
incentives. 
In terms of the overall impact of the directors' remuneration on the net profit of 
the bank, the ratio had increase significantly since 2004 from 0.006% to the 
highest of 0.03% in 2006 and then remained relatively stable at 0.02% in 2007 
and 2008 (CCB Annual Report, 2004-2008). This figure was similar to the 
other SOBs in China, such as ICBC, which paid about 0.02% of its net profit to 
the directors in 2008 (ICBC Annual Report, 2008). Nevertheless, this payment 
ratio is still quite low compared to other Asian listed companies (CLSA, 2004). 
For example, the ratio of remuneration to net profit of China mobile was about 
0.05% in 2004 (Madera and Sun, 2005). As most of the directors of China 
SOBs are directly appointed by the central government, apart from the basic 
salary and performance related payment, other kind of indirect benefits, such as 
housing subsidies, childcare, various duty-related reimbursements, are hard to 
be precisely measured. Not to say some of these payments are deliberately 
covered up to serve personal interests. Therefore, stricter rules to force 
compliance and enhance transparency would be necessary in future. 
Besides detailed disclosure of the remuneration package, personal information 
of individual board members and the selection process if changes have been 
made are also required by the Principle to enable the investors to evaluate their 
experience and qualifications and to assess any potential conflicts of interest 
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that might affect their judgements. Earlier annual reports before IPO had 
already incorporated some general information, such as age and gender of the 
directors. However, detailed information about the qualification, past work 
experiences and holding of membership in other organisations of the directors, 
supervisors and seniors managements had only been disclosed since 2005. It is 
quite important to disclose membership of other boards not only because it is 
an indication of experience and possible time pressures facing a member of the 
board, but also because it is a crucial measurement of independency and may 
reveal potential conflicts of interest. 
Concerning changes of directorships, the selection process, background of the 
new the director and his connection with the bank, these information had been 
clearly stated since 2002. However, whether the new nominated director could 
be classified as executive or non-executive and, if non-executive, whether he 
could be considered as independent or not were only started to be disclosed 
since 2004. We found that the number of board of directors increased yearly 
from 13 in 2004 to 17 in 200710 and seven out of 13 members in 2004 were 
still serving on the board in 2008. Meanwhile, the number of independent 
non-executive director (NED) had doubled to six in 2007. Such increased 
weight of independent NED (from 23% in 2004 to 38% in 2008) could be 
regarded as movement towards good corporate governance as they are 
expected to be less influenced by the management and thereby overseeing the 
management and bank's operation from an independent stand. 
Regarding the share ownership structure and voting rights, the substantial state 
10 in 2008, the number of board of director dropped by one to 16. 
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ownership simplified such issue. Since the bank obtained stock listing in 2005, 
China SAFE Investments Limited (Huijin) together with its wholly controlled 
subsidiary, Jianyin, had owned about 60% of the total shares. Therefore, share 
ownership for parties other than the holding company was not material. 
However, such over-concentration of share ownership might impair the 
effectiveness of corporate governance as apart from shareholder's benefits, 
interference from other beneficial groups would also need to be addressed. 
International experience of establishing sound corporate governance suggests 
that as the share composition has an inherent influence on boards of directors 
in discharging their strategic responsibilities, the share split structure should be 
carefully designed (Wei and Geng, 2008). Institutional investors and banks 
should be encouraged to take a majority ownership while government-related 
agencies or state-owned investment groups should invest less. Otherwise, the 
board of directors would very often to serve as a mere "rubber stamp" for those 
state-controlled shareholders (Tong et al., 2009). 
In the Chinese SOEs, most of the shares are owned by the government and 
there is lack of "check and balances" from other interest groups, therefore 
introducing strategic foreign investors to optimising share structure has been 
widely chosen to improve the boards' performance (Tong et al., 2009). In 2005, 
two foreign strategic investors, Bank of America (BOA) and Asia Financial 
Holdings (AFH)" were brought in by the CCB to assist the bank in improving 
its corporate governance system in various aspects. Nonetheless, as BOA 
trimmed its share holding of CCB in early 2009, the bank needed to evaluate 
" Asia Financial Holdings (AFH) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Temasek. On 4 July 2005, 
CCB had reached an agreement with the Singapore-headquartered Temasek Holdings (Private) 
Limited on entering into a strategic partnership. AFH holds about 6% of the stake of CCB. 
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the potential impact of such foreign divestment critically and be prepared for 
other potential changes in future. 
Thirdly, the Principle requires the disclosure of Company Objectives. It 
specified that not only the commercial objectives of the companies, but also 
policies relating to business ethics, production safety, occupational health, 
protection of workers' lawful rights, the environment and other public 
commitments were encouraged to be incorporated because such information 
could be important for investors to evaluate the relationship between 
companies and the communities in which they operate as a whole (OECD, 
2004). In China, consensus has not yet been reached regarding the 
understanding of social responsibilities, and firms are not giving sufficient 
priority to their social responsibilities. Nevertheless, in the case of CCB, it 
started to include a separate chapter on "corporate social responsibility" since 
2005 and the term, "corporate social responsibility" was incorporated in its 
Chairman's statement in 2006 for the first time. Facing tough competition, in 
particular after the entrance of foreign banks, CCB had become increasingly 
aware of its corporate image and committed to fulfilling its social 
responsibilities as a good corporate citizen. 
Furthermore, issues related to employees and other stakeholders in terms of 
legal proceedings and factors that will influence their involvement with the 
company have largely been considered immaterial and thereby not included in 
CCB's annual reports. To commitment towards good corporate governance, 
CCB incorporated one section called, "major issues" since 2007 to provide 
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more information about substantial litigations and arbitrations of the bank and 
changes of shares held or controlled. In the area of foreseeable risk factors, the 
CCB has excelled in providing a robust list of risk factors to its business 
operation and updating the list when new factors emerge, as evidenced by its 
outline of the affects of US sub-prime related securities on its performance in 
2007. Since 2001, the bank started to add an independent sub-section, "internal 
audit" under the chapter of "risk management" analysis. The department plays 
a key role in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of bank's internal 
control as it is able to report to senior executive management free of influence. 
In CCB's annual report, a separate chapter called, "corporate governance" was 
included since the beginning of our sample period 1999 with the only 
exception of 2001. Nonetheless, disclosure in early period was quite general, 
simply listing the bank's reorganisation of the importance of good corporate 
governance, organizational reforms and goals of the bank. In 2000, CCB set up 
the Supervisory Committee (board) to carry out the non-executive supervisory 
function of monitoring and inspecting the performance of the bank. 
The most significant changes on CCB's corporate governance practice 
happened since its stock listing in 2005. The bank first publicly documented its 
corporate governance policies in the 2005 annual report and has continued to 
outline specific changes and initiatives engaged by the bank to foster improved 
corporate governance. The CCB adopted the "Code on Corporate Governance 
Practices (Codes)" set out in Appendix 14 of the Rules Governing the Listing 
of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited and also committed 
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to comply with both domestic and international corporate governance best 
practices. In addition, according to the requirement of Code, the CCB also 
established five independent subcommittees and disclosed detailed information 
about the formulation, function, meetings of each of the five subcommittees. 
This should be considered as a very good start for the bank. Although the CCB 
moved back to SSE in 2007, it still committed to comply with all the rules in 
HKSE, which was regarded to be stricter than the rules for the SSE. 
4.2.2 Responsibilities and Composition of the Board 
The OECD Principles provide clear guidance regarding the board of directors 
in various aspects under the Responsibilities of The Board. According to the 
guidelines, the CEO and the chairman of the board should not be the same 
person. Although CCB had separated both positions to enhance the 
independence of the board, members of the NEDs were dominated by 
high-ranking state bureaucrats and seasoned members of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and therefore may not fulfil their expected role of 
"watchdog". Meanwhile, as the major shareholder of CCB, the state typically 
appoint leaders of the bank directly rather than leaving the authority to the 
board. These appointed executives are either seasoned financial technocrats in 
the banking industry or state bureaucrats and their performance are heavily 
influenced by the government, consequently weakening the corporate 
governance practise of the bank. 
In terms of the composition of the board, one of the sub-principle states that it 
is the duty of the company to appoint sufficient number of independent, 
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non-executive directors sitting on the board. In particular, the NYSE requires a 
majority of independent directors while HKSE specified that an issuer should 
assign at least one-third independent NEDs on the board (Appendix 14, p5. ). 
Having a balanced composition of executive and non-executive directors is 
regarded as beneficial to the company as it helps align the interests of different 
parties, forcing the board of directors to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders and bringing an objective view to the evaluation of the 
performance of the board of management. Table 4.1 summarises the 
composition of the board of CCB during 2004 to 2008. 
Table 4.1 Composition of the board of CCB, 2004-2008 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total number of directors 13 15 16 17 16 
Number of NED 6 7 7 7 7 
Number of independent NED 3 4 5 6 6 
Independent NED/Total directors (%) 23% 27% 31% 35% 38% 
Source: CCB Annual Report, various issues. 
Note: NED: non-executive director; Annual reports before 2004 had no separation on the 
dependency of the directors and therefore information from 1999 to 2003 was not 
included. 
It is not surprise that there was no distinction of dependency among directors in 
early sample period as the CCB was a fully state-owned enterprise. The 
ownership structure of the bank did not require it to have any pre-existing 
outside investors prior to listing. For example, in 2001, its president and chief 
executive officer, Enzhao Zhang, was also in charge of the Human Resources 
Management Department, the Audit Department and other major departments. 
Meanwhile, he was also the chairman of several large Chinese corporations and 
the Deputy President of the China Banks Association. Such oversaturation of 
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power and lack of effective supervision facilitated him to pursue unending 
personal interests and finally led him to be sentenced in prison for 15 years for 
accepting more than $500,000 in gifts and bribes. 
To impose effective control over the senior management and to bring in foreign 
expertises to assist the bank with its final stock listing, CCB introduced two 
foreign strategic investors, BOA and AFH in mid-2005. Holding about 9% of 
the stake of CCB and committed to spend another $500 million to maintain its 
share after the IPO of CCB in the second half of 2005, BOA had agreed to 
assist CCB in various areas, including risk management, corporate governance, 
credit cards, treasury services and consumer banking. In addition, BOA had 
also appointed one of its members as the non-executive director of CCB since 
August 2005. Up to 2008, foreign people sitting on board had increased from 
one in 2004 to four, clearly indicating the bank's awareness of absorbing 
foreign expertises to enhance its own performance. 
For the percentage of independent NEDs, CCB is improving continuously and 
has satisfied the requirement of HKSE since 2006. The ratio reached its highest 
level of 38% in 2008. However, compared with the higher requirement set up 
by NYSE, CCB still has a long way to go. Within these six independent NEDs 
in 2008, one of them used to be a partner of KPMG. Although retired in March 
2003, the independency of the director was questionable as he could still use 
his personal relationships to influence the audit result as KPMG had become 
the auditor of the CCB since 2004. If taking account of only unchallenged 
independence, the percentage of independent NEDs of the bank in 2008 would 
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fall to just above 30%. The low representation of independent directors on the 
board would be a critical flaw in CCB's corporate governance practices. 
Worse more, as a SOB, CCB was originally funded by the Chinese government, 
and therefore there was no need for directors to represent the interest of 
minority shareholders. However, after IPO, how to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, increase transparency and communication and improve 
the efficient and prudent usage of asset had imposed serious problems for the 
directors. In such situation, the need for experienced non-executives to take a 
leading role in educating other board members on best practises has become 
prominently important. Nonetheless, acknowledging the need for independent 
NEDs and employing the right candidates are two separate issues. Especially in 
China, hiring appropriate NEDs to sit on board is even more difficult as the 
pool of qualified people is quite small. This situation has been improved 
continuously in recent years as more Asian firms attain listings overseas. The 
CCB should keep on recruiting high-quality independent directors to address 
the current imbalanced board, trying to achieve better corporate governance. 
The importance of independent NEDs is also represented by their ability to 
fulfilling other corporate governance requirements set out in the Principles. In 
particular, the Principles recommended that three board subcommittees should 
be formulated, namely, the audit committee, the remuneration committee and 
the nominations committee. The audit committee is expected to serve as a link 
between board of directors and the external auditors and to mediate potential 
conflicts or disputes between the management and auditors, thus enabling 
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auditors to perform their job more independently (Ding et al., 2005). While the 
objective of the latter two subcommittees is to design the most appropriate 
policies to recruit and retain the right candidates. Directors sitting on these 
subcommittees are supposed to be all NEDs and the chairman should be an 
independent NED to ensure that they could monitor the bank's critical issues 
on behalf of the shareholders effectively. 
In the case of CCB, the term, "Board Committees" was first appeared in its 
2004 annual report. The board set up five specialised committees to "ensure the 
efficiencies of the policies agreed on at the Shareholders' General Meetings" 
(CCB annual report, 2004, p. 27). However, the classification of these 
subcommittees was not consistent with the Principles and no other information 
apart from the definition of the committees had been incorporated. 
It was in CCB's 2005 annual report that the bank first disclosed comprehensive 
information about its corporate governance framework. Five subcommittees 
were established under the board, namely, strategy development committee, 
risk management committee, audit committee, nomination and compensation 
committee and related party transactions committee. People who composed 
these committees, their dependency status, responsibilities of the committees, 
meetings during the year, issues discussed and the attendance rate of the 
directors had all been clearly stated in the report. Moreover, conform to the 
recommendation of the Principles, chairmen of the latter three subcommittees 
are all independent NEDs to enhance transparency and effectiveness. However, 
again, the relatively small number of non-executive board members at CCB 
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made it hard to formulate all the critical subcommittees with NEDs. Not to 
mention that the effectiveness of these committees might have already been 
hampered by requiring each director to sit on several committees and spread 
their limited time and knowledge amongst various demanding projects 
simultaneously. For example, two independent NEDs, Song Fengming and Tse 
Hau Yin Aloysius were found to sit on four of the five subcommittees in 2008. 
Therefore, despite attending all the meetings during the year, the amount of 
time they could devoted to each of the project and their ability to fulfil all the 
functions specified for board members were really questionable. 
Finally, concerning the effective mechanism to align the interest of board of 
directors and senior management with the shareholders, the principles of 
professionalism and ethics would offer some help but this is generally not 
enough to drive the director to make controversial statements in support of 
minority shareholders. The best way to ensure that sufficient motivation has 
been granted to the directors to act on behalf of the interests of shareholders 
whom they represent is to make them minority shareholders themselves. Such 
recommendation has also been suggested by the OECD Principle. However, 
until 2008, annual report of CCB stated clearly that "there were no internal 
staff shares" and "none of the directors, supervisors or senior management 
holds any securities of the banl"' (CCB annual report, 2008, p. 111). "Other 
benefits" been awarded to the board of directors of CCB mainly include the 
bank's contributions to medical fund, housing fund and other social insurances 
but not stock options. Such remuneration arrangement for the directors is not 
popular among large listed corporations as it makes the board members with 
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little personal wealth at stake and therefore reluctant to align their own interests 
with those of the shareholders. The CCB should learn from the experience of 
other companies, being aware of the potential problem of over-issuance of 
options, and introduce its own "Stock Ownership Plan" in the near future. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
Corporate governance is a reflection of quality of management and it has 
become increasingly valued by the investors in recent years. In comparison to 
the firms in other developed nations, listed companies in China facing added 
challenges, such as the need to educate executive and non-executive board 
members and the frequent multi-level agency problems associated with the 
controlling shareholder who is also the government. Moreover, as the standard 
of corporate governance required by local stock markets in China are generally 
lower than that of the capital markets in other western countries, many Chinese 
companies choose dual-listing to show their commitment to fulfilling higher 
level of governance requirements. Such strategy was also adopted by China 
Construction Bank. 
From the discussion above, we could see that CCB has strived to comply with 
good principles of corporate governance since its IPO in 2005. Compared with 
the annual reports of past few years, changes made since the 2005 report were 
quite profound and comprehensive. In all major areas required by the 
Principles, the bank had displayed a very high level of compliance. For 
instance, in the area of Disclosure and Transparency, the CCB clearly outlined 
the operating and regulatory structures and risks to its investors and had good 
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tracking records of communications. The requirements of OECD Principles on 
equitable treatment of shareholders, rights of shareholders and the provision of 
a framework for effective corporate governance had all been well followed by 
the bank. 
However, despite outstanding improvements, flaws in some fundamental 
aspects of its corporate governance still existed. The highlighted responsibility 
of the independent non-executive directors was not fully reflected in its board 
composition. In most of the sample period even after stock listing, the 
percentage of independent NED of CCB was about 30%, just reaching the 
threshold of HKSE but far less than the higher requirement of NYSE. This 
level of independent director disabled board of CCB to exercise its function, 
such as monitoring complex transactions effectively. As more Chinese 
companies attained stock listing in recent years and the pool of qualified people 
been built up, CCB should try to attract more of these high-quality independent 
directors to address the current imbalanced board and consequently to achieve 
better corporate governance in future. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
Apart from the qualitative method, case study we discussed earlier, the 
quantitative technique, frontier models for efficiency measurement will also be 
applied in the following chapter to estimate quantitatively the extend to which 
the efficiency of the banks can be improved after IPO. The case study 
technique emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of 
events or conditions and their relationships, and therefore allows the 
researchers to look at the events in a systematic way, helping them to gain a 
sharpened understanding of why the instance happened as it did. While the 
econometric models estimate quantitatively how much the change is going to 
make. The use of two types of research methods allows us to get a more 
comprehensive understanding of the instance and therefore provides us a level 
of assurance that the findings are generalizable and reliable. 
In this chapter, two methods, DEA and SFA, which will be used to estimate 
efficiency levels of listed banks, will be reviewed. Compared with traditional 
ratio analysis, frontier methods are better techniques as they could provide a 
comprehensive performance measurement whilst taking account of external 
environmental factors. In particular, the mathematical derivation, advantages 
and limitations of the non-parametric approach, DEA, and the parametric 
approach, SFA, will be compared and discussed in detail. 
5.1 Non-Parametric Approach-DEA 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric linear programming 
technique, which was developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. 
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They generalized Farrell's (1957) single input-output model into the multiple 
input-output context and introduced the term "Decision Making Unit" (DMU). 
At the beginning, DMU was used to differentiate non-for-profit business from 
profit-oriented firms. Later it was extended to incorporate all producers and 
organizations. In efficiency analysis, the observations (DMUs) in one sample 
needed to be relatively homogeneous in terms of resources consumed, 
operations undertaken and outputs produced. The efficiency of the DMU is 
estimated by the ratio of the sum of weighted outputs to the sum of weighted 
inputs. Under DEA estimation, the "efficiency frontier" is made up of the 
DMUs that are more efficient than the other DMUs within the sample and the 
efficiency scores of all other DMUs are assigned based on their radical distance 
relative to the frontier. The efficient units, those making the best use of 
resources, are rated as 100% or 1 while other inefficient DMUs receive lower 
ratings. An efficiency score of less than one indicates that a linear combination 
of other DMUs from the sample could produce the same vector of outputs but 
use a smaller vector of inputs (Cooper et al., 2006). 
DEA has several advantages over other efficiency measures. It does not impose 
any restriction on either the form of the underlying production relationships or 
the distribution of the data employed (Banker, 1984; Al-Faraj et al., 1993). The 
DEA production possibility set is built by linear combination of a set of best 
practice observations and thereby avoids the need of pre-specifying the relative 
importance of different inputs or outputs. In addition, the choice of input and 
output variables is quite flexible; DEA is able to process multiple inputs and 
outputs without standardization. Not only the traditional indictors such as the 
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number of employees, working hours and stock value of the deposits can be 
used, but qualitative variables such as personality and motivation can also be 
incorporated. Therefore DEA gives the analysts more freedom in choosing 
variables according to managerial objectives or under complex situations. 
Finally, DEA could identify factors that contribute to the inefficiency of certain 
DMU and suggest reference DMUs to it for further improvement. With similar 
input and output mix, it would be easier to understand the nature of 
inefficiencies and set up targets accordingly. The major limitation of the DEA 
is that it assumes that there is no measurement error of the data and classifies 
all deviations from the frontier as inefficiency (Mester, 1996). This makes the 
DEA result particularly sensitive to data errors and outliers. Any random error 
could cause the reclassification of efficient DMUs and lead to the recalculation 
of efficiency scores of all inefficient DMUs. Another potential problem for 
DEA estimation is that the DMUs identified as fully efficient are only 
benchmarks within the sample, making it hard for cross sample comparisons. 
One basic DEA model, the CCR model, could be illustrated as the following 
(Charnes et al., 1978). Assuming there is a set of DMUj, j=0,1,... n, and each 
of them consumes varying amount of i =1,..., m inputs to produce r =1,..., s 
outputs. For example, DMUj uses amount xj of input i and produces amount 
yrj of output r. We further assume that x,, Z 0, yrj >0 and at least one 
component of every input and output vector is positive. Farrell (1957) 
generalized the concept of "Pareto efficiency" 12 to a multiple input and output 
12 Pareto efficiency is an important concept in economics. It refers to the situation if there is no 
way to rearrange things to make at least one person better off without making anyone worse 
oft. 
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context and defined the term "efficiency" as the sum of weighted output 
divided by the sum of weighted inputs. Accordingly, the efficiency of a 
particular DMU, k, under constant return to scale can be obtained by 
maximizing the equation below. 
sm 
max h=ý, ur. Yk ýVX, k (E5.1) 
r-I j. 1 
subject to 
sm 
ýr yrj 
'xij :! g 1 for j =1,..., n; 
r=1 i=1 
, 
u,, 6, >_ O for all i and r 
where yrk and X, k are the rth output and the ith input of the kth DMU 
respectively. fit, and t are coefficients of the rth output and the ith input 
that maximize h. 
(E5.1) aims to find the proper weights of inputs and outputs that maximize the 
Farrell efficiency. Unlike other efficiency estimation techniques pre-specifying 
weight of each input and output variable, DEA allows the optimal weights to 
vary among different DMUs to maximize the ratio of virtual output/virtual 
input (Cooper et al., 1999). By solving the above fractional program (n + 1) 
times, each time with a different DMU serving as the reference unit, the 
efficient frontier could be constructed and the distance from it represents 
inefficiencies of the DMUs. 
The (E5.1) is nonlinear, which may lead to computational difficulties because it 
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could yield an infinite number of solutions. The original solution, (, u', r9), can 
remain optimal when it is multiplied by any positive number. Charnes et al. 
(1978) solved the problem by setting the denominator, F. 19, x, k , equal to I and 
i-I 
transformed the former fractional program into a linear programming problem 
(LP). This ingenious transformation has long been regarded as the genesis of 
the DEA method. 
(LP) max h=p, yrk (E5.2) 
r-I 
subject to 
sm 
Y. 
PrYrj 
-E&, Xij : 50 
r=1 i=I 
Oixik 
-1 
i=1 
L4, t9; ZO 
(E5.2) is referred to as multiplier model (also called the primal problem). It has 
proved to be equivalent to the envelopment model (also called the dual 
problem), which is based on a production boundary (Thanassoulis, 2001 ). 13 
Instead of working out LP directly, solving its "dual" (DLP), the envelopment 
model is easier because the constraints imposed on the DLP model, (m + s) 
, 
is 
much smaller than that of the LP model, n. The efficiency of DMUk, expressed 
in the envelopment form is: 
" For detailed proof, see Cooper et al., 2006, appendix A. 4. The "Duality Theorem" suggests 
that: "(i) In a primal-dual pair of linear programs, if either the primal or the dual has an optimal 
solution, then the other one does also, and the two optimal objective values are equal; (ii) If 
either the primal or the dual problem has an unbounded solution, then the other has no feasible 
solution; (iii) If either problem has no solution then the other problem either has no solution or its solution is unbounded. " 
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(DLP) min 9 (E5.3) 
subject to 
Xy77, :5&, k i_1,..., M; 
j-1 
n EYrJ 
77, Z yrk r=1,..., s; 
J. 1 
7J, >_0 j=1,... n 
where i= (7,,..., 17 )T is a non-negative vector of variables. When 0=1, the 
DLP has one feasible solution, 9 =1, rik =1, raj =0 (j * 0) 
. 
Hence the 
H 
optimal B, denoted by B` , is not greater than 1. Moreover, EXy77, S &r * j-l 
ensures that 9 must be greater than zero. On the other hand, as the data are 
n 
assumed to be non-negative, the constraint yrj17) ý Yrk forces 17 to be 
nonzero because yrk >0. Putting all these together, the optimal objective 
value, B` 
, 
is bounded between (0,1 ]. 
The above DLP is also referred to as the "Farrell model". The efficiency 
estimated is regarded as "weak efficiency" because 0 only reflects the 
maximum possible radical contraction of a DMU's inputs within the production 
possibility set while maintaining the output level constant (Zhu, 2003). Some 
boundary points, which result from non-zero input and output slacks, are not 
considered. To fully evaluate the inefficiencies, the maximum value of input 
excesses, s- E R"' and the output shortfalls, s+ E Rs must be incorporated. 
(E5.4) provides the complete solution. 
96 
Chapter 5 Methodology Dan LUO 
oil s 
max S, - +ES, (E5.4) 
subject to 
n 
Z x. 11, +S; =Bx, k, i=1,..., m; 
i-1 
n 
Yrj'/j 
- 
Sr 
- 
Yrk9 
l. 1 
? 7j 
, 
Sj 
, 
S; z0 
The aim of this second phase is to find a solution, (; 7', S-', S+') , that 
maximizes the sum of input excesses and output shortfalls while keepingO=9'. 
If the optimal solution (B', ij', S-' , S+') of (E4.3) and (E4.4) satisfies 9" =1 and 
has zero slacks(S-' =O, S+* =0), then this DMU is called CCR-efficient or 
Pareto-Koopmans efficient (Zhu, 2003). Otherwise, it is CCR-inefficient. The 
first condition, 0* =1, is referred to as "radical efficiency" or "technical 
efficiency" because of a value of 0 <I means that all inputs can be 
simultaneously reduced without altering the proportions in which they are 
utilized. 
For those inefficient DMUs, DEA could suggest reference sets to them for 
further improvement. Assuming DMU0 is inefficient with xo input and yo 
output. Its efficiency can be improved through reducing the input values 
radically by 6' and eliminating the input excesses, s'* or through augmenting 
the output shortfalls, s+*. (E5.5) illustrates the formula for enhancement, which 
is also called the "CCR projection" (Cooper et at., 2006). Oxo and Dyo are 
An 
the input and output improvements and (xo, ya) represents the improved 
activity that projects the DMUo onto the efficiency frontier. 
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n 
x0 xo 
- 
ax0 = B`xo - S-` 5 x (E5.5) 
A 
yo=Yo +Avo =yo+s' ? va 
In previous discussions, we implicitly focus on the input technical efficiency. 
The input-oriented technical efficiency of a DMU refers to the extent to which 
the input resources can be reduced while producing at least the given level of 
output. However, in certain circumstance, we are more concern about how to 
raise output production of a DMU without using more than the observed 
amount of input. There comes the output-oriented model. The option of input 
minimization or output maximization is reflected in the choice of objective 
function in the DEA linear program. Table 5.1 presents the output-oriented 
DEA multiplier model (LP) and its dual (DLP). 
Table 5.1 Output-oriented DEA model, CCR 
(LP) min q= 6jx; k 
subject to 
m 
l9jxj UrYrj 10 
ý=1 r=1 
s 
1: 
UrYrk 
r=1 
Ur, i9 ýt 0 
m 
(DLP) maxO+e(ES, +ES, ) 
subject to 
n 
XJ 17, + St X, k ; 
/=I 
n 
Yrj )l j 
Sr 
1"! " rk 
Source: Cooper et al., 2007. 
If there is no input excess or output shortfalls, the optimal objective value 
represents the rate of output that can be radically enlarged to realize full 
efficiency. 
These two kinds of CCR models generally estimate similar results and can be 
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easily transposed between each other. In empirical research, the type of model 
chosen depends on the purpose of the research. For instance, the input-oriented 
model is more appropriate when the company seeks to reduce costs and 
downsize the branch network during a price cutting competition, whereas when 
the firm tries to expend market share in an emerging market, an output-oriented 
model suits better. 
To evaluate the technical efficiency of the DMUs, the influences of scale 
diseconomies should also be taken into account. Under similar operational 
environment, some DMUs may operate at constant return to scale (CRS) whilst 
others may experience various return to scale (VRS). CCR model is 
constructed based on the assumption of CRS, which suggests that when the 
input investment goes up, output level will increase proportionately and 
therefore the efficiency of the firms will not be affected by their return to scale 
characters. However, empirical studies show that most of the firms are 
experiencing VRS that changing in inputs consumption will not result in a 
proportional change in output production (Liu and Song, 2004; Zheng and Cao, 
2005). In general, VRS takes two forms, either increased return to scale (IRS) 
or decreased return to scale (DRS). A firm experiences IRS if a radical increase 
in input consumption leads to a more than proportionate radial increase in 
output levels, whereas if the radical increase in output production is less than 
proportionate, the firm is operating under DRS. 
In 1984, Banker, Charnes and Cooper introduced the VRS DEA model to 
account for scale economies. Figure 5.1 compares the efficient frontier of the 
99 
Chapter 5 Methodology Dan LUO 
BCC and the CCR model. 
Figure 5.1 Efficient frontiers of CCR model and BCC model 
Output 
0 Input 
Source: Cooper et al. (2006). 
D 
The efficient frontier of the CCR model is the dotted Iine that passes through B 
from the origin while the frontier of the BCC model is nonlinear, connecting 
non-dominated units, A, B, C and D together. The use of VRS frontier enables 
the calculation of technical efficiency not to be influenced by scale 
diseconomies. To assess the input efficiency under VRS, one more 
n 
constraint, 1: 77J =1, needs to be added. Together with the condition, 0, 
1=l 
this imposes a convexity condition on allowable ways in which the n DMUs 
can be combined. Table 5.2 summarizes the input-oriented BCC model. 
100 
Chapter 5 Methodology Dan LUO 
Table 5.2 Input-oriented BCC Model 
Multiplier form: 
max z= UrYrk 
r=1 
subject to 
sm 
.Q E urYrj - 
ýj 
t%xij S0 
r=1 i=1 
urYrk = 1; 
r=0 
r9;, ur >_ 0 
Envelopment form: 
mx 
minO-e(YS, -+YS; ) 
iýl red 
subject to BkXjk = Xii 771 +S, 
j-1 
n 
ýry 
-S+ Yrk Yrj'/ jr 
n ý77j=1 
17), S, -, S; z0 
Source: Cooper et al., 2007. 
Efficiency score generated under CRS assumption represents a combination of 
inefficiencies due to input/output configuration and return to scale character of 
the DMU, while VRS efficiency rating reflects PTE. CRS is appropriate when 
most of the DMUs in the sample are operating around optimal production size. 
When the variations in operation scale of the sample DMUs are large, CRS 
estimation needs to be complemented with scale efficiency analysis. 
Previous studies suggest two ways of choosing between CCR, CRS, model and 
the BCC, VRS model. One is to examine the correlation between efficiency 
scores estimated under CRS assumption with the number of DMUs. When the 
relationship is strong, the VRS model is preferred. Alternatively, both of the 
CRS and the VRS models can be run for comparison. If the majority of DMUs 
emerge with the same efficiency scores under both assumptions, either of the 
two models can be adopted. 
In addition to deciding the scale character and input-, output-orientation of the 
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model, when DEA has been applied to bank efficiency study, some other 
aspects, such as the choice of input and output variables, the treatment of 
subjective factors, need to be considered. 
The operation of the banking industry is quite complicated because it provides 
various financial services, which sometimes are interrelated or not directly paid 
for. These "outputs" are difficult to be measured precisely as the form and price 
of these "outputs" can be influenced by the government regulations. In addition, 
despite complying with the general accounting framework, such as the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) adopted by the Chinese 
banks, banks could still manipulate their earnings by treating the transactions 
and defining accounting terms differently. This makes the comparison even 
harder, especially for cross-bank or cross-country studies. Therefore, it has 
been suggested to have the management involved right from the start to help 
with data interpretation and model construction (Cooper et al., 2006). 
Another controversial issue of banking research is the choice of input and 
output variables. Unlike manufacturing firms producing physical goods, banks 
provide both intermediary services and a wide range of financial products, 
which make it difficult to distinguish between input resources and output 
products. In the past literatures, two approaches had been widely used, known 
as the production and intermediation approaches. 
The production approach assumes that profit maximization is the key objective 
of banks. Therefore, the number and type of transactions and related documents 
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are the best output measure, while inputs are restricted to physical inputs 
including labour and capital (Yao et al, 2007). The intermediation approach 
pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977) considers banks as an intermediary 
between savers and borrowers. Accordingly, deposits are treated as an input 
because they are the source of loans and investments. Neither of the 
approaches is perfect as each only addresses one side of the role played by the 
banks and in practice, they can be used as complementarities. 
In addition, the treatment of the variable, bad debt has also been well discussed. 
The emergence of NPLs is an output from imprudent operations. However, 
granting higher efficiency rating for the banks with large NPL is unreasonable. 
Some prior studies addressed the problem by leaving the bad debt in the output 
side but using its inverse value, while the others treated it as an input variable 
directly (Cooper et al., 2006). In a recent study, the ratio of NPLs to total loans 
was chosen as an input variable to reflect the asset quality of the banks (Yao et 
al., 2007). When the banks transferring deposits into interest-earning loans, 
NPLs were hardly avoidable and therefore it was classified as an input which 
was used to generate output, "loans". 
Finally, like other econometric techniques, the robustness of the DEA result is 
also affected by the number and type of variables chosen. The sample size has 
to be big enough, at least two to three times the sum of its input and output 
variables, to ensure the discrimination power of the model (Cooper et al., 1999). 
Otherwise, many DMUs will be classified as efficient. An easy way to 
overcome this problem is to create more than one model with fewer variables 
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each or to run the model with few core input and output variables first and then 
to examine the differences after including more variables. In addition, some 
transformed DEA models, such as the "window analysis" and the "assurance 
region" model could also be employed instead. 
The "window analysis" is suitable when the observations of DMUs are 
frequently available over multiple time periods and the research interest is to 
indentify the efficiency changes of the DMU over time. This method is 
particularly useful if the DMU is subject to structural changes that influence its 
performance. Using a moving average analogue, the DEA model can be 
performed over time by treating each DMU in different period as a "different" 
observation (Färe and Grosskopf, 1996). For example, for a sample of 12 firms 
covering six years, total observation of the sample is 72 (12*6=72). If we set 
up the length of window as three years, then each firm will be assessed in four 
windows (6-3+1=4). Each widow contains the efficiency ratings of three years 
for one firm, making the total efficiency estimation within one window to be 
36 (3*12=36). Such estimation effectively transforms the total observations of 
the sample into 144 (36*4=144), much larger than the previous 72, which 
solves the potential problem of "weak explanation power". In our study, data 
for14 listed banks covering 1999 to 2008 will be employed. Total observation 
of the sample is 139, while the number of input and output variables is five, so 
the proposed "misspecification" problem should not exist. The window 
analysis model can be run for comparison. 
The other approach, the "assurance region", deals especially with 
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"non-discretionary" factors that exist exogenously fixed rather than controlled 
by the management, such as weather and soil characteristics. If these factors 
are not taken into account, estimated efficiency ratings can be misleading. 
Earlier studies address the issue by dividing the whole sample into several 
sub-categories and comparing each DMU only with DMUs that operate under 
similar or worse conditions. Other studies solve the problem by imposing 
constraints on the multipliers. 
The usual assumption of the DEA model is that the dual multipliers assigned 
for the input and output variables may not account for any prior assumption. 
Golany (1988) extended the DEA to include ordinal relationships among 
multipliers to reflect the relative importance of input and output variables. 
Later Thompson et al., (1990) introduced the "assurance region" model to 
incorporate prior judgment and knowledge into the model specification. 
Through imposing restrictions about the range of multipliers with reference to 
management judgments, problem of assigning extremely low or high values to 
particular multiplier can be solved. The "cone-ratio" model, developed by 
Charnes et al. (1990), uses a similar approach. 
Under DEA estimation, DMUs that are most efficient within the sample would 
receive the highest efficiency rating of 1. However, it is possible that a few 
DMUs of one particular firm can be ranked as fully efficient for several years 
and/or more than one DMU can achieve full efficiency in one particular year, 
making it hard for cross section or period comparison. Andersen and Petersen 
(1993) overcame this obstacle by proposing a super-efficiency model. It 
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enabled ranking among efficiency DMUs. Changing the reference set of the 
original BCC model, the super-efficiency model provides the same efficiency 
score for those inefficiency DMUs while generates larger than "I" scores for 
those efficient DMUs (E5.6). 
ms 
minO-e(YS, +ES, ) (E5.6) 
i=1 r=I 
subject to 
OkXik 
=1X, 1 +Si- 
J-1 
jsk 
n 
Yrk 
- 
YýjIj 
- 
Sr 
1'I 
jsk 
n 
j-l 
(E5.6) is identical to the BCC model except that the DMUk, which under 
evaluation, is not included in the reference set. The theoretical rationality of the 
super-efficiency model could also be illustrated by Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 Super-efficiency measurement of the DMU 
Ii 
0 
Source: Andersen and Petersen, 1993. 
I2 
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The solid line ABCDE is the efficiency frontier estimated by the BCC model 
and I, and 12 are different inputs. R represents a technically inefficient DMU 
while C represents an efficient DMU under DEA-BCC estimation. When using 
the super-efficiency model to estimate the technical efficiency of an inefficient 
DMU, R, the original efficiency frontier, ABCDE, will still be chosen as the 
reference set and therefore gives the same TE score of DMUR as the BCC 
model, TER=OR'/OR<1. Nevertheless, when the efficient DMU, C, is 
estimated by the super-efficiency model, C itself will be excluded by the 
reference set and its efficiency score is calculated by the ratio: TEc= 
OC'/OC>_ 1. It means that the efficient DMUc could expand its input by TEc 
but remain efficient in the whole sample. Therefore, the bigger the TEc score 
assessed by the super-efficiency model, the more efficient the DMU is. To 
differentiate performance among efficient DMUs and to enlarge estimated 
efficiency ratings, this study will also adopt the super-efficiency model after 
the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models. 
5.2 Parametric Approach---SFA 
The parametric efficiency measurement, SFA was first introduced by Aigner et 
al., Battese and Corra, and Meeusen and Van den Broek independently in 1977. 
It has been criticized for pre-specifying the functional form and inefficiency 
distribution. However, the model acknowledges the fact that output level can 
be influenced by random shocks, which are not controlled by the producers and 
the inclusion of which therefore improves the accuracy of estimation. Using a 
compound error term, the estimated technical inefficiency has been separated 
from the impact of variations in labour or machinery performance, weather 
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conditions and opportunistic luck, and so on. The stochastic production frontier, 
which incorporates producer-specific random shocks, can be specified as: 
Y=f (1B; x, 
, 
x2,..., x, ) " exp(v) " exp(u) (E5.7) 
where [f(ß, x, ) " exp(v)] is the production frontier which consists of two parts, 
a deterministic part, f(ß, x, ) , universal to all producers and a 
producer-specific part, exp(v), capturing the effect of random shocks on each 
producer. x,, i =1,..., m are the input resources and ß is the parameter vector, 
which describes the structure of the production frontier to be estimated. Y 
denotes the observed output level. 
Assuming the stochastic production frontier takes the log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
form, (E5.7) can be re-written as: 
InY=, ß+1, ß, Inxm; +v+u (E5.8) 
m 
The random error term v is normally distributed, v- N(0, Q? ) and 
independent with the explanatory variables, and u represents nonnegative 
technical inefficiency. These two error terms are mutually independent and the 
compound error, e=v+u, is asymmetric as E(e) = E(u) >_ 0. In the 
Cobb-Douglas function, A= 1, i#0, u follows a half normal distribution. 
i=l,.., m 
However, such assumptions are relatively inflexible and lead many DMUs 
cluster near full efficiency (Fu and Heffernan, 2007). Two alternative 
distributional assumptions, the normal-exponential model, developed by 
(Aigner et al., 1977) and the truncated-normal model, proposed by Stevenson 
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(1980), have been employed instead. When the deterministic production 
frontier takes the Translog function, its inefficiency is assumed to follow the 
truncated-normal distribution. Most of the recent studies adopt the Translog 
function because it is able to deal with multiple input and output variables and 
imposes no restriction on scale economy (Liu and Song, 2004; Fiorentino et al., 
2006; Yao et al., 2007). The maximum likelihood method (ML) can be used to 
estimate the parameters in (E5.8). 
Consequently, the technical efficiency is defined as: 
TE = f(ß, x; ) " exp(v) - exp(-u) 
(E5.9) 
The ratio of observed output to maximum feasible output under the condition 
characterized as exp(v) represents the technical efficiency of the DUM. TES I 
captures the output shortfall and provides the measurement of technical 
inefficiency. (E5.10) is the technical inefficiency model which is used to 
explain the differences in estimated inefficiencies by some firm-specific or 
macroeconomic characteristics. 
u=Oa+w (E5.10) 
a is a vector of explanatory variables that associated with efficiency levels of 
the firms and 0 is the coefficients need to be estimated. w denotes random 
disturbances. 
Earlier efficiency studies employing SFA frequently adopted this two-stage 
procedure, estimating the technical efficiency of the DMUs first and later 
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running the regression to estimate the influence factors. However, this 
two-stage process suffers from serious econometric problems. The assumptions 
imposed on the independence of the inefficiency effects in two steps are 
inconsistent (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The estimation in the first step can 
be biased if the firm-specific characteristic, a, is correlated with input 
resources it consumed (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). 
Being aware of the limitations, Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed the 
single-stage approach that specifies the stochastic frontier and the relationship 
between technical inefficiency and a simultaneously. In this thesis, we will also 
adopt this one-step approach, assuming the non-negative technical inefficiency 
is a function of firm-specific and environmental variables, and independently 
distributed as truncations of normal distribution with constant variance. The 
mean is represented by the linear function of the explanatory variables. 
After obtaining the efficiency scores of both DEA and SFA, three consistency 
hypotheses will be examined to test the robustness of these two efficiency 
measures. The efficiency estimations generated by the different techniques 
were expected to be consistent in efficiency levels, ranking of DMUs and were 
related to traditional non-frontier financial indictors (Bauer et al., 1998). In this 
study, the correlation coefficients and the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficients will be estimated to test for consistency. 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the detailed review of two widely employed efficiency 
110 
Chapter 5 Methodology Dan LUO 
measurement approaches, DEA and SFA. In addition to their mathematical 
derivations, we also discussed issues that need to be considered when the 
method has been used for banking studies, such as selection of input and output 
variables and treatment of "non-discretionary" or "environmental" factors. 
DEA is a non-parametric approach, which was originally designed to assess 
efficiency ratings for those non-for-profit institutions while SFA belongs to the 
parametric group. Neither of the approach is perfect and both have limitations. 
To enable comparison, both approaches will be applied in Chapter 6 to measure 
the effect of stock listing on banks efficiency improvement. The correlation test 
will be applied in the following part to examine the consistency of the two 
approaches, but more importantly, to ensure the correctness and usefulness of 
the derived policy implications. 
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Chapter 6 Efficiency Analysis of Listed 
Chinese Commercial Banks 
In this chapter, we will apply both of the non-parametric approach, DEA, and 
the parametric approach, SFA, to assess the efficiency levels of 14 listed 
Chinese commercial banks. In particular we want to examine whether the stock 
listing is an effective way to improve the efficiency of the banks. In addition, 
we will employ the technical inefficiency effects model to test the factors that 
determine the efficiency ratings of the banks. 
6.1 Data Description 
Most of the data we employed are extracted from the monthly updated 
Thompson's BankScope database. The sample is composed of 14 listed 
Chinese commercial banks during the period 1999-2008 with 139 observations 
in total. 14 Other data sources we used include Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
(NBS, various issues), Almanac of China 's Finance and Banking 1999-2008, 
websites of People's Bank of China (PBOC), statistical reports of China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the annual financial statements 
of banks. As the quality of data in Chinese banking sector has been questioned, 
we cross checked the data from multiple sources to ensure consistency and to 
improve the reliability of research findings. 
In determining the output and input variables of this study, we adopt the 
14 Data of Ningbo Bank in 1999 are unavailable. 
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intermediation approach that treats bank deposits as an input. The output 
variables are (1) Total Loans and (2) Other Earning Assets (including 
Short-term Investments, Long-term Investments, Deposits with Central Banks, 
Other Investments, etc. ). The input variables include (I) Number of Employees, 
(2) Fixed Assets and (3) Deposits. As data for the number of employees is not 
fully disclosed and other resources cannot be used as a substitute, missing 
values will be estimated in accordance with the change of total assets (Liu and 
Song, 2004; Wang and Tan, 2007). 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 depict the changes of two outputs: total loans and 
other earning assets according to the ownership structure of the banks. Within 
ten years from 1999 to 2008, total loans had increased by 174% while the other 
earning assets had risen by 400%, suggesting that the banks had diversified 
their investment channels to broaden their income generation capacity 
significantly. Among all listed banks, it was the SOBs that expanded their 
outputs most obviously. 
Figure 6.1 Total loans of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
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Source: BankScope, 1999-2008. 
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Figure 6.2 Other earning assets of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
Figure 6.3,6.4 and 6.5 presents the changes of three inputs: deposits, fixed 
assets and number of employees over the sample period 1999-2008. Despite 
producing more outputs, inputs of the banks were actually remain relatively 
stable except stock value of the deposits of the SOBs. It is worth noticing that 
employees of the SOBs were decreased by almost 20% over ten years, 
indicting a significant improvement of human capital usage by the SOBs. 
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Figure 6.3 Deposits of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
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Source: BankScope, 1999-2008. 
Figure 6.4 Fixed assets of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
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Figure 6.5 Number of employees of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
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Source: BankScope, 1999-2008. 
Although the above analysis of input consumption and output production can 
not be directly interpreted as an improvement of banks' efficiency, it clearly 
signified that performance of the banks had been enhanced. Such assertion 
could also be confirmed by the following Figure 6.6. The ratio of overall return 
on assets (ROA) of listed Chinese commercial banks had increased by 95% 
over 1999 to 2008, while this figure was as high as 270% for the SOBs. In 
2008, average ROA of listed CCBs had reached a relatively high level of 1.7%. 
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Figure 6.6 Return on assets of the Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08 
The following Table 6.1 summarized of related variables and ratios used in 
efficiency analysis. 
Table 6.1 Mean value of sample banks by ownership structure, (RMB, billion) 
All listed banks SOBS JECBs CCBs 
Outputs and inputs 
Total loans 720.15 2414.73 302.82 44.89 
Other earning assets 597.74 2061.59 224.79 48.75 
Fixed assets 19.63 71.91 6.02 0.795 
Employees (person) 79837 316095 15975 2303 
Deposits 1234.02 4213.00 483.83 87.25 
Other performance indictors (%) 
ROA 0.6483 0.6203 0.5798 0.8572 
LLR/TLs 2.8248 3.6755 2.8495 1.8121 
Equity/Assets (E/A) 4.3831 4.9655 3.7671 5.4810 
Source: BankScope, 1999-2008. 
Notes: ROA: return on assets; LLR: loan loss reserve; TL: total loans; SOBs: state-owned 
banks; JECBs: joint-equity commercial banks; CCBs: city commercial banks. 
Compared with the SOBs, non-state-owned banks are much smaller. Both 
output and input of the JECBs are about 10% of that of the SOBs, except the 
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number of employees. The SOBs employ almost 19 times more staffs than the 
JECBs and this can be explained as a result of their relative longer history and 
past employment practices. Established about 10 years earlier than the JECBs, 
the SOBs employed a large number of people to fulfil its service requirement 
under the old labour-intensive system, typical of SOEs in China. When these 
people retired, the banks retain an obligation to provide pensions, housing and 
other benefits, imposing a heavy burden on the SOBs. If we look at the total 
number of employees of three listed SOBs, they are actually decreasing, 
suggesting an improved efficiency of human capital usage. 
The profitability indictor, ROA, measures how much return has been generated 
by the assets employed. It increased steady from 0.45 in 1999 to 1.32 in 2008, 
with the improvement of SOBs more obvious from 0.37 to 1.38 during the 
same period. The CCBs surprisingly have the highest average ROA score and 
this may because only three of the most profitable CCBs are included. Both 
risk-taking indictors suggest that the SOBs are the most prudent banks, 
contrary to the general expectation. In particular, E/A controls for capital risk. 
A higher E/A ratio implies that banks use less debt finance and are exposed to 
lower capital risk. Facing high interest rate fluctuation or cash flow shortage, 
banks with high E/A ratio are less likely to experience bankruptcy risk. The 
ratio has also been used as an indictor of the risk management ability of the 
banks. Moreover, E/A ratio can be analysed in conjunction with the budget 
constraint argument. 15 A high proportion of equity finance suggests that banks 
15 "Budget constraint" describes the consumption options available to an economic entity with 
limited resource to allocate among various goods. An entity faces hard budget constraint means 
that it must cover its cost of production with revenues generated or from other financial sources, 
such as capital support from the shareholders. On the contrary, soft budget constraint is used to 
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are subject to a hard budget constraint. Dependent on the capital of 
shareholders, they are more accountable, prudent and risk-adverse. The credit 
risk indictor, LLR/TLs, measures how much the banks provide for 
unanticipated losses from irrecoverable debts. It reflects the financial strength 
of the banks as the reserves provided can be used as a cushion against future 
loan default losses. Therefore, banks with higher LLR/TLs ratios have less 
exposure to credit risks and are expected to be more efficient. However, it has 
been argued that because the capital provided as reserves are effectively locked 
up and unavailable for investment, they actually forgo investment opportunities, 
which influence negatively their efficiency. Whether a higher provision of LLR 
influences the efficiency of the banks positively or negatively will be tested in 
the technical inefficiency effects model later. 
In addition, the GDP growth rate is chosen to represent general macroeconomic 
environment in which banks operate. The dummy variable, ownership, captures 
the influence of the ownership structure on the efficiency of banks. A time 
trend variable, t, is incorporated to reflect common effects on efficiency, such 
as technical changes. 
6.2 Application of DEA to Chinese Commercial Banks 
6.2.1 DEA-CCR Model 
Before applying the efficiency models, relations between specified input and 
output variables needs to be tested. Although the test itself can not directly 
prove the presence or absence of causality among input and output variables, it 
characterize an entity that is likely to receive government support it' it gets into tinancial 
difficulties. 
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helps identify critical factors that are most likely to fit the input-output 
correspondence being proposed (Thanassoulis, 2001). Table 6.2 shows that all 
three inputs are highly correlated to the output variables. The deposit is 
identified as the most important input resources with correlation coefficients to 
two output variables, total loans and other earning assets, as high as 0.99 and 
0.92 respectively. Total employee is the weakest input, in particular in 
generating other earning assets. In addition, the relationship between the two 
types of outputs is found to be quite high at 0.94 1, reflecting the fact that banks 
that have a stronger finance position would not only grant more loans, but also 
invest more extensively in other interest-earning assets. 
Table 6.2 Correlations between input and output variables 
Fixed Employees Deposits Total loans Other earning Correlate assets assets 
Input variables 
Fixed assets 
1.0000 
Employees 0.9063 1.0000 
Deposits 0.9190 0.8571 1.0000 
Output variables 
Total loans 0.9307 0.8927 0.9927 1.0000 
Other earring assets 
0.8666 0.7555 0.9175 0.9408 1.0000 
In our study, we choose the input-oriented DEA model because a reduction of 
input level is easier for management to control while the output quantity can be 
influenced by a range of external factors. Especially in a competitive market, it 
a bank will struggle to increase its output without raising inputs. Nevertheless, 
a bank can make efforts to minimise the inputs for given output levels and this 
rationale influences our selection of the input-oriented model. 
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The results of DEA-CCR model is summarised in Table 6.3. Consistent with 
the prior studies, the mean efficiency of the Chinese commercial banks is about 
0.86, with the JECBs the best performers (Li and He, 2005). On average, 
efficiency scores of JECBs, SOBs and CCBs are 0.89,0.79 and 0.87 
respectively. Despite the latest reforms of SOBs, their performance remains 
poorer than the other two types of banks (Figure 6.7). All three SOBs are 
ranked bottom among 14 listed banks in terms of mean efficiency between 
1999 and 2008. Within the 139 sample DMUs, 13 are fully efficient but none is 
state-owned. The most efficient bank is CMINB, with an average efficiency 
score of 0.94, while the least efficient bank is CCB whose mean efficiency is 
just 0.73. Nine out of 14 banks average efficiency scores clustered around 0.85, 
suggesting there is significant potential for further efficiency improvement 
even among listed banks. 
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Table 6.3 Efficiency of Chinese listed banks before and after IPO--CCR 
One year before IPO 
Efficiency Level 
IPO year One year after IPO 
State-owned banks 
BOC 0.8923 0.9325 0.8989 
CCB 0.7406 0.7829 0.8028 
ICBC 0.7970 0.8480 0.8623 
City commercial banks 
Beijing 0.8597 0.9898 1.0000 
Nanjing 0.8849 1.0000 0.9437 
Ningbo 0.9421 0.9698 0.9113 
Joint-Equity banks 
BOCOM 0.7804 0.8041 0.8145 
CITIC 0.9567 0.9815 0.9140 
CMB 0.8053 0.8405 0.8343 
CMINB 0.8347 0.9040 0.8802 
HXB 0.8063 0.8199 0.9347 
Industrial 1.0000 1.0000 0.9291 
PDB 
-- 
0.8213 0.8355 
SDB 
-- 
-- 
Notes: CCR represents the DEA constant return to scale model; Full names of the banks are listed 
in the appendix; our data period covers the 10 years from 1999; the PDB was listed on the stock exchange 
on 10 November 1999, so data for 1998, before IPO, are not available: the SDB was listed in 1991, so its 
information is not included in this table. 
My empirical results support the hypothesis that stock listing is an effective 
way to improve bank efficiency. The average efficiency rating of banks in the 
IPO year was about 6% higher than that before IPO. All 12 banks managed to 
achieve higher efficiency levels in their IPO year, except the Industrial Bank, 
which was already fully efficient before IPO. Under increased pressure of 
public scrutiny and foreign competition, Chinese banks were forced to improve 
their performance to satisfy current shareholders and to attract new investors. 
However, the efficiency scores of seven of the 13 banks declined immediately 
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after the IPO year. One possible explanation is that operational and managerial 
weakness may be covered up before the IPO to create favourable financial 
reports in order to be listed on the stock market, resulting in subsequent 
short-term gains. If the banks were unable to implement effective measures to 
overcome the weaknesses, these temporary gains were unsustainable in the 
long term. Another reason for the decline in the efficiency ratings after the IPO 
may reflect the timing of their listing: four of them were listed in 2007, so their 
performances were badly hurt by the poorer economic conditions in 2008. 
Although the expose of Chinese banks to the US sub-prime related securities 
was quite limited, the tightened credit policies and the slump in the stock 
markets impaired their performance significantly (Yao et al., 2009). Therefore, 
in order to evaluate more critically the effect of the IPO on the efficiency of 
banks, data for a few more years would be necessary to assess these external 
market fluctuations. Theses data we obviously do not have yet. 
Figure 6.7 Efficiency of the Chinese commercial banks, I999-08--CCR 
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Note: CCR represents the DEA constant return to scale model. 
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As well as identifying the best practice in the banking sector, the DEA results 
also show the scope of possible improvement for the inefficient DMUs. With 
reference to the efficient observations within the sample, the DEA technique 
estimates the maximum possible radical contraction to the input levels of 
inefficient DMUs and the input slacks. The target efficiency improvement is 
then calculated as the sum of radical input contraction and slack deductions. 
Take the lowest efficiency rating DMU, CCBOI, as an example. CCBOI is 
scored 0.66, representing the maximum possible radial contraction to its input 
level while maintaining its output level constant. In addition, the DEA result 
shows that it has input slacks of 14505.16 on fixed assets and 29033.24 on 
employees respectively. These slacks need to be deducted to enable CCBOI 
realize full technical input efficiency. Table 6.4 presents the possible efficiency 
improvement of CCBOI 
. 
Table 6.4 Slacks and targets of CCBOI 
Input Actual Radial reduction Slack Target 
Fixed assets 60,356 20,553 14,505 25,298 (RMB million) 
Employees 419,157 142,731 29,033 247,393 (Persons) 
Deposits 2,514,192 973,251 0 1,540,941 (RMB million) 
CCBOI needs to reduce its fixed assets, number of employees and deposits by 
58%, 41% and 36% respectively to achieve full efficiency. These numbers are 
calculated by deducting the ratio of targeted input level to actual input level 
from unity. To improve efficiency, the CCBOI clearly needs more attention to 
be paid to fixed assets reduction rather than deposit cuts. 
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Apart from quantifying the amount of reduction, the DEA results also provide 
the referential efficient DMUs to the inefficient ones for further improvement. 
With similar input and output mixes, the reference set offers the inefficient 
DMU an easier way to develop an understanding of the nature of their 
inefficiencies and to re-allocate resources to catch up with their efficient 
counterparts more effectively. Again, we use CCBO1 as the example. 
BOCOM99 was identified as its sole efficient peer. Multiply the variables of 
BOCOM99 by 5.326, as estimated by DEA technique, and compare the results 
with CCBO1, we obtain the Table 6.5. 
Ater expanded by 5.326, BOCOMO I offers the same output amount as CCBOI 
but consumes no more than 65.9% of the inputs of CCBOI. This result is 
consistent with the efficiency rating of 0.659 for CCBOI . 
The reference set does not necessarily contain one efficient DMU only. When 
multiple efficient DMUs serve as the reference set, their combined results 
could also provide a fair approximation of the efficiency rating for inefficient 
DMU. For instance, CCBO2 has two efficient DMUs in its reference set, 
BOCOM99 and HXBO5. Data calculated in Table 6.6 indicate that CCBO2 can 
reduce its input level by 67.3% to become technically efficient. This figure is 
consistent with its efficiency rating of 0.67275. 
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All the efficient DMUs can be chosen in the reference set. Those DMUs that 
appear in the reference set most often are the better role models for inefficient 
DMUs to learn from. Table 6.7 presents the frequencies of efficient DMUs' 
appearance in the reference set. Thirteen DMUs were scored as fully efficient 
by the DEA-CCR model but only four of them were frequently emulated by 
inefficient DMUs. Industria107, BOCOMOO, BOCOM99 and HXB05 were the 
most often adopted benchmarks before China's accession to the WTO whereas 
other banks, including some better-performed city banks, join the reference set 
in recent years. This might result from a more diversified scope of banks' 
operation. Different types of banks have their own strength and weakness and 
therefore been chosen jointly to provide a combined role model under current 
economic conditions. 
Table 6.7 Frequencies of efficient DMUs used in reference set 
DMU 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
BOCOM99 8 5 6 3 3 2 5 4 3 4 43 
BOCOMOO 6 8 10 8 9 8 3 5 6 3 66 
HX605 5 9 10 11 11 11 6 8 4 3 78 
Industrial06 
-- 
-- -- 
2 5 4 3 2 3 3 22 
Industrial07 8 11 11 8 5 7 8 7 7 9 81 
Nanjing02 4 3 1 
- 
1 1 5 4 3 4 26 
Nanjing07 1 
-- -- -- __ -- -- 
-_ 
1 
CMINBO4 
- -- 
-- 
1 3 2 2 2 2 1 13 
CMINB08 
-- - 
-- 
- 
4 2 2 3 3 
-- 
14 
PDB06 
-- 
-- -- 
- -- -- 
2 1 2 
-- 
5 
PDB08 
-- 
-- -- 
1 1 
-- -- 
-- 
2 1 5 
Beijing08 
-- -- 
-- 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
1 1 3 
SDB08 
-- 
-- -- 
1 1 
-- -- 
- 
3 
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For scale efficiency, the CCR model reported that all 30 DMUs of SOBs were 
operating at DRS, while for JECBs and CCBs, more than 60% of them present 
IRS, in line with earlier studies (Yao et at., 2008). Fourteen out of 139 DMUs 
were operating under CRS. To exclude the effect of scale economies on bank 
efficiency, the BCC-VRS model will be applied in the next part. 
6.2.2 DEA-BCC Model 
The DEA-BCC model estimates the pure technical efficiency (PTE) of banks 
without the influence of scale economies. Under input-oriented assumption, the 
scale efficiency can be calculated as: 
SEA 
= 
CRS 
VRSJ (E6. I) 
where SEA is the scale input efficiency of DMU j. CRS and VRS, represents 
the efficiency ratings of DMUj estimated by CCR and BCC models 
respectively. As VRS, is always higher than CRS,, scale economy score, SEA 
, 
never exceeds unity. A higher SE score indicates that the technical efficiency of 
the DMU is less influenced by scale economies. Only those DMUs operating 
under CRS could obtain scale efficiency ratings equal to one. 
After eliminating the negative impact of scale diseconomies, the overall 
efficiency of Chinese listed commercial banks increased to 0.92. The highest 
mean efficiency score over the 1999-2008 period was realised by ICBC of 0.98 
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while the lowest was Beijing Commercial bank of 0.87. Thirty DMUs realize 
full efficiency, representing almost 22% of the sample. Eleven DMUs of the 
SOBs were fully efficient, accounting for 37% of the total observations for the 
SOBs. In particular, the efficiency ratings of all six SOBs' DMUs in 2007 and 
2008 were "I", confirming the improved performance of the SOBs. 
Under the VRS estimation, the average efficiency score of SOBs was 0.96, 
which was an increase of 17% from the CCR model, while this ratio for the 
JECBs and CCBs were just 2% and 6% respectively. The efficiency gap among 
different banking groups was greatly reduced. Compared with the previous 
10% efficiency deficit, the mean efficiency of SOBs was 3% higher than the 
JECBs, implying that the main source of the inefficiency of the SOBs was their 
diseconomy of scale. Despite continued improvement of their productivity and 
profitability, the large overhead expenses due to overstaffing and an extensive 
network of branches made the SOBs' overall efficiency far inferior to the 
JECBs. For pure technical efficiency, however, SOBs had already 
outperformed all other banks (Figure 6.8). 
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Figure 6.8 Efficiency of Chinese listed banks, 1999-08--BCC 
1.1 
1.0 } 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
State-owned 
-. - 
Joint-equity 
-a- City Banks -Total Banks 
0.5 I 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Note: BCC is the DEA various return to scale model. 
Estimation of scale economy score confirms the above findings. The mean 
scale economy rating for the listed banks was 0.93, indicating that about 7% of' 
the prior DEA-CCR inefficiencies were come from scale diseconomies. This 
ratio for the SOBs, JECBs and CCBs were 18%, 3% and 6% respectively, 
clearly suggested that SOBs were the most scale inetlicient banks. [ leven 
inefficient DMUs of the SOBs were purely caused by scale diseconomies. The 
lowest scale efficiency rating, 0.67, was realized by Ningbo00. Alter 
eliminating scale diseconomies, NingboOO was actually full technically 
efficient. The finding suggests that it is very important for the Chinese 
commercial banks to control their production size and to ensure the etiective 
allocation of resources. 
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Table 6.8 compares the VRS efficiency score before and after IPO. The results 
are similar to those obtained from the CCR model. Efficiencies of all sample 
banks were enhanced after stock listing, about 3% higher in average than the 
level before the IPO. However, as the highest possible efficiency score was one 
under DEA-BCC estimation, it was impossible to quantify any efficiency 
improvement of banks which were already fully efficient before ! PO. To 
overcome this limitation, we apply the CRS and VRS super-efficiency models 
in the next section. 
Table 6.8 Efficiency scores of Chinese listed banks before and after IPO-BCC 
One year before IPO 
Efficiency Level 
IPO year One year after IPO 
State-owned banks 
BOC 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CCB 0.9757 0.9816 1.0000 
ICBC 0.9365 0.9901 1.0000 
City Commercial banks 
Beijing 0.8636 0.9981 1.0000 
Nanjing 0.9435 1.0000 0.9506 
Ningbo 0.9841 1.0000 0.9271 
Joint-Equity banks 
BOCOM 0.8794 0.8964 0.9160 
CITIC 0.9836 1.0000 0.9972 
CMB 0.8101 0.8424 0.8513 
CMINB 0.8730 0.9349 0.8930 
HXB 0.8154 0.8234 0.9372 
Industrial 1.0000 1.0000 0.9689 
PDB 
-- 
0.8403 0.8493 
SDB 
- 
-- 
-- 
Notes: BCC represents the DEA various return to scale model; Full names of the banks are listed in the 
appendix; our data period covers the 10 years from 1999; the PDB was listed on the stock exchange on 10 
November 1999, so data for 1998, before IPO, are not available; the SDB was listed in 1991, so its 
information is not included in this table. 
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6.2.3 DEA Super-Efficiency Model 
The super-efficiency model provides the same efficiency scores for those 
inefficient DMUs while generating higher than "1" efficiency scores for those 
efficient DMUs as estimated by the traditional DEA models. Such 
measurement enlarges the estimated efficiency differences and makes the 
efficiency comparison among DMUs more straightforward. Table 6.9 lists the 
super-efficiency scores under VRS assumption. 
Table 6.9 Super-efficiency of listed banks before and after IPO--VRS 
One year before IPO 
Efficiency Level 
1130 year One year after IPO 
State-owned banks 
BOC 0.9739 1.0415 1.0058 
CCB 0.9757 0.9816 1.0123 
ICBC 0.9365 0.9901 1.0102 
City Commercial banks 
Beijing 0.8636 0.9981 1.3152 
Nanjing 0.9435 1.0459 0.9506 
Ningbo 0.9841 1.0018 0.9271 
Joint-Equity banks 
BOCOM 0.8794 0.8964 0.9160 
CITIC 0.9836 1.0109 0.9972 
CMB 0.8101 0.8424 0.8513 
CMINB 0.8730 0.9349 0.8930 
HXB 0.8154 0.8234 0.9372 
Industrial 1.0371 1.1705 0.9689 
PDB 
-- 
0.8403 0.8493 
SDB 
-- -- 
-- 
Notes: Full names of the banks are listed in the appendix; our data period covers the 10 years from 1999; 
the PDB was listed on the stock exchange on 10 November 1999, so data for 1998, before IPO, are not 
available; the SDB was listed in 1991, so its information is not included in this table. 
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In average, the pure technical efficiency had been improved by 5.5% after 
listing with 4.2%, 8.5% and 4.7% increase for the SOBs, CCBs and JECBs 
respectively. Compared with super-efficiency scores generated under CRS 
estimation (Table 6.10) which took the effect of scale economies into account, 
it was found that stock listing could improve efficiency in two dimensions. 
PTE can be improved by imposing more pressure on a bank's operations, 
which helps the banks to realize scale economy by making public funding 
sources more readily accessible. For example, the efficiency rating of Ningbo 
bank increased by 2.8% assuming CRS, but was reduced to 1.7% under the 
VRS assumption, which implied that 1.1% of the gains were obtained from 
scale economy improvement. 16 Such dual positive effects have also been 
found in the other six banks, such as the CCB, Nanjing Bank, BOCOM and 
CMB. However, the results of the CRS model also suggested that despite the 
PTE of all listed banks having been enhanced, the scale economy of some 
banks, such as the BOC, CCB and Beijing bank, actually decreased. The PTE 
of the BOC, for example, improved by 6.8% after IPO under the VRS 
assumption, whereas under the CRS assumption, the efficiency score increased 
4%, which indicated that there was a 2.1 % loss of scale efficiency. ' 7 Such a 
'6 Improvement of scale economy for Ningbo bank could also be proved as: TE. =PTE*S( 
, 
under CRS assumption, before IPO, SE=TE/PTE=0.9421/0.9841=0.9573; alter IPO, 
SE'=TE'/PTE'=0.9698/1.0018=0.9681. Therefore, scale efficiency has been improved by 
0.9681-0.9573=0.011 or ]A%- 
17 Scale efficiency loss for BOC can be estimated as: TE=PTE*SE, under CRS assumption, 
before IPO, SE=TE/PTE=0.8923/0.9739=0.9162; alter IPO, 
SE'=TE'/PTE'=0.9325/1.0415=0.8953. Therefore, scale efficiency has decreased by 
0.9162-0.8953=0.021 or 2.1 %. 
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negative impact of TO on scale efficiency may arise from some Chinese 
commercial banks, especially the SOBs, being already too big to realise 
efficiency gains via further expansion. Stock listing enables banks to access 
wider financial resources, enabling them to spread rapidly to emerging 
business operations or to invest heavily to boost their capital base or branch 
networks. Without careful plan and investigation, over-expansion leads to a 
shortage of management ability and professional expertises, which drags down 
the efficiency of the banks. 
Table 6.10 Super-efficiency of listed banks before and after IPO 
--CRS 
One year before IPO 
Efficiency level 
IPO year One year after IPO 
State-owned banks 
BOC 0.8923 0.9325 0.8989 
CCB 0.7406 0.7829 0.8028 
ICBC 0.7970 0.8480 0.8623 
City Commercial banks 
Beijing 0.8597 0.9898 1.3088 
Nanjing 0.8849 1.0020 0.9437 
Ningbo 0.9421 0.9698 0.9113 
Joint-Equity banks 
BOCOM 0.7804 0.8041 0.8145 
CITIC 0.9567 0.9815 0.9140 
CMB 0.8053 0.8405 0.8343 
CMINB 0.8347 0.9040 0.8802 
HXB 0.8063 0.8199 0.9347 
Industrial 1.0359 1.0667 0.9291 
PDB 
-- 
0.8213 0.8355 
SDB 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Notes: Full names of the banks are listed in the appendix; our data period covers the 10 years trom 1999; 
the PDB was listed on the stock exchange on 10 November 1999, so data for 1998, belbre IPO, are not 
available; the SDB was listed in 1991, so its information is not included in this table. 
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We should note that the super-efficiency scores of Industrial Bank and Beijing 
Bank after IPO were as high as 1.17 and 1.32 respectively under VRS 
assumption. The results mean their inputs could expand up to 1.17 or 1.32 
times and they would still operate on the efficient frontier. These two banks 
were also chosen more frequently as the reference set for inefficient DMUs in 
recent years. 
The above empirical results show a positive effect of stock listing on bank 
efficiency. However, factors that influence such improvement have not been 
addressed yet. To identify those determinants, a regression analysis will be 
conducted in the next section. 
6.2.4 Determinant of Banks Efficiency 
Bank efficiency can be influenced by various factors, both internal and external. 
Seven variables are included in the following regression analysis, two dummy 
variables, ownership structure and stock listing indictor (TPO), return on asset 
(ROA), time trend (t), GDP growth and two risk indictors, ratio of loan loss 
reserves to total loans (LLR/TL) and equity to total asset (E/A). For ownership, 
"0" represents non-state owned banks and "1" represents SOBs and for IPO. 
"1" means that bank has already listed on the stock exchanges while "0" stands 
for the contrary. LLR/TL is used to control for credit risk and E/A for capital 
risk. The dependent variable is the efficiency ratings estimated by DEA-CCR 
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model. The scores are transformed by the natural logarithm to tighten the lower 
tail of its bimodal distribution. As the efficiency score is restricted within (0,1 ], 
the distribution is censored. With censored data, ordinary least square (OLS) 
yields asymptotically biased estimators (Breen, 1996; Green, 1993). 
Consequently, to analyze the determinants of efficiency, we adopt the Tobit 
model and present the results in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.11 Determinants of bank efficiency 
Factors Coefficient Std. Error t 
Constant. 
-0.57533 0.21242 -2.71 
Ownership 
-0.01799 0.01054 -1.71 
IPO 0.04128** 0.01946 2.12 
ROA 0.002713 0.05176 0.958 
LLR/TL 
-0.00517 0.003198 
-1.62 
Equity/Asset 0.03802* 0.022120 1.71 
GDP growth 0.115679 0.09606 1.20 
t 0.01150- 0.00502 2.29 
Notes: """ means that the variable is significant at 1% level; " means that the variable is significant at 
5% level and " means that the variable is significant at 10% level; ROA, return on asset; LLR/TL, loan 
loss reserve to total loans. 
Four variables, ownership, IPO, E/A and t, are found to have significant 
impacts on efficiency. The negative sign of "ownership" means that on average, 
non-state owned banks are 1.8% more efficient than the SOBs, lower than the 
10% efficiency discrepancy estimated by the DEA-CCR model. This result 
would not be welcomed by Chinese reformers in particular after the 
government having devoted considerable efforts to reforming the banking 
sector in recent years. However, as we discussed for the DEA-BCC model, 
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these inefficiencies are mainly caused by scale diseconomies, which are not 
fully controlled by the management. In order to realize the full effects of 
previous reforms and to be completely transformed into the benchmark of the 
banking industry, SOBs may need a few more years. 
The sign and size of the coefficient on the IPO implies that stock listing can 
improve bank efficiency by 4%, ceteris paribus. This is consistent with prior 
DEA results that in general, banks are more efficient after they have been listed. 
Nevertheless, as the efficiency of more than 50% of sample banks deteriorated 
immediately after their IPO year, the positive effect of stock listing and 
efficiency improvement should be interpreted with cautious. Further research 
on Chinese commercial banks after they have acquired a longer post-IPO 
trading record is needed to reach a more convincing conclusion. 
The profitability ratio, ROA, does not influence the efficiency of listed banks 
significantly. Banks that generate good profit may not necessarily be more 
efficient; for example, the SOBs devote more human resources to achieving 
their relatively high income. The negative sign of the risk indictor, LLR/TL, 
suggests that banks taking more credit risk were more efficient. However, it is 
not statistically significant. The positive coefficient of capital risk indictor, E/A, 
implies that banks with more equity capital were more efficient. One 
percentage point increase of the E/A ratio could increase banks' efficiency by 
137 
Chapter 6 Efficiency Analysis of Chinese Listed Commercial Banks Dan LUO 
almost 4%. Banks that could manage their capital risk more effectively also 
displayed higher than average performance, in line with our expectation. 
Moreover, the result also confirms our assumption that banks subject to hard 
budget constraints were more efficient. Soft budget constraints cause 
inefficiency because of moral hazard problem. Therefore, if banks were subject 
to hard budget constraints, they need to attract shareholders with better 
performance. 
The macroeconomic indictor, GDP growth, was found to have a positive 
impact on efficiency, but it was not statistically significant. A favourable 
economic condition does not guarantee a better performance of the banks. The 
time trend, t, was statistically significant and suggests that the efficiency of the 
banks was improving at about I% per year. 
Our discussion above relies on the non-parametric approach, DEA. To compare 
the efficiency rating generated by different measurements, a parametric 
approach, SFA, will be applied in the next section. 
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6.3 Application of SFA to Chinese Commercial Banks 
6.3.1 Model Specification 
In this part, we will adopt the distance function approach introduced by 
Shephard (1953) to assess the efficiency of the Chinese listed commercial 
banks. This technique has become increasingly popular recently because it 
enables the consideration of multiple-outputs and -inputs production 
technology without the need for price information or to make any behavioural 
assumptions, such as cost-minimisation or profit-maximization (Cuesta and 
Orea, 2002; Coelli and Perelman, 2000). When price information is unavailable 
or inaccurately measured, or when behaviour assumptions are inappropriate, 
traditional approach to resolve multi-outputs production technology is 
inapplicable. So the distance function approach is an appropriate alternative. 
A distance function can be expressed either in terms of input conservation or 
output expansion. Consistent with the prior DEA estimation, we retain the 
input-orientated model. An input distance function measures the maximum 
amount of input that can be proportionally reduced with the output vector held 
fixed. It can be defined on the input set, L(y), which represents a list of 
technologically feasible combinations of inputs and outputs, as: 
D, (x, y, t)=max{Q: (x/a)E L(y)) (E6.2) 
where x and y are the input and output vectors and t is the time trend, capturing 
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the technical changes. If the vector of M inputs is denoted by 
x= (x,, xZ,... xM) and the vector of K outputs is denoted by y= (y1 
' 
y2,... yx) 
, 
the input set L(y) takes the form of (E6.3). 
L(y) = {x r= RM :x can produce y} (E6.3) 
The input isoquant, expressed as IsoqL(y) = (x: D, (y, x, t) =1) 
, 
corresponds to 
the set of input vectors that have an input distance function value equal to one. 
Any further radical contraction of the input vector is incapable of producing the 
given output vector y. Figure 6.9 depicts the input distance function with two 
inputs, Xi and X2; L(y) *is the input isoquant for producing output vector y. 
Figure 6.9 Input distance function 
X2 L(y) 
X'/u= K' 
_ 
X. 
. 
x1 
Note: X' is the actually usage of input X, and X2 to produce output y. 
The input distance function, D, (x, y, t) 
, 
is non-decreasing and concave in x, but 
non-increasing and convex in y. It takes the value of unity if x is located on the 
input isoquant while otherwise it is greater than one. That is, D, (x, y, 1) >_ I if 
140 
Chapter 6 Efficiency Analysis of Chinese Listed Commercial Banks Dan LUO 
XE L(y). 
The input distance function is closely related to the measurement of technical 
efficiency. 0< TE(y, x, t) =B5] represents the input-oriented technical 
efficiency while D, (x, y, t) =a z1 measures the input distance function. Their 
relationships can be expressed by (E6.4) and shown graphically in Figure 6.3. 
TE(x, y, 1)=1/D, (x, y, 1) or TE(x, y, 1) * D, (x, y, 1) =I (E6.4) 
Replacing TE with exp(-u), where non-negative values of u measures the 
input-oriented technical inefficiency, (E6.5) can be rewritten as 
1nD, (x, y, t)+InTE(x, y, t)=InD, (x, y, 1)-u=0 (E6.5) 
The inefficiency u is calculated by taking the logarithm of the input distance 
function. 
In this study, a Translog function is assumed to represent the input distance 
function which is given in (E6.6) for i banks consuming M inputs producing K 
outputs. 
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In D, = ao +2: a. Inxm +J: ß, InYk +1tt amn Inxm Inxn 
m=I k 1 
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m I n I 
1KKMK 
+2lnyk 1ny, +ýýPmk InXm Inyk k-l j-1 m-1 k-l 
MK 
+mat+ 
1 
m012+yyýtlnxm+, 4k, tInyk (E6.6) 2 
m=ý k"1 
For notation ease, subscripts i and t representing the individual bank and time 
period are omitted. Since our sample covers a relatively long time period, 
1999-2008, changes in both technology and efficiency are taken into account. 
The inclusion of tZ term allows for a flexible temporal pattern of technology 
change as the technological changes do not have to be monotonic. The input 
distance function is required to satisfy certain restrictions, including 
homogeneity of degree one in inputs 
m A4 
am =1andamn = Pmk = 7mr =0 (E6.7) 
M=l M-1 m. l m-l 
and restriction on symmetry 
amn = anm (m, n=1,2,... M) and fßk, =ß (j, k=1,2,... K) (E6.8) 
According to Lovell et al. (1994), the homogeneity restriction can be imposed 
by normalizing the input distance function by one of the inputs. The 
homogeneity property suggests that 
1ID, (z, y, t) = D; x, y, t) for any 
A>0 and therefore if the Mth input is chosen for normalization, (E6.6) 
becomes: 
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U-1 K 
In(D1 / xM) = In D, 
- 
In xM = ao + a, 
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, 
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, X. ) + ýk, t 1n yk (E6.9) 
m-1 k-1 
Since D, (x, y, t) =u, rearranging (E6.9) by moving the distance term "In D, " 
to the right-hand-side, (E6.10) can then be transformed into the standard SFA 
model with a noise, v, and inefficiency, u. 
M-1 
-In x =o+a,. 
If(Xm /x) + f'k In 
m°I k-l 
KKM 
-I K 
+2EE 
," kl 
In Yk in yl +EE Pmk In(Xm /XM ) In yk 
k-I f-I m. 1 k-I 
M-I M-I 
+1 Lr amn 
I n(Xm / x,, ) ln(x,, / x,, ) + mot +ým. t' 2milnýI 2 
M-1 K 
+2: Ym, t ln(xm lxs, )+j: ýk, t Inyk +v-u (E6.10) 
M-1 kal 
As discussed in the methodology section, we employ Battese and Coelli's 
(1995) single-step technique to explore the factors that influence the technical 
efficiency of the banks. Again, the same set of variables used in the DEA 
analysis capturing the macroeconomic environment, the nature and risk taking 
characteristics of the banks and time trend will be estimated using (E6.1 1). 
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u= So + 8, t + 52t2 + &(IPO, ownership, Risk, Profitability, GDP) +e (E6.11) 
6.3.2 Result of SFA Estimation 
Using computer programme Frontier 4.1, the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation of stochastic frontier parameters was reported in Table 6.12. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) test of one-side error was greater than 39, strongly 
indicating the existence of a one-side error within the composite error term. 
The coefficient of the time trend variable was positive but not statistically 
significant, suggesting there was no obvious upward shifting of the production 
frontier over sample period from 1999 to 2008. For the first-order coefficients 
of input and output variables, only one in each group was found to influence 
the efficiency level of the banks significantly and the signs were as expected. 
The negative coefficient of the output variable, total loans, indicated that banks 
generating more loans were less technically efficient. This can be interpreted in 
the following way. The banks grant loans to the customers to generate interest 
incomes. So the loan itself does not represent he ultimate output of the banks 
but the interests it earned. If the banks expand the loan business too rapidly, it 
may lead to mounting NPLs and consequently impairs the overall performance 
of the banks. 
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Table 6.12 Results of the stochastic input distance function 
Deposit (X3) Coefficient Std. Error t 
Total loans (InY1) 
-0.237267 0.224693 -1.055963 
Other earning assets (In Y2) 0.776363- 0.217672 3.566860 
Fixed Assets (In(X, /X3)) 0.254097 0.264475 0.960761 
Employees (ln(4X3)) 
-0.79308 0.343533 2.308602 
0.279599* 0.157581 1.774323 
Z 0.002125 0.000431 4.924990 
LR test of the one-side error 39.4833 
Mean Technical Efficiency 0.9543 
Explanation Variables 
Ownership 0.07735*** 0.017907 4.319427 
IPO -0.058905*** 0.018664 3.156007 
t -0.017291** 0.007784 -2.22137 
In(ROA) 
-0.039596 0.623055 -0.63551 
In(LLR/TL) 0.0001717 0.007191 0.023881 
In (EIA) 
-0.027993** 0.013653 -2.050347 
1n(GDP Growth) -0.183046 0.115686 -1.582263 
constant 0.5745715» 0.242293 2.3713942 
Notes: *** means that the variable is significant at 1% level; ** means that the variable is significant at 
5% level and * means that the variable is significant at 10% level; ROA, return on asset; LLR/'1'L. loan 
loss reserve to total loans; E/A, equity to assets. 
The average technical efficiency of the 14 listed banks over the 10 years 
sample period was 0.95, improving steadily from 0.88 in 1999 to over 0.99 in 
2008. In particular, the efficiencies of the SOBs, JECBs and CCBs increased 
16%, 8% and almost 20% respectively over the sample period. The most 
efficient bank was PDB with mean efficiency rating of 0.99 while Beijing bank 
was found to be the least technically efficient. Figure 6.10 depicts the 
efficiency ratings of the 14 listed banks in terms of their ownership structure 
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from 1999 to 2008. 
Figure 6.10 Efficiency of Chinese listed commercial banks, 1999-08--SFA 
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In the early years before 2003, the efficiency gaps among the different types of 
banks were substantial with the JECBs leading the overall banking industry. 
From 1999 to 2001, the JECBs in average were about 10% to 15% more 
efficient than the SOBs and CCBs. However after China's accession to the 
WTO and the completion of comprehensive banking retbrms, the situation 
changed dramatically. Despite the JECBs performing better than the other 
types of banks, the SOBs and CCBs had caught up rapidly and reduced the 
mean efficiency ratings greatly to less than 1% in 2007 and 2008. This finding 
is consistent with the prior DEA conclusion. 
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For the effect of stock listing on efficiency improvement, Table 6.13 
summarises the results. In line with the DEA estimations, the efficiency ratings 
of all 12 banks improved after stock listing. The difference in the mean 
efficiency level is about 2.5% between the pre-IPO and IPO year. The positive 
effect of stock listing was more obvious for the CCBs and JECBs as their 
efficiency in average was enhanced by 3.3% and 2.8% respectively while for 
the SOBs the improvement was just 1%. The small efficiency gain of the SOBs 
after listing might reflect the significant gains that had already been obtained 
through the recent banking reform that was mainly focused on them. After the 
unloading of their NPLs and substantial financial aid from the state, the 
efficiency of the SOBs had already been enhanced. The subsequent stock 
listing was just a way of consolidating the previous reform achievements and 
transforming the past management practices of the SOBs. Instead of serving as 
the lending mechanism of the government, the SOBs became responsible for 
their investment decisions after becoming public listed companies and were 
required to satisfy shareholders. On the other hand, as suggested by the results 
of DEA various return to scale model, the improved technical efficiency of the 
SOBs may be compromised by a deterioration in their scale economies, leading 
to a relatively small improvement of their overall efficiency. 
147 
Chapter 6 Efficiency Analysis of Chinese Listed Commercial Banks Dan LUO 
Table 6.13 Efficiency levels of Chinese listed banks before and after 
IPO-SFA 
One year before IPO 
Efficiency Level 
IPO year One year after IPO 
State-owned banks 
BOC 0.9840 0.9950 0.9963 
CCB 0.9836 0.9937 0.9940 
ICBC 0.9781 0.9933 0.9949 
City Commercial banks 
Beijing 0.9224 0.9411 0.9902 
Nanjing 0.9468 0.9926 0.9884 
Ningbo 0.9576 0.9925 0.9903 
Joint-Equity banks 
BOCOM 0.9892 0.9955 0.9962 
CITIC 0.9936 0.9970 0.9968 
CMB 0.9549 0.9913 0.9938 
CMINB 0.9006 0.9880 0.9899 
HXB 0.9628 0.9929 0.9957 
Industrial 0.9961 0.9976 0.9969 
PDB 
- 
0.9696 0.9821 
SDB 
Notes: Full names of the banks are listed in the appendix; our data period covers the 10 years from 1999; 
the PDB was listed on the stock exchange on 10 November 1999, so data for 1998, before IPO, arc not 
available; the SDB was listed in 1991, so its information is not included in this table. 
Moreover, similar to the DEA findings, the efficiencies of the four banks, 
Nanjing Bank, Ningbo Bank, CITIC and Industrial Bank, were found to have 
deteriorated immediately after the IPO year. As we discussed in the DEA part, 
this worsening performance may be due to "window-dressing" effects in their 
IPO year or it may be caused simply by the tough economic condition 
worldwide in 2008. The latter explanation in particular holds for the SFA result 
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as all these four banks were listed in 2007. 
Table 6.12 also presents the result of the technical inefficiency effects model. 
Quite consistent with the Tobit estimation of the DEA efficiencies, the four 
variables-ownership, IPO, t, E/A and GDP growth-were found to influence 
significantly the efficiency of the banks. The positive sign of the ownership 
variable confirms the prior conclusion that in the sample period, the SOBs 
were 7% less efficient than the non-state-owned banks. The coefficients of the 
other three statistically significant variables were negative, indicting that they 
influence the efficiency level of the banks positively. In particular, the listed 
banks were almost 6% more efficient than the non-listed banks while a better 
asset quality and/or hard budget constraint could enhance bank efficiency by 
around 3%. The time trend, t, is significant at 5% level, implying that 
efficiency of the banks was improved by 1.7% year after year. 
6.4 Comparison of SFA and DEA Results 
The use of the two estimation techniques allows us to assess the robustness of 
tested efficiency ratings. In this section, we will apply the correlation test and 
paired t-test to analysis the relationships between the DEA and SFA results. 
Table 6.14 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the two methods. The mean 
technical efficiency estimated by SFA is about 10% higher than the DEA 
efficiency, consistent with the past research (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Bauer et 
149 
Chapter 6 Efficiency Analysis of Chinese Listed Commercial Banks Dan LUO 
al., 1998). This difference stems from the different assumptions of the two 
models. DEA assumes no specific production frontier and reports all noisy 
factors as inefficiency whereas SFA pre-specifies the functional form and 
allows for random error. In particular, if the measurement errors do exist in the 
data, DEA estimation will mistakenly classify all of them into inefficiencies 
and therefore grant lower efficiency scores to the DMUs. It is also noticeable 
that the standard deviation of the DEA efficiency rating was twice as large as 
that of the SFA. The dispersion of DEA efficiency was more than. O. 2 while the 
same figure under SFA estimation was just 0.1. This might because the DEA 
efficiency is a relative estimation and it is sensitive to "self-identifiers" or 
"near-self-identifiers". 18 All these factors lead to the relatively low DEA 
efficiency ratings and wider dispersions. 
Table 6.14 Comparison of DEA-CCR and SFA efficiency estimations 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SFA 14 0.9540164 0.0359535 0.8906471 0.9908708 
DEA-CRS 14 0.8621343 0.0531057 0.7343848 0.9389356 
Table 6.15 and 6.16 present the correlation test and paired-t test based on 
DEA-CCR and SFA efficiency ratings. The correlation coefficient is 0.33 and 
18 DEA identifies a DMU as either efficient or inefficient compared to other observations in its 
reference set, which is composed of efficient observations with the most similar configuration 
of inputs and outputs. The problem of "self-identification" will occur if there is no comparable 
observation of a particular DMU existing in the sample. This DMU will thereby choose itself' 
as "reference" and obtain relatively high efficiency score. 
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not statistically significant, suggesting that the two sets of efficiency results are 
not directly comparable. The weak correspondence between the two methods is 
not a surprise and is consistent with earlier research (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; 
Bauer et al., 1998; Weill, 2004). A paired t-test further confirmed our 
conclusion. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the two 
observations. In the case of our sample, it can be rejected at 1% level as the 
value of test statistic, t, is 6.42. 
Table 6.15 Correlation test of DEA-CCR and SFA efficiency ratings 
Efficiency scores SFA DEA-CCR 
SFA 1.0000 
DEA-CCR 0.3272 (0.2535) 1.0000 
Note: To reduce the effects of noise, the correlation coefficient are estimated based on the 
average efficiencies of 14 listed banks over 10 years' sample period. If use the efficiency 
ratings of different banks in separate years, the result is quite similar to the one reported 
Table 6.16 Paired T 
-test of DEA-CCR and SFA efficiency ratings 
Std. 
Std. 95% confidence interval Pair1 Mean error t df Sig. 
DEA-SFA Dev. Lower Upper mean 
diff. 0.0919 0.0143 0.0535 0.0609 0.1228 6.42 13 
. 
000 
Note: To reduce the effects of noise, the correlation coefficient are estimated based on the 
average efficiencies of 14 listed banks over 10 years' sample period. If use the efficiency 
ratings of different banks in separate years, the result is quite similar to the one reported 
In addition to testing the relationship of efficiency scores estimated by the two 
approaches, we further examine the consistency by comparing the rank-order 
correlations (Table 6.17). Although the parametric and non-parametric frontier 
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measurements generate different level of technical efficiencies, it is still 
possible that they similarly rank the same DMU. Identifying the rough ordering 
of which banks are more efficient than the others is important for regulatory 
policy decisions because it helps the government determine whether a 
particular reform is effective in improving efficiency rating of target banks 
(Bauer et al. 1998). The Spearman rank-order correlation of DEA and SFA 
estimation is 0.48 and significant at 10% level, indicating a fairly close rank 
correlation between the two methods. Despite increased efficiency ratings over 
years, the SOBs are all ranked in the bottom half of the sample banks, 
suggesting a clear necessity of further improvement. 
Table 6.17 also reports the Spearman rank-order correlation among DEA, SFA 
efficiency and standard non-frontier performance indictors. It is expected that 
the efficiency orders should be positively correlated with traditional 
performance measurements to provide a certain assurance that the frontier 
techniques are not simply an artefact of the procedure but a measure of the 
performance and decision making. All the DEA, SFA efficiencies and financial 
ratios are averaged over time to reduce the influence of external random shocks. 
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Table 6.17 Spearman Rank-order correlation of DEA-CCR, SFA estimations 
and traditional performance indictors 
Efficiency Rankings SFA DEA-CRS 
SFA 1.0000 
-- 
DEA-CCR 0.4769* 1.0000 
ROA 
-0.5473 
-0.1956 
LLR/TLs 0.2835 
-0.1736 
E/A 
-0.6308w 
-0.2584 
Loan/ Deposit 0.8505-- 0.4022 
Note: To reduce the effects of noise, the rank-order correlations of the average efficiencies and 
financial ratios of the 14 listed banks over time are reported. If we use the efliciency ratings 
and financial ratios of different banks in separate years, the result is quite similar to the one 
reported. * represents that correlation is statistically significant at 10% level, ** is significant 
at 5% level and *** is significant at 1% level; DEA-CCR represents the DEA constant return 
to scale model; ROA, return on assets; LLR/TLs, loan loss reserve to total loans; E/A, equity to 
total assets. 
Both frontier measures are related to traditional performance measures to some 
extent. Two risk taking indictors, LLR/TLs and Loan/Deposit are positively 
correlated with frontier efficiencies. The SFA efficiency rankings are more 
consistent with financial indictors while the DEA-based estimations are less so. 
This is consistent with prior literatures that the parametric techniques represent 
the traditional performance indictors better than the non-parametric approaches 
(Bauer et at. 1998). The profitability indictor, ROA, and the capital risk 
indictor, E/A is found to be negatively correlated with both DEA and SFA 
efficiency rankings. This might because of the Chinese banking data we 
employed. The Chinese financial institutions are well-known for operating 
under various state restrictions and are constantly subject to changing 
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government policies at various administrative levels. The bank management 
therefore can not fully control input investments and output productions, which 
leads to the discrepancy between frontier estimations and financial indictors. 
On the other hand, our DEA and SFA efficiency estimations are consistent with 
general expectations and prior studies, so it may suggest that the financial 
ratios employed for comparison are inaccurately measured. The allowance of 
choosing among different accounting policies leaves substantial potential for 
manipulating reported earnings, not to mention the manipulation by 
management of the financial figures to achieve desired outcomes. To improve 
the quality of published reports, financial regulation and supervision will need 
to be strengthened in future. For example, not only the listed banks, but all the 
commercial banks in China should be required to adopt International 
Accounting Standards (ISA) in preparing interim and annual reports. At present, 
only the listed banks follow the ISA. The banks will then have less opportunity 
to be "creative", making their financial statements more readily comparable. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we apply both the non-parametric approach, DEA, and the 
parametric approach, SFA, to analyse the efficiency of the 14 listed Chinese 
commercial banks. In particular, we sought to test the impact of listing on the 
efficiency level of the banks. 
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We first estimate the DEA-CCR, the constant return to scale model. Consistent 
with the prior studies, the mean efficiency of the Chinese commercial banks 
was about 0.86 and the JECBs were the best performers among all the banks. 
Despite the latest reforms of the SOBs, their performance was still poorer than 
the other two types of banks. Within the 139 sample DMUs, 13 were fully 
efficient but none was state-owned. Nine of the 14 banks had average 
efficiency scores clustered around 0.85, suggesting there was still significant 
potential for further efficiency improvement even among listed banks. 
For scale efficiency, the CCR model reports that all the 30 DMUs of the SOBs 
were operating at DRS, while for the JECBs and CCBs, more than 60% of 
them displayed IRS. To eliminate the effect of scale diseconomies, we further 
apply the DEA-BCC, or the various return to scale model. The overall 
efficiency rating improved significantly to 0.92. The efficiency gap among 
different banking groups had been greatly reduced over years, implying that the 
main source of inefficiency of the SOBs came from scale diseconomies. 
Despite continued improvement of their productivity and profitability, the large 
overhead expenses stemming from overstaffing and an extensive branch 
network made the overall efficiency of the SOBs inferior to the JECBs. In 
terms of pure technical efficiency, however, the SOBs outperformed all other 
banks. 
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In the next part of the chapter, we employed the parametric approach, SFA. The 
average technical efficiency of the 14 listed banks over the 10 years sample 
period was 0.95, improving steadily from 0.88 in 1999 to over 0.99 in 2008. 
Similar to the DEA results, SFA also identified a converged movement of 
efficiency rating among different banking groups. Despite the JECBs 
out-performing than other banks, the SOBs and CCBs have caught up with 
them rapidly and reduced the mean efficiency ratings to less than one 
percentage point in 2007 and 2008. 
All three models supported the hypothesis that stock listing would improve 
efficiency. Under DEA-CCR estimation, the average efficiency rating of the 
banks in the IPO year was about 6% higher than that before the IPO year while 
the figure under SFA model was 2.5%. However, we found that efficiencies of 
several banks deteriorated immediately after IPO. This worsening performance 
may be because of the "window-dressing" effects before their IPO year, which 
had already given the impression of significantly improved efficiency, or it 
may simply reflect the tough world economic condition in 2008. Therefore 
further research becomes necessary. 
In addition to calculating efficiency ratings, we also employ the technical 
inefficiency model to test the determinants of bank efficiency. Both DEA and 
SFA results suggest that the four variables-ownership, IPO, t, E/A and GDP 
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growth-influenced the efficiency of the banks significantly. The SOBs were 
less efficient than the non-state owned banks over sample period and their IPO 
proved to be an effective way to improve their efficiency. 
To examine the robustness of estimated efficiency ratings, we test the 
consistency conditions for DEA and SFA techniques in three aspects. Firstly we 
tested for the correlation between the DEA-CCR and SFA efficiency levels, 
compared their rank-order correlations, and finally compared the frontier 
results with traditional performance indictors. Our findings were consistent 
with prior literatures. Efficiency ratings estimated by the DEA-CCR and SFA 
techniques were not directly comparable whereas their rank orders were fairly 
well correlated. Both of the frontier measures were found to be related to 
financial indictors to some extent while the SFA was a better representation of 
traditional measures. 
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Chapter 7 Implication of the Financial Crisis 
on the Further Development of Chinese Banks19 
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis which started from August 2007 has been 
transformed into a worldwide financial crisis. The slump in housing prices 
increased the default on mortgages, the negative effect further amplified by 
asset securitization. Not only were the US banks affected, nearly all financial 
institutions around the world suffered substantial losses from their investments 
in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). Investors lost confidence in the US 
financial market and its economy, causing the collapse of the stock market. 
Turbulence of the US financial market also generated substantial negative 
impacts on the Chinese financial sector and its real economy. A report from 
Goldman Sachs disclosed that the BOC was widely exposed to the US 
sub-prime securities and might incur huge losses. SSE Composite Index 
plummeted through 2008 and there was a rapid increase in unemployment as 
export-dependent factories closed in late 2008, which subsequently promoted 
the Chinese government to announce a huge stimulus package. As China's 
financial sector becomes more integrated into the world market, there is 
increased interest in understanding the influence of the US housing crisis on 
19 A part of this chapter will be published in: Yao, S. J., Luo, D. and Morgan, S. (2010). 
`Impact of the US Credit Crunch and Housing Market Crisis on China', Journal of 
Contemporary China, 19 (65). 
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the Chinese banks and its wider economy. This chapter will address the above 
issue in following aspects: to what extent is the Chinese banking sector 
exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage market? Might such an exposure 
spillover into China's financial sector? With rapid growth in domestic 
mortgage market, is it possible for China to experience a similar housing crisis 
in the future and what are the implications of the crisis? 
7.1 US Credit Crunch and Its Threats to the Chinese Financial 
Market 
7.1.1 Sub-Prime Lending and the Housing Crisis 
MBS represents a debt obligation whose cash flows are backed by the principal 
and interest payments of a pool of mortgage loans, most commonly on 
residential property. It originated from the US in the 1970s and was regarded as 
one of the most important financial innovations in the past three decades. 
However, such a financial instrument based on risk management can make 
lenders vulnerable to losses and liquidity stress during an economic downturn, 
as exemplified by the current US sub-prime crisis from August 2007. 
After many years' steady improvement, the US economy was badly hit by the 
"dotcom bubble , 20 in 2001. The real GDP grew by 1.2% in 2001, compared to 
20 Also is referred as "l. T bubble". It was a speculative bubble starting roughly from 1995 and 
peaked in 2000. During this period, the value of the stock markets in Western nations increased 
rapidly because of the growth in the new Internet sector. Many companies dismissed standard 
business models, purely focusing on increasing market share at the expense of the bottom line. 
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4.1% one year earlier (Country Profile, USA, 2002). To revive the economy, 
the Federal Reserves cut the interest rate II times continuously from 5.5% in 
January 2001 to 1% in June 2003. During the same period, mortgage interest 
rate dropped by more than 20 % from 7.01 % in the first quarter ol'2001 to just 
5.52 % in the second quarter of 2003 (PD&R, 2004). Reduced interest rate 
directly relieved the mortgage payment and led to a renewed prosperity in the 
housing market. The US housing price index more than doubled between 2000 
and July 2006, reaching its highest level of 206.52 (January 2000=100). In 
particular, the US house prices increased faster than its GDII growth From 
December 2001 to 2005 (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1 US real home prices vs. real GDP 
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Source: Country Profile, United States, 1996-2008. 
When the bubble burst, many dotcoms ran out of capital and were acquired or liquidated, 
representing the beginning of a period of mild recession in the developed world. 
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Meanwhile, various personal mortgage products21 were offered to people with 
poor or impaired credit history and consequently, triggering the rapid growth of 
sub-prime lending (Figure 7.2). From 2004 to 2006, about 21% of* the newly 
issued mortgages were sub-prime, up from 9% during 1996 to 2004 period 
(Waggoner, 3 September 2007). Till the end of 2006, sub-prime mortgages 
totalled $665 billion, accounting for 23% of the US home loan market 
(Bernanke, 14 March 2008). 
Figure 7.2 Sub-prime mortgage growth and its share in total mortgage market 
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21 These mortgages include Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), interest-only ARM and negative 
amortization loans, etc. ARM is a mortgage loan which adjusts the interest rate on the note 
periodically based on a variety of indices, such as 1-year constant-maturity Treasury (CMT) 
securities and London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). An interest-only ARM is a loan in 
which for a set term the borrower pays only the interest on the principal balance, leaving the 
principal balance unchanged. At the end of the term, the borrowers may choose to enter an 
interest-only mortgage, pay the principal, or convert the loan to a principal and interest 
payment loan at their own option. The negative amortization loan means that based on some 
pro-agreed terms, the loan payment for a period can be less than the interest charge over that 
period and this shorted amount is then added to the total amount owned to the lender. From an 
international perspective, all these three mortgage types belong to Variable Rafe Mortgage or 
Floating Rate Mortgage whose interest rate fluctuates to reflect market conditions. 
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To cool down the overheated economy, the Federal Reserves raised the interest 
rate 17 times consecutively to 5.25% by 29 June 2006. Increased mortgage 
payment pressure led to foreclosures and a sharp drop in house price. This 
problem worsened after the second half of 2007 when most of the 
adjustable-rate or interest-only mortgages entered their resetting period (Figure 
7.3). In 2007, about 1.3 million US housing properties were subject to 
foreclosure activities (Irvine, 29 January 2008). After the first two years' low 
initial offering rate period expired, the revised interest rate increased as much 
as 30-50%. Accompanied by the banks' tightened lending activities, housing 
demand was further reduced, which caused more price drops and defaults. 
During the previous downturn in the early 1990s, the US average house price 
fell by 2.8 % according to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index (Corkery 
and Hagerty, 14 July 2008). However, the price slide this time was 
substantially steeper and has lasted much longer. By July 2008, average US 
house prices had dropped 19.2%, resulting in the value of some houses even 
significantly less than the outstanding mortgages. 
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Figure 7.3 First reset date as percentage of Sub-prime outstanding 
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Source: FitchRatings, Loan Performance, http: //wvwtitchratina. com. 
Soon after the broke of housing crisis, two credit rating agencies, Moody and 
Standard & Poor's, downgraded the ratings of 399 and 612 sub-prime related 
MBS respectively (England, 2007). Heightened levels of fear in the credit 
market soon transformed the original residential mortgage default problem into 
a financial turmoil. Investors lost confidence in the US housing market and its 
economy, causing the collapse of its stock market. The US S&P 500 Index 
slumped to 682 on 5 March 2009, a level much lower than its previous drop in 
2002. Bearing the risk of higher inflation, the US Federal Reserves slashed 
interest rate nine times consecutively to 2% by April 2008 to stimulate 
consumption and generate relief to borrowers. However, it also accelerated the 
speed of the US dollar depreciation. Huge amount of foreign investments was 
withdrawn from the US market, making capital financing more difficult. 
Meanwhile, these "hot money" imposed greater pressure on the Euro and other 
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currencies, generating turbulences in the worldwide financial markets. 
Both the US Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) acted swiftly and 
unprecedentedly to rescue the market, but could do little to stop the global 
economy from deteriorating. All the Wall Street giants suffered. Between June 
2007 and March 2008, more than $430 billion was wiped off the combined 
market value of the top ten US investment banks, while the losses for the 
mortgage lenders was about $162 billion (Stamp, 3 August 2008). Some of the 
US biggest names, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers and AIG were either put up for sales, bought by the US 
government or became bankrupt. Worsening problems in the financial sector 
cascade through to impact negatively on the real economy. During 2008, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to issue increasingly worse forecasts 
for world GDP growth in 2009. The US economy is expected to contract by 
3.3% and the UK by 4% in 2009 (Anonymous, EIU, 4 May 2009). 
As the turmoil unfolded in 2008, reports emerged that one of the biggest 
Chinese commercial banks, BOC, had also invested heavily into the US 
sub-prime market and may face substantial losses. BOC's exposure indicated 
China's financial sector was more integrated into the world economy than 
previously imagined, which raised questions about the influence of the US 
housing crisis on the Chinese banks and its economy. To what extent has the 
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Chinese commercial banks been exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage sector? 
Will the US housing crisis be replicated in China? These are two important 
questions that need to be addressed to understand better the current Chinese 
housing and stock markets. 
7.1.2 Influence of The Financial Crisis to the Chinese Banking Sector 
The Capital Weekly, a Chinese journal, reported that Chinese financial 
institutions had invested $107.5 billion into the US sub-prime sector in the year 
ending 30 June 2006 (Zhong, 13 August 2007). This was almost double the 
amount of the previous year. It further estimated the possible losses of six listed 
Chinese commercial banks based on 2006 data and information released by the 
US Treasury. 
Table 7.1 Chinese banks exposure to US sub-prime mortgage securities 
(Million RMB) 
Bank 
us 
Securities 
Investment 
ABS 
(%) 
SPL 
Lending 
(%) 
Value 
of SPL 
Estimated 
Loss of SPL 
Compared 
with PBT of 
2007 (%) 
BOC 590,766 37.4 0.51 29,641 3,853 4.5 
CCB 306,685 10.8 0.07 4,433 576 0.7 
ICBC 199,870 3.5 0.01 930 120 0.1 
BCOM 27,583 52.5 0.1 1,941 252 1.2 
CMB 34,272 17.3 0.07 794 103 0.7 
CITIC 24,052 4.8 0.02 154 19 0.2 
Source: Capital Weekly, 11 August 2007, htt2: //focusj r'. com. Qn. 
Notes: ABS: Asset Backed Securities; SPL: Sub-prime Loans; PBT: Profit hclore Tax. Full 
name of the banks are listed in Appendix; PBT in 2007 is estimated. 
165 
Chapter 7 Implication of the Financial Crisis on the Further Development of Chinese Banks Dan LUO 
The disclosure of these losses generated huge turmoil in the Chinese financial 
market. BOC clarified immediately that their exposure was not as large as 
reported. CCB and ICBC confirmed that they only had small holding of US 
sub-prime related investments, while the joint-equity banks, CITIC and BCOM, 
simply denied any exposure. CMB announced that all its sub-prime securities 
had already been settled in August 2006 in a favourable condition. 
On 25 March 2008, the BOC 2007 annual report showed net profit of the group 
was up 31% to RMB 56.2 billion, which was far inferior to the other 
commercial banks, such as ICBC, whose net profit rose 65% (Leow, 7 April 
2008). BOC disclosed information related to its sub-prime mortgage 
investment, including that by the end of 2007, the bank had settled most of its 
MBS and its entire Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). 22 It retained $4.99 
billion (RMB 36.4 billion) MBS and $2.47 billion (RMB 18.04 billion) 
Alt-A, 23 accounting for 2.13% and 1.1% of the group's total securities 
investment. BOC disclosed that it had made loss provision of $1.3 billion 
(RMB 9.5 billion) and $0.3 billion (RMB 2.1 billion) for its MBS and Alt-A 
22 A CDO is an unregulated asset-back security and structured credit product, which is an 
important funding vehicle for fixed-income assets. It is constructed from a portlblio of 
fixed-income assets, which are divided by the ratings firms that assess their value into different 
trenches. On 30 June 2007, the balances of BOC's MBS and CDO were USD 8.965 and 0.682 
billion. On 31 March 2008, the balances of BOC's MBS and Alt-A were $4.43 billion and 
$2.21 billion respectively. 
23 An Alt-A mortgage is a type of US mortgage which is risker than "prime" but safer than 
"sub-prime" mortgage. Its interest rate is therefore between those of prime and sub-prime 
house loans. 
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obligations respectively in 2007 (Hou, 2008). However, Moody estimated that 
the actual losses for the MBS alone could reach $2.1 billion (RMB 14 billion) 
after reassessing the associated risks. If the value of BOC's US security 
investment dropped by 5% on average, the total loss could be as high as RMB 
19.8 billion in 2008, wiping off 18.7% of the group's expected profit. 
Compared with ICBC and CCB, BOC's 2008 performance was indeed heavily 
impaired. 
The US credit crunch has played out in the Chinese housing market. The house 
price movements in China, the US and the UK have moved synchronically, 24 
with the Chinese market lagging a bit behind the two developed countries. The 
market condition of China at the start of 2008 was similar to the US market 
during the first half of 2007, when the house prices began to drop. 
The "Chinese Housing Prosperity Index" (CHPI) which is designed to reflect 
the development and the prosperity of the Chinese real-estate market fall 15 
months in a row to 94.74 points in March 2009. Another indictor, "House Price 
Index of 70 Large- and Medium-sized Cities in China", showed a similar 
picture (Figure 7.4). The Chinese house price index went up by 0.2% 
24 We tested the correlation coefficient among the UK, the US and China house price indices. 
The correlation coefficient between UK and China, US and China and UK and l1S was 0.59, 
-0.86 and -0.39 respectively. We next ran the following regression using house indices of the 
three countries, China =a+ PIUS+ 32UK. We found that both of 01 and (i., were highly 
significant at 1% with an R2=0.81, which further supports the view that China's house price 
index is influenced by the movements of the indices of'UK and US markets. 
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year-on-year in March 2009. However, compared with the previous month, it 
had actually decreased slightly. 
Figure 7.4 House price indexes: China, the US and the UK, (July 2005-Mar 09) 
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The slowdown in the Chinese house market has imposed substantial pressure 
on bank operation and profitability. During the six years 2003-08, the 
proportion of home mortgages to total loans rose from 9.2% to about I5%, 
increasing the importance of mortgages for bank revenue (Figure 7.5). 
However, banks could no longer rely on expanding mortgage-lending business 
to boost profit in 2008. All the major SOBs acted prudently towards the 
approval of new personal housing loans, ensuring limited exposure of risk. For 
instance, mortgage lending to total loans of CCB has contracted by 6.1 % in 
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2008. Nonetheless, the default rate and prepayment risk increased substantially. 
For example, the Guangdong branch of CMB reported that in the first quarter 
of 2008, RBM 600 million personal loans were repaid to the bank, 25 of which 
more than 80% were mortgage prepayment (Shihua Financial Report, 14 May 
2008). 
Figure 7.5 Percentage of housing mortgage to total loans, 2003-08 
22 
BOC 
-*- 
ICBC 
--"- CCB 
; 19 
16 
13 
10 
7 
Dec/03 Jun/04 Dec/04 Jun/05 Dec/05 Jun/06 Dec/06 Jun/07 Dec/07 Jun/OS Dec/OS 
Source: Bankscope. 
Meanwhile, Chinese banking stocks slumped. BOC's share price for the 12 
months to October 2008 fell from RMB 7.48 to RMB 3.06. which was below 
its IPO price. Poor performance of banking stocks has brought down the entire 
stock market in China. The SSE Composite Index declined more than 70% to 
1706 by November 2008. Yao and Chen (2008) argue that such a sharp 
Z5 Personal loans includes: personal residential mortgage loans, credit card loans and other 
loans, in which personal residential mortgage loans account for around 80% of the total 
personal loans. 
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downturn might have been associated with the US credit crunch, but a more 
recent study by Yao and Luo (2009) attributes the Chinese stock market crash 
to specific psychological factors of Chinese investors. 
Moreover, the weakened US dollar and the contraction in US consumer 
spending hit China's exports hard. Export to the US has slowed significantly 
since the beginning of 2007 (Anderlini, 16 November 2007). According to the 
National Bureau of Statistic, the trading surplus of China in 2008 had increase 
just 13% year-on-year, compared with a rise of 84% one year earlier. Worse 
more, rather than reflecting improved or sustained exports, the increase was 
mainly due to the sharp decline of China's imports, many of which were 
intermediate inputs for the export manufacturing sector. For instance, the $62 
billion trade surplus in the first quarter of 2009 was realized by a decrease of 
25% of export and a more radical contraction of 31 % in imports. As exports 
accounts for more than a third of China's economic growth, and the US is the 
second largest recipient of all Chinese exports, a depressed US economy might 
derail China's rapid economic growth (Anderlini, 16 November 2007). China's 
central bank estimates that if the US's GDP growth declines by one-percentage 
point, Chinese exports to the US will drop by 6%, which would cut about 
two-percentage points from the Chinese GDP growth (Wang and Fan, 2008). 
Clearly, China is unable to decouple itself completely from the slow down of 
the rest of the world and it will also need to cope with increased pressure from 
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"foreign investment" betting on RMB's further appreciation. 
7.2 Threat to the Chinese Financial Market 
7.2.1 Housing Boom 
House prices in China increased sharply and even doubled during the past two 
years in some fast developed cities. The Chinese National Development and 
Reform Commission showed that the "House Price Index of' 70 Large- and 
Medium-sized Cities in China" rose 6.5% in 2008,1.1% lower than the 
previous year. Figure 7.6 presents the house price indexes of China's four 
major cities, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou from January 2006 
to March 2009 (July 2005=100). 
Figure 7.6 Housing price index of four major cities: Jan 2006--March 09 
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The prosperous Chinese housing market had already started to drop down since 
the second half of 2007. Cities with a steeper past house price upswing, such as 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou, were the biggest causalities in the market downturn. 
Within a year to 2009, the average sale price of houses in Shenzhen was down 
more than 30%. While the downward movement flattened in early 2009, there 
were few signs of recovery in the overall house price index. In response, most 
Chinese banks have tightened their lending policies, asked new home buyers 
for larger deposits and restricted lending to multi-home buyers. A big concern 
of the Chinese government is that the house market downturn following on the 
heels of a stock market crash may unleash a domestic financial crisis. 
7.2.2 Irresponsible Lending Activities of the Banks 
If the sub-prime crisis in the US was due to irresponsible lending activities of 
banking and non-banking mortgage originators, then Chinese banks have made 
similar mistakes too. Rising house prices made mortgage lending lucrative and 
attractive to Chinese banks. On one hand, loans secured on residential property 
are classified as high quality assets when the house market is booming, 
normally with a bad debt ratio of less than 1%. On the other hand, the "Basel 
Accord II" specified that the risk weight of such assets is only 35%, much 
lower than some other assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; 
Li and Lin, 2007). Therefore, banks have strong incentives to reduce their loan 
application requirements to attract more and more borrowers. Table 7.2 
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summarizes the investment of Chinese banks in the housing market. The total 
loans committed to the housing market increased from RMB 7.36 trillion in 
December 2006 to RMB 9.6 trillion in December 2007. Over the same period, 
commercial housing loans rose by 30.8%, mortgage loans 33.6% and 
real-estate development loans 25.7%. 
Table 7.2 Bank loans in the housing market 2006-07 (RMB trillion) 
Category Dec-06 Dec-07 
Balance 3.7 4.8 
Commercial Housing Loan Growth (°k) 22.1 30.8 
Balance 2.3 3.0 
Personal Mortgage Loan Growth (%) 19.0 33.6 
Balance 1.4 1.8 
Real-estate Development Loan Growth (%) 22.1 25.7 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, Statistic Yearbook 2006-07. 
Notes: Growth rate = annual growth from the previous year, Commercial housing loans 
Personal mortgage loan + Real-estate development loan 
Rapid growth in mortgage and real estate development loans fuelled the 
already overheated housing market in China. Although Chinese banks were 
unable to offer deals to their borrowers with zero down payments like their US 
counterparts, loose loan granting requirements and numerous faked documents 
provided by borrowers rendered the banks exposed to unpredictable risks. This 
problem was exacerbated in China because of the undeveloped system for 
monitoring the personal credit history of a borrower. Frequently borrowers can 
obtain evidence of income from some private companies that can be I0-times 
higher than their salary, which is used to support the application for a mortgage 
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(Guo, 2007). When the market is good, this was not an issue as banks could 
recover their lending by selling the collateralized estate had the customer 
defaulted. However, even before the market deteriorated, the complexity of 
disposing of mortgaged assets made such an approach somewhat unrealistic or 
even cavalier. 
Commercial banks in China are more fragile because of the underdeveloped 
financial market, rather than the converse. US banks could spread their high 
risks related to sub-prime mortgage through asset securitization. Thereby, if the 
borrower defaults, the bank was not the sole entity that bore the loss. Such 
mortgage-related financial instruments originated in the US from the 1970s, 
but appeared in the Chinese market only in 2005 when the CCB launched the 
country's first mortgage-backed securities, the "Jianyuan 2005-I MBS". As a 
result, if the housing market in China lost value, commercial banks providers 
of mortgages will be the only losers to carry the cost of irresponsible borrowers. 
At least in the first instance 
- 
the large state banks have ready recourse to 
government assistance. 
7.2.3 Interest Rate Cycle 
Interest rate adjustment is widely used as a monetary instrument by most 
central banks to manage their national economies. From January 2001 to 2003, 
the US Federal Reserves cut the interest rate from 6.5% to 1% to boost the 
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economy (Figure 7.7). Cheap credit overheated the US housing market quickly. 
Consequently, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to cool the market. This 
U-turn in interest rate policy was the catalyst for the crash in the house market 
that accelerated from 2006 onwards. 
The UK interest rates moved similarly to the US pattern, but with less volatility. 
The UK house market had enjoyed more than a decade of rising prices to the 
end of 2007, but started to decline steeply in 2008. Both the US and UK have 
cut their interest rates to historical low levels to restore market stability and 
cushion the slide into recession. 
Figure 7.7 Interest rate movements of US, UK and China: Jan 1999- Jan 09 
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Source: US Federal Reserve, Bank of England and People's Bank of China, Statistic data. 
In China, the interest rate was maintained at a relatively low level before 2006, 
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but as the housing market heated up, the rate was raised. Mortgage borrowers 
began to feel the pinch more acutely from January 2008, when the one-year 
loan interest rate had up swung by almost 1 percentage point to 7.26%. On 
average, the monthly payments had increased by hundreds or even thousands 
of RMB, causing many homeowners to default on their mortgage payments. 
However, as China's Consumer Price Index (CPI) was rising and the real 
interest rate of savings was negative, there was pressure on the Central Bank to 
raise the interest rate further. High interest rates, declining house prices and 
defaults on mortgage payments can run into a vicious circle, which have 
potential to induce the Chinese housing market to collapse. However, despite a 
sharp drop in a few big cities, the overall Chinese housing market is unlikely to 
crash in the same way as in the US due to a number of social, economic and 
cultural differences. 
7.3 Competitive Strength of China 
7.3.1 Fast Development of China's Economy 
Different from the US, the prosperity of the Chinese real-estate market was not 
triggered by low interest rate or by attractive mortgage products, but has grown 
along with the fast expanding Chinese economy. Table 7.3 compares the GDP 
growth rates of China, the US, the UK, Japan and Germany. 
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Table 7.3 GDP growth in China, the UK, the US, Japan and Germany (%) 
Year UK US Japan Germany China 
2001 2.46 0.75 0.18 1.15 8.30 
2002 2.10 1.60 0.26 0.01 9.10 
2003 2.82 2.51 1.41 
-0.23 10.0 
2004 2.76 3.64 2.74 1.18 10.1 
2005 2.06 2.94 1.93 0.75 10.4 
2006 2.84 2.78 2.42 2.98 11.6 
2007 3.03 2.03 2.08 2.51 11.9 
2008 0.70 1.13 
-0.58 
-0.4 9.13 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), http: //www. im t, oriL/extcrnul/datu. htm'. 
http: //www. tradingeconomics. co 
- 
China achieved much higher economic growth than the four largest 
industrialized economies in the world, especially after its accession to the 
WTO in December 2001. By the end of 2008, China's trading volume reached 
$2.6 trillion, generating a surplus of $297 billion, a rise of 18% and 14% 
respectively from the previous year. In addition, a large and increasing amount 
of foreign capital flowed into China during recent years. Therefore, it was not 
surprising that the stock and the housing markets soared. Although the house 
price index for large- and medium-sized cities in China increased by 6.5% in 
2008, it was slower than the GDP growth rate and seemingly reasonable. 
Meanwhile, the fast expending economy spurred on income growth. The real 
incomes of China's urban and rural residents grew by 7.5% and 11% 
respectively in the year to September 2008, which was faster than the growth 
of house prices. As a result, the demand for housing increased, which 
prolonged prosperity in the real-estate market. 
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It is no doubt that the favourable trade condition of China had been seriously 
deteriorated from the second half of 2008 due to contracted demand from the 
western world. China still managed to keep its GDP growth rate at 9% in 2008 
(National Bureau of Statistic, 2001-08). Although the figures are not high 
compared with recent achievements, they are the envy of the rest of the world 
under the current financial situation. In November 2008, China stunned the 
world by unveiling a massive fiscal stimulus package worth RMB 4 trillion 
($586 billion). The plan put substantial emphasis on upgrading China's 
infrastructure and improving the living standards of disadvantaged groups 
through the building of social security and social welfare systems (Dollar, 12 
November 2008). Amounting to 16% of China's GDP in 2007, the stimulus 
plan is large by any measure and showed China's determination to stem the 
domestic impact of the global financial crisis and prepare for sustainable 
long-term growth in the future (Batson, 10 November 2008). 
7.3.2 China's Specific Social and Cultural Characteristics 
China's huge population, diversified housing requirements, and peoples 
savings and consumption habit are distinctly different from the other countries. 
From the demand side, the US has only one-fourth of China's population, 
although the territorial areas are almost the same. There is no doubt that US 
physical housing needs are far less than those of China. On the other hand, 
China's urbanization process was another factor pushing up house prices. 
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Many rural people have migrated to cities in recent year, but the urban areas 
available for real estate development are limited (Zhao and Lv, 2007). As a 
result, the cost of land has increased rapidly in China over the past 15 years. In 
the US and other western countries, such social transformation process is 
relatively moderate and bidirectional. 
Chinese consumption and savings habits are also more conservative than the 
westerners'. Table 7.4 shows the house buying intention of different income 
classes in "China seven biggest cities" in the first quarter of 2008 and 
compared with three months earlier. 26 
Table 7.4 Potential buyers of different income classes (Q4 2007 &Q 12008, %) 
Monthly 500- 1000- 2000- 5000- 10000- 20000- 
income per <500 1000 2000 5000 10000 20000 50000 >50000 
head (RMB) 
Q42007 9.3 9.9 12.7 15.5 18.7 21.8 28.4 33.1 
Q12008 8.8 8.8 10.9 14.2 17.8 19.5 26.3 29.9 
Change (+-) 
-0.5 -1.1 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 -2,3 -2.1 -3.2 
Source: Chinese real-estate information statistic, http; //www. crei. cn/. 
More than 80% of potential home buyers are those with a monthly income of 
RMB 10,000 or more. For these people, mortgage payment accounts for a 
rather small proportion of their incomes. Therefore, different from the US 
where banks lent to those who were less able to service a mortgage, especially 
26 The survey was carried out by the People's Banks of China in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Xi'an, Tianjin, Wuhan and Guangzhou. 
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the low income households, most of the home loans are concentrated on the 
well-off urban middle and high income households in China. As a result, a 
house market meltdown would impact on relatively few Chinese. 
Chinese house buyers are also rather risk-averse. Owning a house is an 
important savings instrument and Chinese people have a much higher 
propensity to save than their western counterparts. This saving and investment 
behaviour combined with fast growing incomes is a key factor that has 
sustained recent China's housing boom. Comparing the figures in the first 
quarter of 2008 with those in the last quarter of 2007, only among high-income 
households was there a marked declined in expressed intension to buy a house 
(Table 7.4). However, except in a few fast developed cities, the house price fäll 
was not as big as has been in the US or the UK. 
7.3.3 Different Nature of Chinese Commercial Banks Operation 
First of all, Chinese banks require higher buyer deposits from borrowers than 
the US banks. In order to reduce the operational risk to a controllable level, the 
CBRC requires at least 30% of the total value of the property as deposit, while 
100% mortgages were available in the US and the UK. Under the pressure of 
recent housing boom, CBRC and the People's Bank of China further request 
that multi-home buyers have to stake a minimum 40% down payment from 27 
September 2007. Such a policy sought to provide the banks more protection. 
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As long as house prices do not fall more than 30%, banks are unlikely to incur 
huge losses from liquidating properties repossessed. 
Secondly, the proportion of "Personal Loans" of Chinese banks was much 
smaller than their US counterparts. Although these have increased during 
recent years, in total personal loans only account for around 20% of the bank 
lending in China while this ratio in the US was between 30% and 50%. 
Residential mortgages account for the largest share of personal loans, typically 
70-80%. However, multiplied by the ratio of personal loans to total loans, even 
among the state-owned banks, home mortgages only accounts for 15% of total 
lending. Therefore, the impact of a house market downturn on Chinese banks 
will be limited provided the rest of the economy does not deteriorate at the 
same time. 
Finally, the improved asset quality of Chinese commercial banks gives them 
more flexibility to deal with unexpected risks. Both the impaired loan ratio and 
composition of bed debts look quite healthy recently. Figure 7.8 sketches the 
bad debt ratio and the percentage of sub-prime debt to total bad debt of all the 
Chinese commercial banks from 2004 to 2009 and figure 7.9 concentrates on 
the three state-owned banks. 
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Figure 7.8 Bad debt and sub-prime debt of Chinese commercial banks: 2004-09 
Figure 7.9 Bad debt and sub-prime debt of BOC, ICBC and CCB: 2002-08 
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Source: Bankscope. 
After a series of bank reforms, the problems related to state-owned banks' 
non-performing loans (bad debts) have been solved by and large. The bad debts 
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Notes: Total bad debt of the Chinese banks equals to Bad debt plus sub-prime debt. 
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and sub-prime loans have been small and have decreased over the years. In 
particular, on 21 October 2008, the state had approved the reform plan of the 
last troubled state bank, the ABC, and injected $19 billion to strengthen its 
balance sheet, bringing down the overall bad debt ratio of Chinese commercial 
banks to just 2.42% by the end of 2008. In the first quarter of 2009, the ratio 
fell further to 2.04%, of which 0.95% represents sub-prime debt (CBRC, 2009). 
Moreover, as the securitization market in China is in its infancy, the negative 
effect of sub-prime loan defaults can hardly spread to the whole financial 
system. 
These three points discussed above lead us to believe that the gloomy 
atmosphere in the US and the rest of the industrialized world may not seriously 
affect the stability of Chinese banking system and financial market. The 
conservative nature of the banks operation and the risk-averse attitude of the 
Chinese people enable the Chinese commercial banks to survive the turmoil of 
the financial crisis. Despite losses in its US sub-prime related investment, BOC 
managed to realize a net profit of RMB 64 billion in 2008, up 14.4% 
year-on-year, while the other two state banks, CCB and ICBC, were up 34% 
and 35% respectively. Meanwhile, the collapse of the share price of many 
banking giants has enabled the three biggest Chinese SOBs in early 2009 to 
supplant their American and European competitors as the world's largest 
commercial banks measured by market capitalization (Table 7.5). Not only is 
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the ICBC the world's most profitable bank and largest bank in market 
capitalization, it has become the biggest deposit holder as well (Anderlini and 
Guerrera, 14 April 2009). By the end of March 2009, customer deposits of 
ICBC reached RMB 8,900 billion ($1,302 billion), overtaking JPMorgan Chase 
and Japan's Mitsubishi UF J Financial Group, which held about $1,000 billion 
and $1,290 billion in deposit respectively (Anderlini and Guerrera, 14 April 
2009). This latest symbolic milestone again supports our argument that Chinese 
banks have emerged relatively unscathed from the global crisis and also 
highlights the growing affluence of Chinese citizens, who have historically 
saved a large portion of their incomes rather than relying on credit. 
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Table 7.5 Share prices, market values and profits of selected world banking 
giants 
Deo-98 Deo-01 Dec-05 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mar-09 
Share price 0.90 0.43 0.51 
BOC Market cap. 229.69 110.30 129.59 
profit before tax 1.03 1.88 7.54 13.51 12.76 
Share price 1.11 0.52 0.58 
ICBC Market cap. 371.76 173.01 192.52 
profit before tax 1.83 8.96 17.75 21.27 
Share price 1.35 0.56 0.63 
CCB Market cap. 315.12 130.96 147.68 
profit before tax 0.25 1.31 7.77 15.49 17.52 
Share price 5.21 7.91 9.80 8.57 0.72 0.35 
RBS 
Market cap. 4.52 21.84 31.21 99.55 11.85 5.80 (UK) 
profit before tax 1.67 6.23 13.65 19.47 
-59.37 
HSBC Share price 8.11 11.70 16.04 16.89 9.51 5.50 
(Hong Market cap. 65.40 108.06 177.10 194.99 112.32 94.68 
Kong) profit before tax 6.57 8.00 20.97 24.21 9.31 
Share price 23.19 47.10 48.53 29.44 6.71 2.53 
Citigroup 
Market cap. 265.80 147.06 38.89 13.94 (US) 
profit before tax 28.56 0.78 
-53.06 
Share price 30.06 31.48 46.15 41.26 14.08 6.82 
BoA 
Market 51.82 cap. 49.08 156.91 183.11 70.64 43.68 (US) 
profit before tax 8.05 10.46 24.48 20.92 4.43 
Sources: share prices: http: // www. aoogle. c om/financ e, httn: //riina nce. y_ahoo. com/ and 
httg: Hwww sse com. cn/ssenortal/webarm/d ataoresent /aueryindexc np? indexC ode=00 )00I &inde 
xName=; profit and number of shares: offi cial websites of the banks, e. g. RBS: 
http: //www. rbs. com/, Citigroup: htU2: //%v%vw. citiizrou2 
. 
com/. 
Notes: When the share price data of 31 D ecember 1 998 do not exist, we use the earliest 1999 
January figure instead; Share price: $; M arket cap: $ billion; Profit before tax: $ billion; the 
market cap. is calculated by: Market cap. =No of shares * share price; the exchange rate we use 
are from: http: //tinance. yahoo. com/currenc y-convert er? u#from=CyyBP-to=lJS1)4anit-I; 
Dec-98 Dec-01 Dec-05 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mur-09 
RMB: $ 7.3046 6.8346 6.8359 
£: $ 1.664 1.4562 1.72 1.98 1.46 1.43 
HKD: $ 7.7459 7.8003 7.7536 7.7979 7.7506 7.7504 
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7.4 Policy Implications of the Financial Crisis to the Further 
Reform of Chinese Banking Sector 
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis has wrecked havoc in the worldwide 
economy and invokes the need for major reform of the global financial system. 
Various proposals have been put forward by international organizations and 
policymakers that stress the necessity of strengthening financial regulation and 
supervision. It involves the balancing of several issues. The current crisis was 
blamed on profit-driven bankers who were motivated by short-term measures 
such as quarterly profit results and their year-end bonus. Therefore an effective 
corporate governance system should be designed to balance the short- and 
long-term profits, as well as short- and long-term risks and reward the 
managements accordingly. Another issue, the operational scope of banks, also 
triggered substantial controversies. The relationship between the traditional 
"narrow banking", deposit taking, extending loans and providing payment 
services, and a more complex financial product and service provider is again, a 
trade-off. Thirdly, financial innovation and development of the quasi-private 
market should be subject to increased oversight from associated regulatory 
departments. Their positive effect of wealth generation and risk diversification 
needs to be balanced with the potential risk involved. And finally, the extent to 
which the policy makers should influence the banks' decision making is 
another critical issue. Excessive political influence to the banks' operation 
should be avoided while ensuring that banks are managed effectively under the 
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general guidelines. 
Apart form these "balancing issues", other aspects, such as reforming the IMF 
and World Bank to restore the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions; 
increasing international regulatory cooperation, especially the effective support 
from emerging countries; strengthening supervision and independence of the 
credit rating agencies; expending the coverage and quality of capital 
requirements to provide adequate buffer during crisis; enhancing human 
resource development to provide sufficient qualified people engaging in 
regulatory and supervisory work, had also been addressed. Each country should 
adjust their financial system according to their different situations. 
For China, despite the banking industry disclosing positive financial results in 
2008, the worsening global financial crisis, sluggish capital markets, interest 
rate adjustment and the sharp drop in the foreign demand of Chinese goods 
imposed greater downward pressure to their operation in 2009. The slowdown 
in the Chinese house market had impaired banks' profitability. Banks could no 
longer rely on expanding mortgage-lending business to boost profit in 2009. 
All the major SOBs acted prudently towards the approval of new personal 
housing loans, ensuring limited exposure of risk. For instance, mortgage 
lending to total loans of the ICBC in the first half of 2009 contracted to 12.9%, 
which was 0.3% lower than the same period of the previous year. In addition, a 
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series of interest rate adjustments from the PBOC reduced the net interest rate, 
directly leading to a decline of the banks' net income. While the downward 
trend has slowed since the second quarter of 2009, net interest income and 
operational income of the ICBC, for example, had declined by 11.9% and 4.3% 
respectively by the end of June 2009 (Official Website of ICBC). Facing 
increased competition, the banks need to accelerate business innovation to 
broaden income sources and cut expenditures to maintain healthy and 
robustness growth. 
Hit by the US credit crunch, cash-strapped foreign banks started to off load 
their stakes in local lenders from the end of 2008 when the three-year lockup 
period expired. UBS sold its entire holding of 1.3% BOC stake on 31 
December 2008, which initiated sell off of China holdings by foreign investors 
(Kjetland, 9 January 2009). This was quickly followed by BOA, which 
trimmed 2.5% off its 19.1 % stake in CCB on 5 January 2009 and RBS, which 
off loaded its 4.3% stake in BOC on 14 January for $2.4 billion. Although 
HSBC bucked against the trend by reaffirming its strategic partnership with 
BOCOM, it was expected that such selling will continue during 2009 (Morrow, 
February 2009). Investment from foreign banks with global reputations assisted 
Chinese banks in an array of projects and eased their way to list overseas 
successfully in 2005 and 2006 (Leow and Fitzpatrick, 8 January 2009). 
However, the central government could not rely on the strategy of using 
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foreign expertise to build a world-class banking system now. Instead, the 
Chinese banks need to map out plans for foreign divestment and to prepare for 
the possible liquidity problems caused by capital flight. On the other hand, 
turbulent financial market led to the value of many world-renown institutions 
substantially undervalued, which gave the Chinese banks an excellent 
opportunity to refine their investment portfolios. In December 2007, the ICBC 
bought 20% of South Africa's Standard bank Group for $5.5 billion, sending a 
strong signal to the world that Chinese banks had begun the move to 
prominence on the world stage (Timewell, December 2007). Nonetheless, the 
banks should take steps cautiously to avoid expanding too rapidly, in particular 
for the SOBs, due to cultural differences and lack of experiences (Leow and 
Carew, 22 September 2008). 
In response to the tough economic condition, the Chinese government unveiled 
a series of key adjustment policies and rescue packages to expand domestic 
demand and promote development, which also in turn proposed great 
opportunities to the further development of banks. While the rest of world is 
still suffering from the lingering effects of the financial crisis, Chinese bank 
lending has been expanded rapidly. In the first half of 2009, bank loans totalled 
RMB 7.4 trillion, three times the pace in the same period of last year and the 
strongest six-month lending surge on record (Roach, 29 July, 2009). In the year 
2009, total bank lending surged to more than RMB 9 trillion (Cookson, 6 
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January 2010). ICBC's new loans in the third quarter more than doubled to 
RMB 144 billion from a year earlier while BOC issued RMB 388 billion worth 
of new loans in the same period, more than eight times it lent a year earlier 
(Anderlini, 30 October 2009). However, such over-expansion of loans had not 
fully translated into correspondingly larger profits for the banks as the 
government slashed lending rates faster than deposit rates at the end of last 
year to cope with the crisis. Increase in the net profit of ICBC, BOC and CCB 
in the third quarter of 2009 was only 19%, 19% and 18.6% respectively 
compared with same period last year. Nevertheless, the outlook for Chinese 
banks is less certain as huge jump in loan granting is unlikely to be sustained, 
not to say the potential risk of bad debt and asset bubble. Such outsized bank 
directed investment stimulus raised serious concern about the quality of the 
loans. As most of the funds have gone to local government backed entities to 
help in the financing of their stimulus-related infrastructure projects, rather 
than credit-starved small businesses, the situation is unlikely to get as bad as in 
the 1990s, when NPL ratio of the banks could be as high as 50% (Batson, 15 
January 2009). Nevertheless, how long such aggressive credit expansion can be 
maintained remains uncertain. While benefiting from investments in 
infrastructure projects to boost loan income and engineering cost consultancy 
business, the banks need to act prudently as bad debt and over capacity could 
return to haunt the banks in the future. 
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Moreover, in the process of continued globalisation, Chinese commercial banks 
need to further strengthen their risk management ability to become more 
resistant to the increasingly complicated and volatile business environment. 
Cooperating with other institutions, the banks need to build up their customer 
credit tracking system to ensure limited risk exposure in future loan granting. 
Financial innovation is important in banks' profit generation and risk 
diversification. However, how to use these new financial mechanisms to 
amplify their positive effects is crucial for the development of Chinese 
commercial banks. 
Last but not least, to avoid any further risks associated with the US securities, 
the Chinese government should adjust the weight of its US investment assets in 
its whole foreign reserves. By the end of 2008, around $130-IS0 billion 
Chinese foreign reserves were invested in the US mortgage securities. If the 
crisis becomes worse, this will directly result in $10-12 billion loss within the 
next three years (Wang and Fan, 2008). Additionally, after several interest rate 
cuts, the yield on US government bonds had dropped significantly. If the 
Chinese government could swap part of the US government bonds to some 
highly undervalued but yet good quality MBS and redeem them back when the 
crisis is over, higher investment proceeds can be generated. This could also 
have some positive effects on appeasing the fluctuation of the international 
financial market. 
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7.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we first review the negative impact of the US credit crunch on 
world economy and then shift our discussion to whether a similar crisis might 
be replicated in China. As the Chinese and the US housing and financial 
markets shared some similarities recently, it has been argued that another round 
of financial turbulence originated from the Chinese house market might be 
coming soon. 
Three reasons, aggressive interest rate adjustments, irresponsible lending 
activities of the banking and non-banking mortgage originators, and asset 
securitization were regarded as the fuse for the US sub-prime crisis. China 
possesses two of the above conditions. However, given the specific nature of 
the Chinese economy and culture, it had also been argued that what happened 
in the US today would hardly occur in China in the same way. 
In 2008, China's GDP continued to grow at a high level of 9%, despite natural 
disasters and the slump of global financial markets. Thanks to limited exposure 
to US sub-prime mortgage, the performance of most Chinese commercial 
banks have not been critically impaired. However, rising consumer prices, 
energy shortages, a struggling stock market and a cooler housing market 
suggest that China, especially its commercial banks, cannot be complacent 
about a potential house market crash and wider financial crisis. Instead, China 
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should review the causes of this crisis critically, grasping the opportunity to 
strengthen their own operations and be prepared for increased competition in 
future. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Further Research 
Directions 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis discusses the development of Chinese financial system and its 
influence on the wider economy in three aspects. These comprise the effect of 
stock listing on banks' corporate governance improvement; the efficiency of 
Chinese commercial banks and impact of the US credit crunch on China's 
financial sector and its commercial banks. 
After a series of bank reforms, Chinese reformers adopted partial privatization 
approach through stock listing as the final step in the process to strengthen 
bank performance. Starting from 1999, the government injected funds or 
stripped-off NPLs that totalled RMB 2.62 trillion from the three biggest SOBs 
to help them build up a sound balance sheet. The pilot bank CCB was 
successfully listed on the HKSE in October 2005, followed by the BOC and 
ICBC in 2006. By the end of 2007,14 Chinese commercial banks had been 
listed. The market reacted positively to these listings, which coincided with a 
bullish run of the Chinese stock markets. 
One fundamental objective of stock listing is to improve the corporate 
governance practice of listed firms and consequently their performance. To get 
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a detailed understanding of in what aspects had the corporate governance of the 
listed banks been improved after IPO, the CCB was chosen to conduct a case 
study in Chapter 3. The 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance was 
employed as the analytical criteria. Through careful comparison of annual 
reports of CCB from 1999 to 2008,1 found that in all major areas required by 
the Principles, the bank had displayed a very high level of compliance. For 
instance, in the area of Disclosure and Transparency, the CCB clearly outlined 
the operating and regulatory structures and risks to its investors and had good 
tracking records of communications. The requirements of OECD Principles on 
equitable treatment of shareholders, rights of shareholders and the provision of 
a framework for effective corporate governance had also been well followed by 
the bank. 
However, despite outstanding improvements, flaws in some fundamental 
aspects of its corporate governance still existed. The highlighted responsibility 
of the independent non-executive directors was not fully reflected in its board 
composition. In most of the sample period even after stock listing, the 
percentage of independent NED of CCB was about 30%, just passing the 
threshold of HKSE but far less than the higher requirement of NYSE. This 
level of independent director disabled board of CCB to exercise its function, 
such as monitoring complex transactions effectively. As more Chinese 
companies attained stock listing in recent years and the pool of qualified people 
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been built up, CCB should try to attract more of these high-quality independent 
directors to address the current imbalanced board and consequently to achieve 
better corporate governance in future. 
Nevertheless, clear changes and significant improvements had been identified 
since the bank obtained listing in 2005, which was also consistent with our 
hypothesis. In addition, due to the US credit crunch in 2007 and the subsequent 
world-wide financial crisis from October 2008, financial markets throughout 
the world had plummeted but the annual reports of the Chinese commercial 
banks continued to show encouraging results. These raise our central research 
question: the extent to which China's recent efforts to partial privatise SOBs 
via stock listing had helped improve bank efficiency. In chapter 6, employing 
data of the 14 listed Chinese commercial banks from 1999 to 2008. both 
non-parametric (DEA) and the parametric (SFA) approach were applied to 
estimate the efficiency rating of the listed banks. 
We first applied the DEA-CCR, constant return to scale model. The mean 
efficiency of the listed Chinese commercial banks was about 0.86, suggesting 
that there was still significant potential for further efficiency improvement. 
With an average efficiency score of 0.79, performance of the SOBS remained 
poorer than the JECBs (0.89) and the CCBs (0.87), despite the latest reforms 
focusing on them. Within 139 sample DMUs, 13 were fully efficient but none 
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of them was state-owned. 
Result of the scale economy estimation showed that in average, about 7% of 
the DEA-CCR inefficiencies came from the scale diseconomies. For the SOBs, 
this ratio was as high as 18%, indicating that they were the most scale 
inefficient banks. To assess the pure technical efficiency of the banks, we 
further apply the DEA-BCC, or various return to scale model. The overall 
efficiency rating using this approach improved significantly to 0.92, with the 
efficiency gap among different banking groups reduced greatly over the years. 
The mean efficiency of the SOBs reached 0.96 and became the most efficient 
banking group among all the listed banks, implying that the main source of 
inefficiency of the SOBs came from scale diseconomies. Despite continued 
improvement of their productivity and profitability, large overhead expenses 
due to redundant staffing and over-expansion made the overall efficiency of the 
SOBs still inferior to the JECBs. In terms of pure technical efficiency, however, 
the SOBs had already outperformed all other banks. 
In the following part, we applied the parametric approach, SFA. The average 
technical efficiency of the 14 listed banks over 10 years sample period was 
0.95, improving steadily from 0.88 in 1999 to over 0.99 in 2008. Similar to the 
DEA results, the SFA also identified a converged movement of efficiency 
rating among different banking groups. Despite the JECBs still leading the 
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whole banking industry, the SOBs and CCBs had caught up rapidly and 
reduced the mean efficiency gap from more than 10% before 2001 to less than 
1% in 2007 and 2008. 
In terms of the effect of stock listing on banks' efficiency improvement, all 
three models support the hypothesis. DEA-CCR model reported that the 
average efficiency score of the banks was 6% higher in their IPO year while 
the figure under SFA estimation was 2.5%. However, it was also identified that 
the efficiencies of several banks deteriorated immediately after IPO. This 
worsening performance may reflect the earlier "window-dressing" of the 
balance sheets before IPO year or it may simply a reflection of the tough 
economic conditions worldwide in 2008. Therefore further research becomes 
necessary. 
Apart from calculating the efficiency ratings, we also estimated the technical 
inefficiency model to explore the determinants of bank efficiency. Both DEA 
and SFA result suggested that four variables-ownership, IPO, t, E/A and GDP 
growth-influence the efficiency of the banks significantly. The SOBs were 
less efficient than the non-state owned banks over the sample period and the 
IPO could improve the efficiency of listed banks by about 5%. 
To examine the robustness of the estimated efficiency ratings, we first tested 
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the correlation of efficiency scores estimated by DEA-CCR and SFA 
techniques, then compared their rank-order correlations and finally compared 
the frontier results with the traditional performance indictors. Our findings 
were consistent with prior literatures. The efficiency scores estimated by the 
two approaches were not directly comparable, whereas their ranking orders 
were fairly closely correlated. Both measures were found to be related to 
financial indictors to some extent, while the SFA proved to be a better 
approximation of traditional performance measures. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, we analysed the possible spill over effect of the US credit 
crunch on China's financial market. Three factors, aggressive interest rate 
adjustments, irresponsible lending activities of the banking and shadow 
mortgage originators, and asset securitization were regarded as the fuse for the 
US sub-prime crisis. China possesses two of the above conditions. However, 
the specific nature of the Chinese economy and culture suggested that the US 
experience was unlikely to reoccur in China in the near future. Fast 
development of the Chinese economy boosted income of the household and 
consequently promoted the prosperity of the Chinese real-estate market. Rising 
house prices had been well supported by real market demand. In addition, the 
consumption and saving habits of the Chinese people and their risk-averse 
tradition meant that Chinese mortgage borrowers were less likely to default on 
bank loans compared to their western counterparts. However, rising consumer 
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prices, energy shortages, astruggling stock market and a cooler housing market 
suggested that China, especially its commercial banks, cannot be complacent 
about a potential house market crash and wider financial crisis. 
The world financial turmoil invokes the need for major reform of the global 
financial system and it could also be valued as a "once in a century" 
opportunity for China to speed up its economic convergence with the 
industrialized world. In the process of continued globalization, the Chinese 
banks need to further strength their risk management ability through importing 
advanced risk control system of the foreign banks and building up their own 
credit tracking system to reduce risk exposure in future loan granting. 
Moreover, facing increased competition after the entrance of foreign banks, the 
Chinese banks need to accelerate business innovation to broaden income 
sources and cut expenditures to maintain healthy and robustness growth. 
8.2 Further Research Directions 
Large scale listing of Chinese commercial banks has only begun. Efficiency 
issues will attract more attention as the reform of the Chinese financial system 
goes further. This is the first study to apply two different frontier approaches to 
explore the relationship between efficiency improvement and IPO. Although 
the results confirmed the positive effect of listing on efficiency improvement 
and provided enormous management implications, the impact of prices changes 
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have not been considered in the technical efficiency analysis. When price 
information, such as wages of the employees, is available, cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency analysis can be conducted by both DEA and SFA again to 
provide a more comprehensive measure of the performance of the Chinese 
commercial banks. 
In addition, as five out of our 14 sample banks were listed on the stock 
exchanges in 2007 and their performance might be influenced significantly by 
the 2008 US financial crisis, our conclusion about the deterioration in the 
efficiency rating after IPO year may need to be reviewed. When the banks have 
chalked up a few more years on the exchanges, we can replicate this research 
to obtain new average efficiency scores. In particular, we could compare the 
three years prior listing with the three years after to evaluate the effect of the 
IPO on the efficiency of banks while controlling for the influence of external 
market fluctuations related to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
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